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At 7t55 on Sunday xorrdap, December ?, 19^1 # Japanese carrier
aircraft struck a surpristng and devastating; blow against American
forces at Pearl Harbor. >'lth tk» detonation of the first bomb the
problem of what America* role should bo in the luropeem and the
reelftc vara was decided, ftlplemsey and enforcement of United States
Pacific policy by moral and legal admonitions and even belated eoonm-Uo
sanctions had failed. 3o had such noble documents as tho STine Power
Treaty of 1922. tho Xelloftfc-ttrland Pact, and arms limitation agree-
ments, tho foellof that American security could bo maintained by
isolation and neutrality had also boon proven false.
Tho problem was now s Military *n»t *nd In tho end American air
power was to be the key to victory in the Pacific, $ut few — not even
the nest arid airoower advocates — could have predicted with any
certainty in December 19*H that this would bo the case. America had
begun to awaken to the reality of world events in late 1933 and
inaugurated a rapid rearmament program, Since then more and more
attention had been {riven to strengthening America** airpower. and
while preparations were In full progress in late 19^1* it was a elasslo
ease of too little, too late. In the 1920* * end 1939* s the United
States government had failed to adhere to a cardinal principle that
armaments and a nation9 s preparedness must coincide with and be able
to sustain a nation* s commitments and foreign policy* this mistake
was proving to be a costly one.
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The Pearl Harbor attack we* net the first uw of air power In
Pacific relations or In war planning. The airman© had played an
important role in the strategic and operational planning of both the
United >tatos and Japan sine* tho end of <Jorld War I* Japan had boon
uaing air power alaoat with tspunltcr in pursuit of her national policy
alnee 1931*
It la the purpose of this paper to describe and assess the role
played by military air power in the Paeifio daring the years between
<orld rfar I and yerld War II. While this is but a prsiittlaery survey
for a much more eomprohensivs thesis , enough Material has been examined
to provide a fairly complete picture of aviation development* air
doctrine, and air power's role in the war plMm of the period* iome
coverage is unavoidably thin doe to non-availability of reliable or
adequate information. In many t*m* extensive archival research will
be required to remedy this.
The organisation of the material for a survey such as this presents
a problem. A ehronoiegloci approach has been chosen * and chapters are
divided according to what are considered major periods for this subject.
Within each chapter a functional approach has been deemed neoesaary in
order to maintain seme order.
There Is also the problem of defining the term "air power. 5* An
understanding of what a writer means by this term Is essential in
reading any work on the subject, and unfortunately it has assumed a
plethora of meanings. For purpose of definition this paper will use
*alr power1* to mean military aviation -» both tactical and strategic —
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that exists for the propose of laflioting ^«stf,e upon an mam? fro*
the *ir# &11« It is impossible to exclude completely other aspects
of aviation Aram a nation* a total air power* those are treated hero
aa outside the soope of this study*
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MG&Qwmmi 1905-1919 — Dirumcf * vflui pumas akd axe pomr
Th* y*ara froa 1905 to 1919 are important for both * *t\xtj of
United ;tatea-4ao«nene relations and for * study of air power. By 1905
America and Japan wore well-committed to policies in tho for j*et which
were ineosspatable and future friction win likely to bo inevitable. 1905
also marked tho second anniversary of nan's first heavier-than-air
flight, Th* danger of armed conflict between tho United States*
committed to maintaining ths Open Door In China and to defending tho
newly acquired Philippine Islands, and Japan* soaking to extend nor
political and economic influence on tho oontiftoat of Asia and looking
askance at what sho thought to bo tho menacing position of America* s
far Eastern policy* could bo soon without much difficulty. On tho
other hand* tho war potential of tho now flying-machine was not so
quickly grasped. 3y tho end of *forld War X the airplane had proven
Itself as an effective weapon of war* although its full potential was
not fully recognised except by a few die-hard air enthusiasts.
Those years are sore than a convenient frame of reference upon
which one can base a narrative. They are the real background to
Pearl Harbor. The policies chosen and the basic premises of war plans
that were established in these years were to remain enaaingly constant
until the outbreak of tforld War II in the Pacific.

2Till DIPLOMATIC SACXOaoOSS
Traditional American Far ;£estern policy centered around
protecting the comereial interests of the United States In China and
Japan* In pursuit of thia the United States sought no territorial
gains and no special commercial privileges other than thoae available
to all on a moat-favored-nation basis. vty 1900 thia traditional
Open Door policy was focused on China and was interpreted by the
United itatea aa having been accepted by other ^ar Saatem power*.
July of that year Secretary of itate John Hay in a circular note* X*
better known aa the ieoortd Open Door note added to thia policy the
preservation of China's territorial and administrative entity when he
proclaimed that United itatea policy was
to seek a solution which amy bring about permanent safety
and peace to China, pr***rt* Chineee territorial and
administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to
friendly powers by treaty and International law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and
Impartial trade with all parte of the Chineee Japire, 1
This was a noble policy, and one to which the United States
officially remained committed until the Pearl Harbor attack, .-ttiile
secretaries of State usually presented only words to fight violation
of it as Japan closed the Open Door from 1931 =»»» America was
unwilling to back away from it and sanction Japanese aggression*
Perhaps Theodore loosevelt was correct in 1910 when he wrote to
President Taft that "the Open Door policy in China waa an excellent
thing ... so tw as it can be maintained by general diplomatic
1. A. «ftitney Orisweld, flmy Far .^astern, Policy of m United itatea
(Sew Kavem Tale University Press, 1962), pa. 501-502*

3eireestent. bat . * • the Open Soor policy * . . completely disappears
** soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it» *ad i*
willing to ran the risk of war rather than forego its intention,*
With tha annexation of tha Hawaiian and Philippine Islands and
Ouam in 1593 tha Unitad states was wall on lta way towards heoomlng
a Pacific power — a nova ©omaleted with tha opening of tha t'anama
Canal in 191^. *ith an expanded empire • Jaaeriean far Eastern policy
took on a new distensions guaranteeing the security of these possessions*
iuch eon®itmenta as the shore and the preservation of the Open Door
required adequate strength to back thaw if they were to be strong
policy, or also they should have been either Modified or abandoned*
the United States from 1900 to 19H chose neither* and while the Open
Door slowly disappeared as a viable policy when Japanese policies
challenged it* the United States refused to recognise this* It is
within this basic framework that this study of air power and Far
Eastern policies will take place*
Japan frost the last decades of the nineteenth century had taken
great strides toward becoming a world power* Although she was
physioally and financially exhausted at the WiA of the &ussoWapanese
War In 1905* her surprising defeat of Russia brought world recognition
that Japan had taken her place as a Pacific power* In order to retain
this status and to gain an even stronger position Japan* in addition i»See*«»)a-
to Internal development and growth, was determined to become militarily
even more powerful , to find economic and physical security by expansion
2* Griswold* ?*r pastern Policy , p. 132.

kin the Far East* to acquire not only Japanese hogeaony in that area,
but an empire as well,
% 1905 Japan had acquired the Kuril*', Benin* ayukyu and
Pescadores Islands* i*orao»s* a lease on tha Llme-tung Peninsula* the
southern half of Sakhalin, various footholds in southern Manchuria
and recognition by Russia, Groat Britain and tha United States of her
paramount interests in Korea"*- a nation which she annexed in 19i0«
With such a base and few obstacles (oven encouragement) Iron other
powers, Japan* s appetite was whetted, and the story of Japan's attempts
at fulfillment of what was now teemed as her historic mission* Is the
story of the road to Pearl Harbor*
Japanese expansionist designs were no secret to the United itates
diplomats, government officials and military planners, Even
Theodore Hoesevelt became apprehensive in 1905* ?ioosevelt*s concern
over these designs plus Japanese resentment over what was becoming
another factor in United itates Pacific policy* the exclusion of
Asiatic immigrants from the United states, and Japanese public
sentiment that the tJnited States was to blame for what was felt to be
a less than satisfactory Treaty of Portsmouth, led to increasing
friction in Japanese»Amerlcan relations. The resul + *«4 war scare of
190&.03 coincided with the first of a series of war plans in the
United States and Japan which provided guidelines for action against
each other,
During *&rld War X the collapse of the balance of power in Asia
prompted Japan to seise Germany* s Northern Pacific islands* occupy
3* Srlswold. Par eastern Policy , p^. 9i* 119-120. 125.

<viaochow la China, invade Siberia and make political and economic
demands of China* acceptance of which would have boon tantamount
to J •panose domination of China, the United States replied to these
Twenty-One «<enand* with Jecretary of rftate ..'illlaa Jennings i$vp*n!9
«on»jrecoi?nition statement In which Japan and China were notified that
the United states would not recognise
any at-reeaent or undertaking which haa been entered
Into or which may he entered Into between the
Governments of Japan and China* impairing the
treaty right* of the United jUtes and Its cltlsens
in Chin*, the political or territorial integrity of
the tepubUe of China* or the international policy
relative to China commonly known a« the Open Door
policy.*
Japan* • demands before this had been modified somewhat and
aooeptod by Chin*, iere Bryan* a caveat seems to have had little
affect* largely because Japan felt the United States was not prmp&rmd
to challenge Japan openly. ^ Strained relations were eased somewhat
In Kevember 191? by the Lanslnf^Xshii Agreement in which Japan
appeared to adhere to the principles of Hay*» Second Coon Door note.
But this agreement also Included a recognition by each party "that
territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries*"
and accordingly the United States recognized "that Japan has special
interests in China." Japan interpreted this to mean American
recognition of her paramount influence and position in Hanehuria*
4. Grlswold. Far Astern Policy , pp. 19^-195.
5. George K. ieckman* The Hodornisaj.frp of Ch^na end Japan (Jfssr Torkt
Sarper and Row, 1962)* p. 353.
6. auhl J. Bartlett* ed.* ?ho accord pf.ta^mMHPW (3d ed,,
Umt Xorfc* Alfred A, Knopf* I960), s, #41*

6Mongolia and Shantung* but this sesme unrealistic* A better inter-
pretation la that this was a "stop-gap acasure . * . a
concession to the gnat of Japanese imperialism" while the United States
7
prepared to face nor* serious problems In .itarops,,
'41th the fall of Cserist fSussla In tha revolution of 1917 the
balance of power In 4ata received another blow, and Japan eagerly
eought a^n smsuae to ejttend her control into Sierthem Manchuria and
eastern Liberia* **hon an international expeditionary force was
organicad In August 1218, Japan was only too eager to participate and
in the end eont some 72#QQ0 troops (compered with 9.000 iuterleams}
into -Iberia^ The opportunity to expand into Northern ttenehuria was
not missed either, rhe United States participated primarily in order
to restrain Japan* s activities* and when Japan failed to withdraw her
forces at the end of the war* another thorn was inserted into United
States -Japanese relations* The Japanese Siberian &qpsdttl0n provided
ons noro glimpse of events to eoae. iith the dispatch of troops
by the Japanese government the natter beoaas a military one* and
the Japanese Amy's General Staff , testing advantage of its autonomy
of command which was sanctioned by the sei^l Constitution*' not only
7. Sriswold, J*p mfcm ftiPMT* P* »?• ^ „
8* ieetaan, ?ho Modernisation of China and Japan, pp* 3e>>3#>..
9* Under the Meiji Constitution of 13*9 the snperor «frotained,, command
of the armed forces of J*paua, and the Amy and ttevy General Staffs
were responsible directly to hi» rather than to the cabinet for
action of the ailitary forces* UoX only did the civilian government
thus look complete control over the military* but the General Staffs
had what amounted to an effective veto over cabinet action through
their control over the selection of the Amy end ttavy Ministers*
Effective control of the Military depended on a strong and unified
political and nllltary leaderehip* or a strong emperor. >ee
John K. FSirbank* Edwin 0* ^elseheuer and Albert , ireig,
'»•* A0fti Ify floflwm ftmfomVw (Bostom **&&** Himm
Company, 19$5)» pp. 296-397*

7««nt in many more troops than originally agreed upon, but rofito«d to
withdraw them when requested to do so by tho government* iiere ma the
first clear mm in modem JapameM foreign policy of "dual
diplomacy." i0
At tho Paris Veace Conference from January 12 until Juno 28, 1919.
President Voodrow Wilson fought a determined battlo to bring about tho
restoration of Shantung to China and tho Internatlon&lisstion of tho
former German Pacific Islands, arguing that their only -value was
military and that control of those islands by Japan would make defense
of tho Philippines impossible* >/llson waa dotomlnod to go all-out,
not only to chock Japanese expansion, but to find a solution for
bringing: permament peace and adherence to the policies of the Open Door
to the far Cast. 3ut Japan came armed as well. In addition to her
determination to push to a conclusion her program of expansion and her
quest for great power recognition, she already had secret agreements
backing her island claims and fresh commitments from China to certain
of the ?wenty«0no Demands*
Wilson's Paris offensive against the Japanese challenge to America*
»
?ar Eastern policy was not successful* The German "forth Pacific Island*
were granted Japan under a mandate, and German rights in shantung were
transferred to Japan, although S^pttn gave her word to restore this
area to China* Added to these serious points of contention was the
continuing problem of the Japanese in Liberia, a growing naval armaments
race and immigration problems* It was seen in both Tokyo and Caehin#ton
that the situation was a serious and dangerous one with war not an
impossibility.
10* fairbank, .lelsohauer and Craig, < *et Amis, p, 563*
11* Louis Norton, w «'ar Plan OranM*"^oxTrmitlea * Vol. 11. Mo* 2
(January. 1959) # P* 22fc*

8Thus at the end of /iorld isfar I* the national policies of Japan
end the United Itetea clearly defined* weU-Jraown to each other sad
were seen to bo on s collision course. The defeat of Germany sjid the
.lusaian revolution had so altered ths balance of power In the f*r loot
that It wis fslt that the collision could come any moment*
tfftft PUfttias 1900-1919
With tho emergence of the United States and Japan as Pacific
powers both nations recognised a need for taking not only steps to
defend tho homeland, and dispersed territorial possessions* but for
support of foreign policies as well. This led to abandonnent of tho
vague * relatival/ staple and unspeolfle concepts of defense that had
guided those nations to tho beginning of the twentieth century * and
ushered in tho age of war planning* 3asie principles of strategic
war planning wore adopted by 1907 and those wore to serve with only s
few variations until 19**1 and after* There were modifications and
refinement of plans* not tho least of which was the introduction of
air power* and how well each nation Implemented these is another
natter. From 190? Japan and tho Onited States placed each other high
on their list of potential enemies* sad by 1916 both had reached tho
number one position.
while the airplane was being accepted as a military weapon by
both nations In this period* it was not to enter as a major factor
In war planning until after World tor I. aut even before military
aviation had come of age in World War X far-sighted military experts la
tits United States envisaged the aircraft as playing an Important role

9its the nafense of the Philippines. Japan was not Idle In planning
for the use of aircraft la pursuit of her national policies. ?his
was cbown by her limited though effective use of *ir power at fsingtao
In t91^
/uwrica's i'aoifie policy as of the beginning of the twentieth
century »«s boon eussnarised* It was the tasfc of ailitery policy to
forstulate plans to support those policies. At the torn of the twentieth
century the United states found itself for the first ttae in Its history
s world power with responsibility for defending outposts far fro* Its
continental shores, the foundation of American Pacific strategy at
this tins of necessity had to ho sea power. Tho defense of tho
Philippines and support of United States policies* In tho Far East
required a powerful float that could operate in tho Western Pacific
,
and this required adequate and weUUdefended basos in tha Pacific*
Dofonso of thoso basos and successful defenses of insular possessions
iUce tha Philippines, 3uea and Hawaii also required strong* mobile
turn? foroos and fortifleationsi and this presented the need for strong
Amy and ISavy oooperation if Pacific strategy was to be suooossful.
To promote this oooperation the Secretaries cf 4$a- and the Mavy
established in 1903 the Joint ifeard, an advisory body of four offleers
from each service. 3y 100k the Joint Board had node its asin task the
development of nar plans* These vers to be a series of joint action
plant for oooperation In an energeney, based upon studies by the Havy*s
General doard and the Amy's General Staff* These plans were soon
color-coded, with contingencies planned for eaoh nation with which the
^
**•*«**»'
J. Turnball and Clifford L. Lord, fmmM^WJfoP*
Savel Aviation (Mew liaveat Tale University Press, 19*9; • p. 22.
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Jnited States was liteeiy to b* involved. Japan was assign*** the color
The Orange plana of th« Joint Beard were to provld* the overall
strategic concept* audi missions la ease of conflict against Japan and
trm this oaoh service was to develop Ita ova plana, This process
was to be carried on down to the field and fleet eo>*manderB,*3
The basic preoccupation of the Joint Board at this time* aa it
waa to be for over 30 years, waa defense of the Philippines. *Hen
tension between the United States and Japan In the sassier of i'W
wade war seen possible. War Plan Orange, and especially the position
of the Philippine* in this plan, received careful examination. The
Joint Board reooasaended that the fleet be sent to the far 2aet as soon
as possible ft and that Army and Mavy Philippine forces be prepared to
defend the small naval station at Subic Bay.
The key to successful defense of the Philippines and protection
of American interests in the far £aat was a strong naval base and
fleet baaed in the Philippines. The statement by the Joint j*»ard
in July 1907 after taking Steele of Japanese strength in the western
Pacific is significant. Concerning the Philippines in the event of
war* the Soerd stateet w Fho United states would be compelled to take
a defensive attitude in the Pacific and maintain that attitude until
reinforcements could be sent." In 1903 when the Joint »^oard and
Congress selected Pearl Harbor aa America* a major base in the Pacific,
the Philippine* were given a 9M0tv\$ry role In Pacific strategic
13. Norton, »«Jer Plan Orange," p. 222.
1*. Louis Morton, gq^pd ay^es Army
,fr aojftd, for fa 'The .-*ar fa the
Office of the Chief of Military History, department of the Army,
1962} , p. 2fr.
*5* ib|d., p. 23.
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plaimlag although a oooondary baao wm to b§ built on HtnUi $ay.
thua by 190S oonoopta that iioro to laat until tho ovo of Poarl Harbor
uoro oatabllahodj 1) dofonao of tho Phillpplnoa would bo dopondont
upon tho oacurlty of Ikwraii owl tho obUit/ •* poiaforoommto to
aovo wottward froa th*ro, 2) tho Philippines nor© to bo dofoadod as
veil *o possible from tho eeneentratlon of defenses around Hanlla 3ay#
16
end tho defenders were to hold out until reinforeawents eouid arrive.*
Doe to disagreements between aeabers on tho boot site for *
naval base la tho Attorn Pacific, tho Joint aoard beeaate less
effective After 199S « end only net twice during tiorld 'iter I* aefbre
this* though • Jxr Flan orange hod boon studied carefully, and It woo
tho assumption of tho pUnnopt from 1913 on that tho Philippines
would bo Japan1 s first objective In tho event of war. It was estimated
th*t the defenders would how to held for an estimated three to four
months, tho time required for tho fleet to arrive. After reinforcements
arrived tho Havv vat to talte tho offensive for oontrol of tho Western
Pacific, watto tho Army's role was to gain control on tho ground in
tho Philippines. ?
At tho end of World Mir I tho United States Army and 8avy were
confronted with a radically altorod strategic picture in tho far loot.
Japan' • strategic position waa so otronethonod aa a result of the war
and tho troatloa, that mv Japan remained virtually unchallenged by
any povor other than tho United States. Japan* a possession of tho
feraer Sermon Islands made tho defense of tho Philippines and tho
ll>. 'Morton . -Strategy and Cement*. , p. 23.
17. Norton* "War Plan Orange." PP. 222*223,
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possibilities of effective action la the far last sees very difficult
indeed. In addition, ailitary aviation had proved itself during the
war, and while attll in ita infancy no grsat iaaglnation was required
to foraaoa the throat that aircraft baaed on the mandated islands
could brlnf against .uaerlean shipping.*8
Paced with tho above plus increasing ill^rill between the
United States and Japan, ailitary leaders saw a greater need than
ever for effective joint planning. The Joint Board waa therefore
reorganised in the summer of i919# provided with a working committee
of plannars from toe two service* and given for the first time power
to originate studies on ita own initiative, 19 With new strength the
Joint Board returned once again to ita major problem, War flan Crange.
Before a realistic revision of Orange could be made, there wore
several dilemmas that had to be overcome, first, what waa America's
policy for the ?w Kaat, not only in view of postwar change* there,
but also in light of the Congressional premise in J9i6 of eventual
Philippine independence? 3inee military policy must serve national
policy, it wae imperative that the latter be clearly defined to
military planners, The answer to questions concerning what type of
operations should be planned io the event of hostilities with Japan and
whether the costs of ell-out efforts that might be n^d^d to uphold
United Statea Pacific policy would be prohibitive as far as the
national interest waa concerned had to come frea the ftate Departaent,
Also in question was the future ^t the League of Nation*. An effective
i^. Harold 3prout and Margaret Sprout, Toward a Hew Order af 3aa *ower
(Princeton! Princeton Unlverelty Proaa
'
; iMU p. %. ,f^*'
!£• Morton, «War ?Ua Orange," p, 225,
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Loagua would »ako obsoloto any war plan basod on tho aaaaaption of
a war batwoon tho Unload itato* and Japan alons. A clear definition
of Unltoa itataa policy am too noooooavy aaana of enforcing, this
«y tho sl&o qua son of roallstio planning, without this a &aj>
oould dorolop that sight bring disastrous vaults,
io in tba abaonoo of clear direction ailltary planning antarad
the postwar ara using saost of tba aosuttptiona of the yeara preceding*
Japan still ranked aa the most probable foo t atrategy was still to 90
priaarUy naval with strongly hold base* aoroaa tho Paelfi* aorvlng
aa keye to successful float action* tiswail remained tho key baao
with tho ^hillprilnoa ranking after Guam in priority, The Fbllipplne
jarrieon was atiU expected to resist a Japanese attack until ratief
arrived, out thla was beoooing largely a aoot question in view of
In Jaoan prior to 1902 there was aucn concern about national
dofonso and Japan* a destiny* but littlo In tho way of formal dofonao
planning exeeot for vague concepts which, with few exception*, were
largely defensive, 'no etrategic war plana voro to bo devised
gi
involving potential ononiaa until 1907*
rha *nglo-Japaneaa Alliance of 1902 gave aono impetus toward
strategic planning, At loaat tho Army began to rogard xuaaia as it*
Moat XXkaly foe, tilth victory in tho Kusse*Jepansse War in 1905 ond
M» Morton. *&* Plan Orange »« p. 227.
21. Jaburo Hayaehi* mm. fflt ffaftWfft. 'W P* *** ?**%$¥*»*
(juantloo, Virginias fhe serine Corp* Association, 1959)* p. It
fakushiro Battorl, "the Complete History of tho Greater ;*«t
Aaia *er" <h Vols., flpfr Tfrffi fllRMl ?ffl«ft*» *»*•» «•* ^hHshing
Company, 1953) • typewrlttar; ,ranalatio»» tfoo. ?80O2 t Offioo of
Chiof of Military History, Washington* Vol. I, ».

t*
aehievertent of several goals of national policy, the already dominant
role of national defense In politic* wae enhanced. Japanese strategic
outlook wae turning wore to offensive-minded operations now that
Russian naval sw»p In tho Far last had boon annihilated, and tho
army had gained a foothold on tho Asiatic mainland. 2* This offensive-
oriented approach was to laat until 19*1 for tho Japanese Amy.
In 190? aftmr £ieid Marshall famegeta had approaehod tho emperor
on tho nood for a national dofonao policy, tho Amy and Mavy ^upraise
Commands draftad tho riwt Imperial Dofonao Policy, had it approved
by tho srime sinister and sanotionod by tho onporor. this poll
provided for specific progrsmning to be done annually by the Amy and
?*avy, which would take tho fora of annual operational plana to run
each year fro* April to saroh. fho Imperial Defense Policy was to bo
based on high level estimates of tho international situation from a
standpoint of national defense. This policy was also to establish the
basis for the strength of the Amy and tfavy*^
rhe 1907 Imperial Defense Policy contained four wain clauses.
*irst, Japan pledged to defend herself against what she felt to be
her potential foesi Russia, the United states and China. Second,
Japan would seek to avoid war by diplomatic chamois as far as
possible, but if war became inevitable, she would fight her potential
enemies one at a tine. Third, against the United states the basic
strategy *>uld be a strategic defensive in the Western Faoifioi against
Russia the main goal wo aid be a decisive Hanohurlan campaign to destroy
onomy ground forces; and against China, the plan envisaged occupation
22. tiayashi. Kogua . p. 1.
23. "Japanese Operational Planning Against the tftSft, 1932-W5,"
Japanese Specie! Study on Sanehuria, Vol 1, Amy forces ?ar Seat,
1955# unpublished monograph on fU* , .-aahington, o. 13$
liattori, "Complete History," p. 250.
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and central of the key areas of north Mid central China* Y>»rth,
in the execution of tho above strategi© goals, the Amy would bo
charged wita tho prime responsibility for Russian operations and
would bo built up to the necessary strength to occupy in tho event
of war. tho rtarittas Provinces, and northern Sakhalin, while at tho
same tins securing Manchuria, tho savy*s responsibility would bo
to acquire tho necessary strength to command tho waters of tho
*estsrn i acific.
Tho 1907 policy postulated Ruasia aa tho number ono hypothetical
enemy of both tho Amy and ftevy, but in 5918 aftor tho fall of
arist Russia and with increasing animosity in tho rolatlona with tho
United Statoa v tho Imperial Dofonoo Policy underwent ita first
revision and tho United States rose to tho position of tho most
probable enemy of both services. Russia went to second piece with
China regaining in third. 25
More details of early Japanese war .planning hare not been found,
but hopefully this framework will be adequate for an understand
of subsequent chapters,
of Aia mum in ths rams stats
Japan and the United States were far from being strong in
military aviation at the start of tforld Uar I. The United 3tatee
aft«r inventing the airplane left it to others, notably trance and
Germany, to develop it as a military weapon. *%en the United States
*£ -layashi, ftogun . pp. 192-193.
25, *shl,
.Kofiun, p. Z\ XHsuo Puchida and ^asatake Ckumiya, Midway
t
the Battle That Doomed iasim < Annapolis * Onited States Havel
Institute, 1955), ?. 11,
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entered the war a tardy but vast expansion program was inaugurated
for military aviation* and while Americans contributed bravely and
not insignificantly to the war, the ttory of the United State* air
services In World rfar X have been aptly detoribed as "one of promise
26
rather than of achievement * w Japanese aviation participation was
even (tore limited* primarily due to her remoteness from the main
fields of battle* but Japan shoved that she was learning* Instead
of almost disastrous demobilisation of aviation ttnlts at the mvi of
the war* Japan was only beginning to seek the status of a first
class air power*
Sven before the .-fright brother* s successful flight in 1903
son* official attention had been given to experimentation in
heavler-than»air flying with thoughts directed toward the possibilities
of the use of such a Machine as a new weapon of war* While some
Halted appropriations were made to these early experiments * the
prevailing attitude then* as It was to be after the Kitty Hawk flight*
was one of skepticism and military conservatism* After 1903 there
were many* both in and out of the American military services* who ssw
what a great potential the airplane had* but the high-ranking officials
who made the decisions were not so easily convinced*
Progress* though slow* was forthcoming* In 190? the Aeronautical
Division of the Amy Signal Corps was established* and in 1909 this
division received its first aircraft* military aviation in the United
States was at last getting started* Growth was slow with sarly years
26. Office of Air force Ulster? * The Army Air Forces in <forld Var II
(Vol* 1, p^ans and Mto Operations * Lesley frank Craven and




devoted oriesatily to experimentation. The Navy not to bo outdone
stepped up its interest in aviation and by 1910 was engaged in
intensive investigation of the feasibility of aircraft as *n adjunct
to the fleet. That aircraft would operate successfully fro» ships
st sos was demonstrated in November 1910 9 when a successful launch
was nods from s ship, and in 1911 a successful "arrested" landing
In spits of generally favorable results frow early aviation,
development wont forward st a (mail's pace, Con&resa was not overly
generous as their 1911 appropriation of loss than 1200,000 for military
aviation placed America fourteenth among nations in aviation
27
appropriations —. below Greece and Bulgaria, 3ut Congress was not
entirely to blame. Here often than not it was the restraining hand
of tho War and #avy Departments that stood in the way of more rapid
29progress,**'
When the Suited States entered the European War in 1917, it had
no real air forces, only manpower* raw materials and enthusiasm.
Army aviation which had been given statutory recognition in 191*1 as
the Aviation Section of the iignal Corps* had acquired a total of
only 22*t airplanes from 1909 » none of which were true combat models
by fnrepeen standards • and few of these were still in commission, 2^
the liavy had only 21 seaplanes in service, although 135 more were
2"^. Craven and Cats, flans and garly, Operations , p. 6.
28. rurnbull and Lord, *Wm of On^tcd, fl^ss. Maval Aviation, p. 21.
29, Craven and Cats, Piano and -iarly Operations , p. 6.
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on ord«r.*> a. ,ntha.U«tle .«t wbltloua progrm. of nqMn.Ua .at
aobillaation to gat American air forces "over there" was started with
* generous boost from th* ovarsealoua promises and claims of air*
enthusiast* and * quickly-pasaed S#*0 #000 aviation appropriation from
Congress.™ Fulfillment of this overly ambitious end oversold
program did not proceed ss rapidly ss planned, and *»eriean aviators
had to rely on foreign equipment (at wall as foreign training) until
1918* America discovered that an aircraft industry or tralnsd air
foreos cannot bo built evemlfcht. this was a lesson quickly to bo
forgotten after world war I.
United itates amy aviation (redesignated again in 1913 as tho
Amy Air >*rvio« and removed from tho Signal Corps) and naval aviation
after a lata start performed wall, although their rolos were generally
as forces adjunctive to the ground force* and fleet* In this capacity
their slsalen was almost entirely tactical, with the bulk of flying
devoted to reeonnaisanee, patrol operations and air defense* though
tied to support of ground forces and tho fleet, American military
units did learn some valuable lessons, namely the concept of
concentration of force and counter-air offensive as the best way of
rendering support.
Unfortunately for the future development of United States air
power the war ended before American aviation reached its full strength
and reallaad its full potential, especially in aerial bombardment
30. William ar—n and John Pricker, fho Air Forces of the
(3*em York j Hanover House, i95®}# p» 310.
31. Craven and Cate, plans and Sarly Operations , p. 6.
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executed independently of the movements of ground fore**, Bod
America's aviators gained experience In this and proved lta value,
they could have spoken from experience rather than theory In arguing
for a more independent rolo for aviation during the interim between
the war*, As it was, those who advocated an air foroa tied to support
of {round foreaa could apoak from experience* The result was that
conventional ideas by which wars ara fought were to dominate military
thinking in ths years to come*
United states aviation In the Pacific daring thosa yaars was
of extremely limited scope* An &rmy training school was established
in tha Philippines in 1*12, and tha Army had a tactical squadron basad
in Hawaii from 1917* 3«t for tha United states tha air war was in
..urope, and any affectiv© use of aviation in tha Far &e*t at its
present stag* of development was out of the question*
Japan's development of Military aviation paralleled in many ways
that of the United utales • Japan's start in this field was slow,
primarily it would sees because of geographical remoteness, military
conservatism and a state of technological development that mad* it
difficult for Japan in the early years of the twentieth century to
compete on the sane level as store advanced nations* dat Japan in her
desire to achieve great power status and Military strength commensurate
with this had shown time and time again that her eclectic
approach to technological development could be successful* Japan
recognised during the course of the war that the military airplane
had enormoua potential, and a slow start did not dampen her determination
to achieve sreat power status In aviation after World tfar I*

20
Japan had mad* limited use of a dirigible as a captive balloon
for scouting disrin^ the Susso-Japanese war, but fait that it was
ineffective* In 1909 Japeneas sallitary aviation officially was
organised with tho Army and Wavy partioipatlnc in tho Temporary
Military balloon Research Committee* Tho balloon was soon glvon a
secondary position, sines from lata In 1909 Japanese military
aviation planning was geared to tho establishment of airplane
components and aircraft production* •** J$r 1911 Japan had ostabllshod
its first aircraft factory, procured about 10 aircraft from abroad
and had started sanding officers to Franco and tho United States for
flight training.
At the outbreak of <4orld War X Japanese aviation components
were email, but strong enough in aircraft strength and training; to
participate in limited action* Japan was too remote from the major
battlefields to contribute much to the European effort, and her
aviation was also still too embryonic for more than minor action*
Japan's major air effort came in the celge and capture of the
port of Tsingtao from the Oermans in 191*** Army aircraft with the
assistance of Japanese i*avy seaplanes operating from the iifrdeenlya
flaru supported operations by army ground forces and the Japanese
ttJfleet* *^ In addition to reconnalsance flights and artillery spo ing.
thess airplanes apparently participated in some bombing operations*
32. H* *. aoyse, Acrta^ ftajba^smft and tbj In^naUo^ negation
of warfare (Sew Xorki Harold Vinel, Ltd*, 1923), p. 63.
33* Green and Frioker* Air forces * p. 177.
3***"Outline of tfevel Armaments and Preparations for War" (5 ports,
Japanese ttonofrapb 1^5, ^eshlngtsn, D*C«i mimeographed, undated
cooy in 0CN&V Pert 1, 1922W193*). P. 5*
35. aobert P. Porter, ^•PjW>.,,.?he ftU» |jf s fffdsrn, fffmy (Oxford*
The Clarendon Press, 1919), p* 257.
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4hile the above was the only major sir aotion by J«pan« there
was other activity* In 191 $ tha Amy taut a squadron of about six
aircraft a* part of Japan'a Siberian force, and these planes remained
in Vladivostok until Japanese withdrawal in 1922. In August 19l§
Japan aant eight pilots to tha Prtmh Ration MUitaira where they
participated in several missions ,3? end in tha ssmc year 92 offloor
pilots partiolpatod in action on tha Italo~Austrtan front,
™
At tha and of tha war Japan was mere determined than ever to
push onward in tha development of hsr air forces, to accomplish
this Japan had observed other nation's aviation with care, and made
tha most of limited war operations, Japan's air units Ilka thosa in
America waro still saparata foroos under Army and fJavy jurisdiction,
snd as such thoy wara tlod to support of ground forces and tha float,
iut thora was a aajor diffaranoo hatwoon American and Japanosa
aviation in 1919t Japan waa expanding har air power instaad of
demobilising it.
And significantly thora was a Japanese Savy Commander studying
at Harvard University during the war years who observed aviation
developmente with intense interest, % the end of the war this officer
was convinced that the key to future wars lay in air power rather than
traditional battleships. His nm* was Xseroku Temaaoto,*^
36. «*Air Operations 1931«49&5" (Vol 4, Japanese Studies on Manchuria,
Washington, D, C,t typed M33, undated, OCMB)* p, h,
37, Oreou and /Ticker, Air .forest , p, 178,
38. jaaan Tfc^ ^^ WM?^' P* **•




D'£g>UM&Zt hm AX8 Wmii 1919-1922
The years between the end of the faria Peeee Conference *nd the
closing of the Washington Conference in Fobaruftry 1932, were yoaro of
foment and change in the fields of For iSestem diplomacy end war
theory, as o result* on tho diplomatic side there was at leost *
nominal return to peaceful relations in the Per Sast and International
codification of American traditional Far Western policy. On the side
of war theory* military aviation was beginning to ohellonfo
conventional doctrines of warfare* especially those of naval warfare*
the impact of tho United States combine trials of 1920 and 1921 was
not only to awaken even the most conservative admirals to the potential
of air power* but also to bring into question the rmry assumptions on
which American Pacific strategy was based. \s a result of the rise of
air power* the "frecsinir of the Pacific** by the Washington Conference*
and retrenchment in American preparedness* military war planners were
to have a difficult task in formulating a realistic Orange plan in the
years to follow*
It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed
description of events leading? to the Wascinfton Conference and
nofoclatlons that took place there. Issues relating to or affecting
air power will be examined later* A brief sketch hopefully will be
sufficient at this point.
The problems in United States-Japanese relations at the 0ttd of
the war* which were compounded by the failure of Wilson to put checks




on Japan at the ?arie t>eaee Conference, were mad* owm «ore serious
by the failure of the United stataa Senate to ratify the Versailles
freety and thereby recognise tne Perls settlement of «aay of ihaae far
Eastern problems* The United States also was concerned about possible
dangers to America and taerlcan interests in &sla that eight ttan fron
tha Angle-Japanese Alliance, which bad baan renewed la 1911* and which
both nations were seeking to renew at thia time. Finally tbara was
potential military danger aa wli aa groat economic ooat in tbo
intensifying naval evmaaeats raea in which Japan* aooin^ America
carrying out rapid naval armaments aa provided for in tbo Havel
MMprUtta Art rf 1916. MO0* .t »** to kMp «p. Z m» ».
widespread conviction by tha and of 1930 the\t "only a restoration of
a far Sastern balaneo of power, redefinition of national intaraata
and policies in that ration, and a limitation of naval armaments
could avart a costly, if not utterly ruinous, war In tha western
Pacific,"3
what atartod aa a proposal for a disarmament oonfaranca was
gradually expanded in 1921 to include broader problems of tha ?ar
Sast, Japan was never a willing participant in the Conference*
but realised tha desirability of a solution to the ornaments raea at
least. Japan suspected that the conference was a plot on the part
of the United States and Great Britain to take away her special rights
and advantages in Manchuria, Inner ftongelt* and China* to check her
2, A complete discussion of these problems ^n well as eventa leading to
the Washington Conference is provided in A* Whitney drtswold, The ?er
frees™!yffi^&tc? ffii* ^^
{Hm "*"*' m* University
3* Harold iprout and Margaret Sprout, Toward a jjew pfder of .ffca Power
(Princeton} Princeton University Preee, tW), o, 99,
*. A* Whitney Qrlswold, ?ho Far .£*stern follcy cf the United States
(Sew Bavcm Tale 8mtveraity Frees, 1962), p. 298/
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proposed naval expansion program^ «a£ to replace Japanese laadereftip
In ;\sl«. ilut mitigating against suspicion end reluctance were severe!
Iwpertant factors: notably a postwar recession which was making vast
naval expansion difficult, and a shift to a acre peaceful and international
approach to foreign relation* dus In part to a rlao in Importance of
6
democratic, llbaral internal politics.
dy the tin* tha Washington Conference adjourned much had boon dona
to raatora tranquility to tha Fasifle, tha major agreements signed by
both tha United states and Japan will bo listed, Tha Five Power flaval
Treaty signed February 6, 1922, callad for a naval holiday, tha scrapping
of certain capital ships, qualitative and quantitativa liaitatlons on
capital vassals, a limitation on total tonnage of airoraft oarriara,
and aa a quid pro gup for Japanese acceptance of lass than "parity11 in
capital ship tonnage allowed, a non-fortification article which was
designed to maintain the status 900 of fortifications and naval bases
7
of designated areas in the Pacific* The Four Power Treaty of
December 13, 1921* terminated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and pledged
the signatories wto respect their rights in relation to their Insular
8
possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific ocean, *
The $ine Power Treaty of ?eoruary 6, 19312 ©eve, in effect, international
5. Oeorge M. Bookman, The apdef^aatlcn, of ^hftna and Jygan (Sew Xorkt
*to*p*r and flow, 1962), pp. 376-377.
6. John K* f&irbenk, 3dwin 0. Aeisehauer and Albert « Craig, &ast AalSi
The ripdern Pranaforation <3ostom Houghton Mifflin Company, i^5)#
pp. 56d-57i.
7. Bahl J, aartlett, ed.. The, .fipcoxd of ,>a^oanjnp^aaoy <!*» ed.,
Sew Torkt Alfred A. Knopf, i960), pp,
8 » Xbt4», pp. *#Q-W.
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sanction to America* a traditional policy of adherence to the i^ptn Door
for China and respect for China's administrative and territorial
integrity*^
iofore turning to the subject of th« ^aehinrton Conference and
air power* it is necessary to examine the postwar state of aviation in
the United States and Japan*
American Amy and *avy aviation units after about seven months of
combat experience in *orid «*r X had a war record which, if not up
to full expectations* nevertheless brought credit to American aviation*
Military aviation* however * was still a stepchild of more conventional
theories of warfare • and battleship fleets and land amies remained the
paramount forees« fo Illustrate Just how closely aviation was tied to
these forces* the Aircraft frearboolq of 1920 in its list of war functions
of the airplane "that wore conclusively brought out by the war" mentions
for Amy aviation only operations in direct rapport of ground troops*
and for the l<avy air am only scouting, patrol work and gun spotting
with the fleet and offensive operations against only those forces
10
operating against or menacing the fleet* This was not very different
from a demarcation of responsibility made by a Joint AmjM*vy
"Cognisance Board** in 191&**
Aviation* no matter hew limited the role planned for it* was not
something easily Ignored. The cry for a separate* independent sir force
9* ' 'Bsrtlett* He^perd * pp. W-&90.
X0, "Aircraft in Warfare in acrid &tr IT Aircraft, laarboofc 1920 *
PP* 79, 63*
11* Archibald »* furnbull and Clifford L« Lord. History cf halted




vas being Heard again, as will a* alalia that with propw air power
the Unit** states would never again need a large Havy or a large Army,
There vara also atromr economic arguments, beginning to be heard with
Increasing frequency, comparing costs of aircraft with battleships,
Yet tha fact raaalnad In 1919 and 1920 that tha battlaah' f waa
•till the first llna of &9T9&99, America had no aircraft carrier*,
and at thla stage of development, air power theory was far ahead of
aircraft performance. 3o America's air power fell victim to the
massive and rapid demobilisation that Is typical of democracies after
a war.
Had proponents of air power been able to stem somewhat the normal
tide of demobilisation, they would hare faced still a formidable
lineup of difficulties. In the years after the war they would have
had to overcome opposition not only from a navy aemerel Board devoted
to the battleship concept of defense and jealous of amy weapon that
12
night interfere with appropriations for these ships* and en Amy
General Jtaff composed exclusively of ground officers who were still
upset from the passage of the aviation appropriations In 1917 over
their opposition, but frost a public whoee interests seemed to step
at the shoreline of the United States and who opposed a large and
expensive Military establishment in the name of world peace ami
domestic economy.
Demobilisation was not a complete abandonment of the air weapon.
Few doubted that aviation had some role to play in national defense.
gren as the "eyes of the fleet" or airborne artillery spotters.
12. Aahbroofe Lincoln, "The United States Savy and the ata* of the




aircraft represant** a giant step in the «Kxi*rni*ation of war.
?hua Congress beoaao aroused in 1920 at the dumping of surplus
aircraft toy ?ranea t Great Britain end italy. reoof.nislng the danjgor
of such motion to a necessary aircraft industry. - Congressional
appropriations froa 1919 on were not as niggardly as ono might susneet,
bolng heavier than othor comparable pea >«tine periods, but they were
nonetheless inadequate for a military posture eoaaensurate with
America* s position and commitment. *** Fro* tho appropriations
granted tho air services voro at the aerey of thoir parent organi-
sations, and battleships and land armies voro ejipeneive.
In promoting tho development of air power tho §Javy was at times
acre active than tho Amy during this period, rhe 8evy in its rolo
as tho "first lino of defense* maintained a mere offensive~s*inded
outlook in plans for performing this traditional function. #any
ranking Saval Offloors wore calling for aviation to aasaae a largor
rolo in this mission* and even tho staunohost "saltwater Admiral"
would find it hard to dispute argumente that aircraft with tho float
©cold bo of somo asset. Events soon to take places off the tfirfinia
coast were to make the rJavy even acre air-minded, bat ono is
cautioned that this is air-miadedaess in a Halted sense, ftavel
aviation was to face an uphill fl$ht for full recognition for years
to come, and like aany other probleas of aviation that date froa
these early years, there are still oroblene between surface and
aviation officers of the Sevy today.
13. AircraftTearbook 1921 . p. 97.
14. office of Air force history, Mjray.frlr ,?»»» Ift ftMfl
-r II (Vol. 1, Plana and &&? Operations . ^eaXajr Frank Craven
and Janes Lea Cate v eds., Chicafot ?hs University of Chicago
Press, 19^) • p. 13.

la ttavy planning a key nuas of taking the airplane to sea mi
to be the aircraft eerrler. It had been demonstrated almost 19 years
ago that successful launches and landings could be made fjpee*. ships,
ether netlent were experimenting with carriers* and primitive seaplane
carriers had emerged daring the war, " The $eyy General Beard had
annually recommended the building of carriers since 1919, and In 191?
Congress authorised the conversion of the collier Jupiter into an
experimental carrier. In 1320 the $avy Department recommended that
construction start on four high-speed carriers* but this wee Vieked
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back and forth in Congress with no aotlon being taken*
between October of 1920 and September of 1921 a series of bombing
tests which proved that aerial bombardment could sink even the mighty
battleship* were to have almost revolutionary iwpact on not only naval
thinking* but Army and civilian thinking as well. It was also to Inflate
a seapower versus airpower controversy that continues to some decree
even today*
The tests began modestly with ?lavy seaplaass testing bombs against
the old battleship Indiana in November 1920* the ship suffered several
damaging hits* but was towed aground before she could be sunk* The
results were inconclusive, and while air power proponents wasted little
time in claiming that the aircraft was now the supreme weapon* ethers
such as Captain rf* 0. Leahy* Director of Kavml Gunnery, stated in his
report to the Secretary of the £ievy that "the entire experiment pointed
to the Improbability of a modern battleship being either destroyed or
15. >prout and Sprout* TWfffl, » ?*» OTJiff* *• ***•
**• M" PP» 221-223.





completely put out of action by aerial tmbs,**
Here testa were obviously needed, and the opportunity cam* la
1921 whan several caotured Oermen ships Including ths battleship
Qstfiosland were made available. This tin* the 'ieeretarf of the Savy,
Jeeephus Daniels invited the Amy Air Service to participate, and they
willingly accented. Cn Jane 21, 19£1 naval aircraft sank the :>oman
G-117, * submarine. On July 13 CJeneral William U ftitehell with 39
Aircraft gave the Army Air Service it* first taste of simulated war
tactloo and sank the destroyer 0-102. The cruiser frankfurt was sunk
on July 13 after repeated bombing from both flawy and Amy planes*
These successes were Impressive, but the real test was a battleship,
and on July 21* 1921, when the Qstfiosland finally sank, airmen had
19
proved a point.
There were still lingering doubts, seme claimed that the trials
were unrealistic, that a ship actively maneuvering and defending itself
would have been unetnkahle. The trials were also marred somewhat by
lack of cooperation between Mitchell and the Sevy, But air power
proponents were convinced that the battleship was slnkabio from the
air, that command of the air also could mean command of the sea below.
In addition to giving; a boost to naval aviation, the trials pointed out
the need either to scrap a fleet concept based on the battleship, or
to provide for adequate anti-aircraft defenses including aircraft
accompanying the fleet to insure command of the air. These trials were
not unnoticed by Congress, although it was to be some years later before
i*. AircrafTTearbook 1922. p, 47.
19.
,
|bM. . 9P. V?«.52.
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additional earrisra wars authorlsad.
Only a briaf troaksant of tha air povar oontrovwray that waa to
run through most of tha 1920* a and bayond will ho attawptoi haro. It
vac both an intrasarvioa and an intarsorvioo oontr©varay and an
•xtranaly complex affair. In its saws #anaral fowa It was a battla of
voir?a, propaganda and logltlatat* appoal frow tboaa aoaking a groatsr
rola for air oowor in national dafsnoa, opposed by mora traditional*
mtnriod and usually hlghly**placad nllitary and civilian ©ffielals who
preferred to keep aviation as subservient, adjunctive ansa* On thla
level it waa a eanpaign for asore aatonwr/, eore control over personnel,
greater representation on poXtcy-auiking boards* and donanda for a
greater share of appropriations, Thla vaa not an unreasonable stru^s-le,
and bad It remained on thla level, results Might hava baan battar. Mt
tha controversy waa store ©oaplex, want ta aere extreme ferns, and arouaad
tba resentment of even strong supporters of air power.
Two ferns of tha controversy brought forth tha aoat acrimonious
debate. One vaa tha proposal for a asperate air force, with an
Indapandant alssion, that would incorporate both amy and savy aviation*
Thla waa not a naw ids*, ac similar proposals had baan advanoad almost
aa aoon aa military aviation waa established, and tha Ida* waa not
completely without nsrit. Tha Savy waa particularly fir» in its
opposition to thla* feeling that tha vital oloaa ooordlnation batwaan
tha float and Maval aviation, and tha apodal skills of &aval aviation
would not bo forthooiinr. under a Unltad Air Service, &eer Adairal
tflUtaai *. Moffett, haad of the raeontly established juraau of
Aeronautics and a leading advocate of naval air power considered tha
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Protested V«ese overflights, end the 3ui#f of Navel operetioiui promptly
ordered the iknrernor of Uuaji to control the kArine i "light* more
eArefuiiy.2^
Japan «t the end of World rfSr X Hod Air forces of nueh smallar
else and with even lees oxpevleaoo then those of the tfnited states.
fhe or^«nlsatiori and mission of these forces wis in goners.! not too
different from American Air forces in 19t9* tot Japen in too postwar
yoArt wms to booonto much more «ir«<tinded And to seek expansion of hor
aviation. Many rcASons can bo suggested for tote, bat p-rfcsArily it
would appear thAt Japan* a doolro to become An Air powor we* a eontln~
ustion of bor drive to Acquire greet powor otAtua using the latest
weapons available. It i« not too difficult to aoo how the airplane
oould bo a pArtlculArly suitable wespon for J*p*n'& long rAngs policies
In the Pacific. Air powor properly developed And properly deployed
throughout tJepan's Already vast * oapa.ro** would provide strong dofonoos
Against Any throat to JApan or hor possessions, '."he offonsivo potential
of Air powor oould bo An importaitt factor in Any future Action on the
continent of Asia.
'technologically behind more developed notions, Japan at the end
of the wer completely re-evaluated hor aviation capabilities in the
light of odvAnces in aviation node during the lest yesrs of the war,
decided on expansion programs And sought help from Abroad to eld in the
fulfillment of those,
the development of Japanese Air power was to be a highly eclectic
22. 3er*ld X, Wheeler, Prffiudo toj^eearl Qaroor (Columbia! The University
of Missouri Pr*9», 1963), p. 87,
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procoss, and the use of foreign instructors* technological experts,
tactics and air doctrine were to »ot the course of Japanese aviation
throughout its history, «7hile this approach undoubtahly handicapped
the development of concepts, technique* and equipment that wera purely
Japanese in origin, it was nonetheless an expeditious way to catch up
quickly. Japan not only purchased equlpatent fro* abroad and invited
foreign aviation niaaiona to Japan* but aha also started sanding har
own missions abroad to purchase equipment* to observe technological
developments in aviation* and to observe the planning and tactics of
others,
Japan was careful to choose only the best* Following this policy
the Japanese relied on aircraft from Great Britain and trance. In
reorganising training and setting in motion her expansion the Army Air
Corps turned to France* and a French training Mission that arrived in
1919 was to have a profound influence on that branch. The Japanese
«eval Air force sought aid from Great Britain*
"
So tine was lost In placing sons of the growing force* where they
could best support national policies* In 1921 the Japanese Mavy
established an air station en southern Ferness and deployed a unit of
naval aircraft there. In the sane year an Amy aviation battalion
was sent to Heijo, Korea to utilise a base under construction there,
Japan expected this base "to be highly efficient in guarding over the
20. AlrorafTTsarbook 1922 . p. 89.
25. Gillian Green and John Pricker, The Air forces of the sftHribd
(Sew York j Hanover House* 19!$)* p. 178| "Outline of Save!
Armaments and Preparations for tfar" (5 ports* Japanese Studies
in World for II* Japanese Monograph 145* irfashtngtont
miAeographed* undated copy in OC&H* Fart 1* t 922-1 93*0* ?• 7*

the frontier* and keeping order lit the peninsula,* 2^
At the same tj»e the Mavy was probing ahead with plans for modem
aircraft carriers. Japan at this time had on* converted steam freighter
which was being uaad as an experimental carrier, another aircraft
27
carrlar under construction, and plana for two more. While evidence
la lacking on more details about this period, it would probably ha safe
to say that the results of the United states bombing trials did not go
unnoticed in Japan*
Aesesnent of the influence of air power at the Washington Conference
is not as simple a task as it night seem, there were two decisions
relating directly to air power | the limitation of aircraft carriers
and the decision not to attempt to place any limitation on aircraft.
Indirectly affecting aviation was the <ion~fortifioatlon article of the
Five Power Treaty* Ihtt when one attempts to assign motives for these
decisions in terms of air power, the picture becomes cloudy — especially
in the case of Japan,
There can be little doubt that the delegates to the conference
were aware that aviation bad a vast war potential, or that the recently
demonstrated aerial threat to the battleship presented a challenge to
conventional doctrines of seapower. tot it is going perhaps too far to
olalm that the rise of air power and in particular the sinking of the
Ostfriesland •cleared the way, more than any other single event, for a
possible solution of the international competition in capital ship
2S
construction," or that Japan agreed to Inferior limitation of her
26. Japan,, yoarboolf ,|?2H?2a, p, 312.
27. sprout and Sprout, Toward a Sew Order , p. 228| Aircraft Xsarbook
12|2, p. 8?i United atatea. United states Strategic Bombing Survey
pacific War (fco. 62, Japanese Mr frower . tfashiagtom military
Analysla division, 1946), p. **-,
28 « Aircraft Yearbook lftft . o. i.
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capital ships because the Mvy hm been assigned an Inferior position
to the Japanese Aw*y Air Force in 1921* A more precise deterwination
of air sower's influence sust await xore research* and only a tentative
conclusion can be offered hare. A desire to restore harmony to
international relatione particularly in the Pacific, a realisation of
the hi$h economic and political coats of a naval armaments race, and *n
assumption that the capital ship wa« the root of evil here were the
prime activation for the limitation* of the five Power Treaty, the
ratios accepted and the non-fortification provision aimed at bringing
equality of security in the pacific in tern* of the traditional concept
of sea power* In this sense considerations of future air power were of
little consequence. Jut when one turns to Japan's acceptance of a
lower ratio, and Insistence on nom-fortificatlon as a quid pro quo to
acceptance, one cannot dismiss entirely the factor of air power, Japan
In 1921 was underway on a program of aviation expansion with a long
range goal of becoming a great power in the air. iuooess in this program*
the knowledge of battleship vulnerability and the elimination of the
threat of overwhelming American forces challenging Japan from either
eea or land in the Western Pacific would seem to make acceptance of an
Inferior ratio a small price to pay. In any event the Washington
Conference was to have a profound effect on future policy in the Pacific.
Aviation received direct attention on the question of limitation
and regulation of aircraft, Mmm» President Harding issued the
invitation to the conference In August of 1921, he did not exclude
W* Alexander Kiralfy, "Watch Japanese Air Power," rorei^ Affairs.
<foi. 23 (October, i^*^i, w 66-70.

non-naval armaments from possible limitation noting that "It nay also be
found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of
humanity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled."-^
This would include aircraft, but the United States had in mind regulation
rather than limitation. Secretary of State Hughes in his arms limitation
propo..!. of Mto 12 did not prop*., th. limitation of n.v.1 airor.ft.31
and the subcommittee appointed to discuss this question did not recommend
the limitation of military aircraft. They found that it would be
impractical to Impose effective limitation on military aircraft, not
only because of the problem of enforcement , but primarily because of
the close interdependence between military air power and a nation's
commercial aeronautics. To handicap the latter would be "to impede
progress in transportation and communications. M *^ The subcommittee
recognised that "in aircraft there was probably the most formidable
military weapon of the future," but they felt, and the delegates at
Washington unanimously agreed that to limit aircraft would be to limit
33progress. JJ
The question of drafting a code regulating the use of aircraft in
war was postponed for future consideration as few participants were
34
ready to discuss this question.
What the conference would not do directly they attempted to do
30. United states Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Armament.
Washington, riovember 12. 1921 - February 6. 1922 (Washington."
Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 17*
31. Ibid., p. 63.
32. Ibid., p. 396.
33. Xbld . . p. 415.
34. Ibid., o. 405.
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Indirectly. This was dona by th<t limitation of alroraft carriers*
In 1921 the state of aviation was such that fair seriously believed
that aircraft would ever be able to npm tha Pacific or even tha
35
Atlantic. With land-based alroraft limited to thalr small combat
radius of action, use of air power over marina areas would depend on
development of tha carrier* So by limitation of this typo of warship
tha oonfarsnes was potentially curtailing tha use of alroraft beyond
tha roach of land,
tha proposal for tha limitation of alroraft carriers was a part
of Hughes* November 12 proposal, and it would assign tha United States
and Great Britain a total tonnage of 30,000 tons each, Japan 46,000
tons, and Italy and France tonnage to he decided upon at a later date*
the United States later proposed a maximum displacement of 27,000 tons
for carriers, and waa hopeful that everyone would be able to meet their
relative needs for theee proposals.
fheae **maut& to suit no om 9 especially Japan* Japan creased for
a larger allowance arguing that carriers were essentially for coast
defense, and due to special circuitstances and a unique geographical
position, Japan needed as much tonnage as alioted to the United States
and (ireat Britain, Japan also claimed that strong; carrier forces
were necessary to protect her highly inflammable cities from hostile
air attack from the sea, and that her economy was so poor that aha could
not effort a vast armada of land planes, Japan's unstated premise In
35« Sprout and Sprottt, toward a New Order * p* 21?
36. IMd*. pp* 213.219,
#• 2S2»» PP. 227,230*
38, Ibid*, p, 229,

all this s*«Pi«d to be that Japanese ««wiara vara for purely defensiv©
p-urooeee* while those of her potential enemies tiara essentially
•*a
offensive weapons.
the final solution reached at «*ahinfton partially mat Japan* a
demand for more carrier tonnage, 'fha United States and Great Britain
vara ellotad a total displacement toanafte not to exceed 135*000 tona
each, while Japan was elloted a total tonnage of ©1*000. All existing
oarriara wore deemed to ba experimental and could be raplaead without
regard to e$e» and an individual ship aaadtmua displacement limit of
27*000 tona was adopted with limited exceptions for a few vessels of
up to 33*000 tona.**
Of all tha provisions adopted at tha tfashinfton Confaranoa none
waa to proaant a greater future dilemma to Peeifie planning than
Article 12 of tha Five ?owor Treaty, tha norwfortiftcation article,
American agreement to maintain tha statu* quo of fortifioationa and
naval bases in possessions that included tha Philippines, Guam and
Aleutians* not only waa a pledge to forego adding new fortifications
and baaaa » hot to abet*In from increealnf facilities at existing naval
41baaaa and Increasing coast defense*. Kuffce* did not appear to ba
too concerned about agreeing to this. His main concern waa naval
dleermament, and ha had been told that wonsrema would never appropriate
W* Qprout'and Sprout* foward a Say crdar . p. 229.
M. Sertlatt, Hsoord . pp. W~*»&9.
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onough nonoy to fortify adsquatoly thsas island*. *h*fc ho hod done,
tho*gh t was to enhance greatly Japan** offensive and defensive position
in the Pacific, and to place an almost insraftountft&to obstacle in tho
path of effective isaaXewentation of American f** Eastern policy, Tne
iapeet of all this »n future strategy «i«3 way planning will ho examined
in later chapters.
»2« Qriswold. fig,. Sastorn Policy , », 3t6.

CSAPTfim III
mak phkMim km h>tn wtz.\<m
The treaties and «§reement* of the Washington Conference while
appearing to provide solution to the major problems of the far .'.:*»t-
ln reality only masked tho effects of the problems of International
relations la tho Pacific. By trying to euro tho symptom* of tho disease
rather than tho disease iteelf . by waking,- what were In reality false
assumptions about tho naturo of modsm warfare, and by putting excessive
faith In self-denying written agreements that wore void of effective
provisions for enforcement, the united states was playing a game of
grand self-deception. That the United states was able to succeed In
this for almost ten years wss due to external factors, not to policies
of self-denial, disarmament, and Isolation, When economic depression
and a stronger **v* nore unified China began to threaten Japan's economy
and Interests In Hanehurla, the world was soon to realise that Japan*
s
national policy of expansion and Asiatic hofomony had not been changed
during the years since 1922, The shift from the so-called "friendship"
policy to a Mpositive** policy was a change of means, not of ends.
The period of over nine years between the Washington Conference
and the Mukden Crisis of ^September 1931 was generally one of peaceful
relations between Japan and the United states. This was due In part to
postwar emergence of more liberal, democratic, party fovemmont in
Japan, which was able to diminish somewhat the influence of the military
in national politics, and the absence of pressures against Japan's
Asiatic Interests, Srtsmally Japan had not given up anything In
Hanehurla after the war, and as long as China and £uoata were too weak

to threaten h«r position there, * policy of friendship was a worksole
one*
•or© wore ripple* on tho relatively tranquil pond of Jaoanesc-
American relations. The old problem of immigration became even more
•cute with tho passage by Congress of tho immigration Act of 1924 which
sanctioned an oriental exclusion policy that was deeply resented by tho
Japanese, In 192** *nA 1??5 the Japanese vernacular press stirred up
war talk in Japan In protest to Ameriesn navel maneuvers * scheduled for
waters near Hawaii* which were to ho climaxed by a cruise to Australia*
those were ieng-soheduled maneuvers and In no way designed to bo
menacing, but many Japanese were able to see a threat in them. Their
outcries subsided somewhat when foreign Minister .mdehare publicly
declared that the Japanese government could see no harm In the
maneuvers* There were other difficulties, principally economic ones*
but all-in-all the problems on the diplomatic level were minor «~
particularly when compared to what came before and what was to follow*
*4ille the American public* Congress* and the administration became
complacent and were content in seeking peace through such international
agreements as the treaties of the Washington Conference* the fact of
Paris in 1928 and the London »aval Conference of 1930* military planners
tended to be skeptical* ?o them Japan remained America* s most probable
enemy* and War Plan Orange underwent continuous examination and
revision* At the same time planning for the defense of America's far
1. Oerald g. Wheeler* Prelude to Pearl harbor (Columbia} The University
of Missouri Press* 19**3), op*

fc2
Eastern policy was beaming increaeincly difficult, for this task had
for All practical purposes becnse impossible after feJaruary 3922.
»Jhile *lr power was gaining recognition as a weapon of increasing
lnportanee for Pacific defense the non-fortlfieatlon prevision* vested
interest And conservation, And reluctance on the part of the nation to
support anything bat a defensive Air •©tabliahstent, combined to prevent
tho growth of &»erlean Air power to tho point where it could play an
effective rolo in fulfilling tho assumptions of tho planners,
Japan aloo had her problems during this period* A surge of post-
war Anti-militarism and oonoorn over rising dofonao costs* couplod
with a still inadequate resource and technological base upon which
strong air powor could bo built* oauaod a slowdown in Japan* a aviation
expansion program* Sut it was nevertheless to faro somewhat bottor than
othor nilltary programs* for Japanaso planner* woro turning .sore And
more to Aviation as an important instruaont in planning for tho fulfill-
itont of Japan's great designs for Asia.
iR PLa&tXlK)
American Military planners* who woro ttiU awaiting a clear-cut
dofinition of United itates notional strategic policy in 1922* woro
confronted with oven score dlfflcultias after too Washington Conference*
American Fat Eastern policy had not been changed but the Military aeons
of supporting It wore even further reduced by the Agreements there.
fno impact of this conference, jApan's postwar position of power in the
Pacific* and the conflict between American national outlook and attitude*
and Pacific eoamdtments were such that a complete review of old strategic
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plana for r iast waa required.
In the reevaluation of ngo that started in 1921 » the
main prolans involved the Philippines, root* islands required pro-
tection not only because th«y were American territory, but they were
the strategic key to enforcement of American policy as well* It was
felt that if there was to be any hope of defeating Japan In ease of war.
an advanced naval base in the Western Pacific was needed, and after the
noivfortiflcation agreement of the five Power ?*aval Treaty. j&merice'a
bases in the Philippines especially Manila Bay. were the only ones with
facilities in existence capable of supporting a naval force large enough
to challenge Japan* These facilities were not modern and hardly adequate
but the premise was that if they could be developed and defended to the
maximum degree permitted by the nen-fortifioatioa provision, they could
2
be held in the event of a Japanese attack until reinforcements arrived.
This was nothing now. for the Hold-untll-reinferced approach had been
part of .ar Flan Orange before the war. and if there were doubts then about
the workability of this, it was even more unrealistic in 1922 and 1922.
In the preparations for a new plan the iSevy had taJeen the position
in July 1922, that Japan could take the Philippines and juan before the
fleet would be able to raaeh the Western Pacific, but the Philippine
garrison should hold out as long as possible and make the capture as
costly as possible to the enemy. This view, that the Philippines could
not be defended, would have to be abandoned after a brave struggle to
defend them, and retaken only after a long war. was challenged by
2. Louis Morten, "vtasr Plan Orange." World Politics .'/ol. 13. So. 2
(January, 19^). pp. 227. 229.

Leor»rd i*ood # fovernor~3eneral of the Philippines and * foreter Chief
of Staff of the Ar«y. To hi* this would be the height of national
disgrace, end seaething the .taerloan people would not stand for, ?he
precise influence of vfcod's intervention Is not dear, but the £avy»s
attsrapt at a realistic appraisal of the aoility to hold the Philippines
wis soon eliminated free* tho preparations, J
on July 7* 1933 the Joint iSeard gave its approval to the
prsiiRinary studios that had boon oarriod out by tho Army. Kevy and
tho Joint Planning Coastittee and authorised a revised War Flan Cranio
based on these* the new plan reoolved its final approval in September
of 1924 and in addition to being the first revision of Orange slnoe
World War I» it was the first plan for operations in tho Pacific to
incorporate air power.
The baste concepts of the new plan were not anion different from
its predecessor* It enbodled a oonoept of "an offensive war* priaarlly
a
naval*1 with tho Sievy taking a strategic offensive position in the
Pacific after the initial Mission of establishing superior seapower -la
the Western Pacific* had boon accomplished. The Amy's role in this was
a strategic defensive one* holding Hanile 3ey, as the key to the
establishment of superior seapower, with Manila $e* secured* the $avy
could then ro about Its primary role of engaging in operations "directed
toward the isolation and harassment of Japan »n which could best bo
achieved by offensive air and naval operations directed against Japan's
naval forces and eeonenls life," It was hoped that these liftlted
i. Horton« **ar Plan Orange," pp, 22S-233*
5* 4tM* * *• ^331*

*5
offensive neesures would teeing early victory* if not waueh further
6
action as way be required to win th» war" wuld be taken.
The 19#* version of Grange* whtlo realistic in lit assumptions
of Japan as th« most probable Pacific enemy and the Xi^althoyi of
hostilities resultimf from conflicting; Pacific policies* waa little
more than a statement of hopes as far as the poeslhUitlss of carrying
oat such a plan ssro concerned, Vhat wes required in view of ths changes
in the Pacific sines th* war was a plan that recognised tha existing
military and naval capabilities of America's Far Eastern forces and
was based en these realities* American military capabilities in
1924 did net even approach the strength that would Have been necessary
to males such a plan a realistic one. Moreover* even in the event of
an Improbable shift of public and Congressional opinion to the support
of military forces «•* including air forces «*» large enon# to provide
military sanction to Pacific policy* the strategic strength of Japan
in the Pacific, including potential use of the mandated islands*
compared to the woefal lack of any adequate American bases west of
Hawaii would make it even hasardeus for the United states fleet to
venture into Western Pacific waters in the event of war* As Ions as the
United States adhered to the Five Power Save! Treaty* this could not be
corrected*
6. toui. Hortcn* ffttftfOfrrfj tmjl\ WfM.&tMt fiH» '^ *ft W
PacjinS <3tretfflr a^ ^mrna^i ffio, ^n% fa t years* Washingteni
Office of the Chief of Military History* l)ep«rtment of the :"umy,
196P>* p. 29.
?. rhaddeus ? fttle>, Statesmen and Admirals (!9sw Torki
ton and Company* Inc., 17*3). p. 27,
S. Sareld Sprout and Margaret aprtmt. Toward, a y 9f^9KJ!»u fSB/Sfl
(Princetom Princeton University Vr**** Iw), p* %%*
^*v
he role envisaged for air power Apparently would be la conformance
with the accepted air doctrine of the dayt aceutt ^fire spotting,
pursuit and bombing. Additional aviation units were being located in
the Pacific during these years, but with aircraft carrier aviation only
beglnninf and with tha non-fortification restriction interpreted aa
preventing any large aviation buildups it would haw boon difficult,
to aay the leaat, for aviation to neke any sejer contribution to tha
plan. 10
Advocacy af tha usa of air power in Eastern Pacific war plann*
and defenses had boan coaing from various quarters for years. In 1919
Jeneral vfllliaa L. Hltcheli offarad a hypothetical war plan against
Japan* tha nation ha fait to be America* a stoat probabla enemy in tha
future. In hi* viaw victory aouid ba achieved aolaly by air strikes
against Japan from baaaa on tha Aleutian and Kuril Islands. This would
ba made poasible by firat warding off Japanese atteeka on tha United
itatea, and strew? air defensea wara tha key to victory here. Mitchell
did not advocate strong air defeneee for the Philiopinas at thia time,
for he believed that theae iaianda "could not ba defended in the case
of war,"
In 1 921 ^tear Admiral William f9 fullam, en outepokon air power
advocate* called for the use of aviation to defend America** outlying
possessions, claiming that sufficient air power in combination with
smbmarinea could at least hold off an attack if not completely defeat
9. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor . p. 96.
0. i below^ a^rffc
11. Leate: -une, "foreign Policy and the Air rower Slsputs,
•
;l«torion . Vol. 23, Ho. *> (August. J #-*59<.
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hostile attacking forces. In 1923 Eear Adsiral Herri* Laniag
adaxtted that land-based aircraft could play an important role in
da{©tiding the ?hiiippli»es, and that carrier-baaed aircraft uy aeklnf
oosaioie tanporary control of the air eoalti be of great assistance in
recovery of tha ia1 arris if that were neoessar.
rategic and operational planning la never a static process in
a dynaate world, and *far Flea Orange was to undergo almost continuous
evaluation mni change in response to changes in tha international and
doaestxc situation and to military necessity. The task of tha planners
** to beeone increasingly oenpiex, for not only was tha gap widening
between Asaerican oorealtnents in the far Saat and tha forces Aaerica
waa villing to ooanlt to honor them, but a controversy was developing
aaong tha planners and tha services thawaelvas, between those who
advocated a strategic offensive plan and thoaa in favor of a atratafio
defensive plan*
The firat revision of the 19*& plan case in October 1926 and was
devoted priaarlly to correcting aabigultles and points of confusion.
However, one major sssunptlon of the original plan — that reinforcements
would eail directly to the Philippines — was dropped, &xd it was
decided that firat the Harehall, Caroline, and Mariana IsUnAt would
have to be neutralised, and bases established, on one or *ore of these
Shortly after the approval of the 1926 revision the Joint iioard
directed tha preparation of « totally new plan. 4s the planners began
12. ipmt and .vprout, ?ow»r4 a .cw vrder, a, 215
13. feeler, Prelude to psjejfr Harbor, p.
1^. Morton, "tfar Plan Orange ,* pp. 232-333.

mtheir search for the proper victory formula there «ro«« a split between
edvocates of a defensive and an offensive policy, Those favoring *
strategic offensive as tho only policy capable of defeating Japan in tho
Eastern Pacific based their argaaienta on tho same assumptions that wore
embodied in tho 192'* plan* Thooo favoring * strategic defensive main-
tained that lay retaining tho bulk of American forces east of Hawaii
victory could bo gained by economic preooure end raids on Japanese
commerce from there, and, in addition, ««oh a strategy woul^**** Hawaii
and the continental United State* impregnable. They conceded that such
a strategy would make it difficult for American far Eastern trade to
continue, and that the Philippines, Guam and Samoa would ho exposed,,
The Joint Board chose to keep the strategic offensive concept, and Joint
Army~tfavy tfar Plan Orange of April 24, 1923 was a refinement, not a
15
change, of tho older plans.
This was hut another endorsement of a policy of *elf«delusion as
the planners surely could hope for little more than"* breve delaying
action from the Philippine defenders* While strategic defensive
advocates had lost their argusent in 1923, they were not to be silenced
16
for too long a time. But the Joint Board was still obligated to
defend the Philippines, and any policy which openly abandoned this
obligation would have to bo initiated by political loaders.
Surrounding the whole issue of defense of tho Philippines was the
problem of Philippine independence and what America's role there should
be if independence was granted. Moves for independence were gaining
15.
" Norton; "^ar Plan Orange," p, 233.
16. See below Chapter* JTand X.
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more and sore support in Congress during the 1920* s, and while
Sepubliean Presidents favored retention of the islands, the Joint lioerd
could not Ignore the possibility of future independence* The prospect
of en independent Philippine* hed through the years etood in the way
of larger Congressional appropriations for It* defenses. Congress
wee disinclined to pour In vest sues of money for facilities that
night soon be lost.
In April 1930 the Joint Board made a comprehensive review of what
the possible effect of Philippine independence on America's strategic
position might be. The Joint ieerd concluded that it did not favor
independence at that time, bat in any case favored maintaining bases
until independence should be granted, With independence the board
favored a complete withdrawal of American forces from the islands,
abandonment of all its bases, and repudiation of any obligation to
17
guarantee the sovereignty of the islands*
«*hil© Army and Savy planners straggled to find a viable solution
to the problems of Western Pacific mar planning, the Army and Sevy
air arms were searching for mays by which aviation night best contribute
to the support of Orange, Army aviation* s planning in relation to
Pacific strategy was based on its role of assisting in the coastal
defense for the West Coast of the United Jtates, Hawaii and the
Philippines, Ho overseas offensive plans were worked out, although
throughout this period there was an undercurrent of theory for strategic
offensive missions, often under the guise of counter-air offense as the
17# Norton, *War Plan Orange,* p, 235.
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best way to provide defense.
The 3avy was busy in the years from 1926 to 1931 plannin« for
aerial defense of the Philippines and for means of establishing Local
command of the sir onoo the fleet arrived to reinforoe those islands in
accordance with War Plan Orange* Gsrrier aviation was to assume en
increasingly Important port in those plans* tfltb the addition of the
Lexington and Saratoga to the fleet in 192? the gavy's ability to carry
10
out its strategic offensive against the Japanese was Improving*
In Japan the years from 1922 to 1931 wore not inactive ones for
military planners* While the power of the military was reduced and held
in check by the ascendency of more liberal and moderate elements in the
government, supported by a poolto that had grown tired of military
arrogance and military expenditures that wore equal to almost one-naif
20
of the national budget before 1922* the lone range poliole* that the
military espoused wore not changed* thus planning and preparations
continued, not only for defense but for future erosion of the empire
as wen*
In the 191& revision of the 190? Imperial Defense Policy the United
21
States was designated the most probable enemy of Japan at that time*
This was recognition of American leadership in opposing Japanese
expansion in the Far £ast and the elimination of any serious threat
ToT" Thomas fl. Oreer, the DeTelo^enl, of ^ .ffrflyfry fr tfrp Army, a^
Arm 1917-19*1 (pnUeTltates Air Force . auurtool Studiost So. 89 ,
Montgomery* Alabama* United States Air Force iistorloal Division*
Air University, 1955) • 9* 52f also see below, pj>»$"-C7.
19* Wheeler, yroludo to Pearl Harbor * pp» 97 • 103*
20* Manoru Shl^emltsu, Japan and, Hoy Destiny (londonj Hutchinson and






21* Joe above, p^ 14-15*
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from a Russia weakened by revolution. i»«n after a return to more
peaceful relatione after the Washington Conference, Japan still viewed
tho Uniteu States as the »aln obstacle to her national security and
prospects of Asiatic leadership. In many circles the treaties of the
vaahinfton Conference were cited ae "ousting floom over future prospects
of Japan."22
In spite of reduce** threats fro* traditional enemies Russia and
China in the early 1920' »* the Amy returned Its attention to Hanehuria
and northern Chin* after the Washington Conference and retained Russia,
now Soviet insula, as its prime objective in war planning. -* Among the
reaaoQS offered for this were the Array's traditional interest in control
and expansion in those areas, and* *ore interestingly • Amy concern that
If the United States remained the number one potential eaeey, the
Japanese ;2avy would get the lions share of tho defense budget*
As a result of the above and the Washington treaties, a new Imperial
defense Policy was drawn up In 1923 and 192** and sanctioned by the
emperor. This document known as Essentials for the tfanloyment of
forces*' sets forth general tactical and strategic procedures for future
war that were to remain basic policy until 193&* In the event of war
with the United States or the Soviet Union It called for Army operations
against the soviet Union with Assistance from the Havy, and siavy
operations against tho Onlted states with Army assistance as necessary.
22
.
fahushlro Matter! • "the Complete History of the Greater Sset
Asia «erB (u Vols, . Dal Ion Sense &cnshl . Tofcyoi Masa Publishing
Company* 1953). typewritten &SJ translation* Doc* 78002, Office of
Chief of Military History, ^eshinrten, y©i. I, p. ©
23. Iblq> . p. 250.
2*. iaburo ilayashl, iiom . T^T ifrMffitlff. AfllT, fa.tf" ft»*4flBi k^(Quantise, '/irginlat The Marine Corps Association, 1959), p. 193»
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Zt did not anticipate total war in China, but directed come operational
planning for possible deployment of Amy and Kavy units to north* central
and tooth Chine in tho event of war*
The Amy in its operational planning to meet tho requirement* of
tho 192*t plan maintained ita effensiv*~orisnted approach for operations
on tho mainland* In tho event of war the Amy would quickly seise tho
initiative , using its footholds and! forces already in Korea and Manchuria
as a springboard to secure all of Manchuria and parts of the Soviet
Union, assistance in these operations was to be provided by both Amy
26
and ftary aviation* These plans were vafue, did not reflect a concern
for the problems of total war* and limited air power exclusively to tho
2?
support of ground forces*
During the same period Amy plans included provisions for sending
troops to Chin* and the Philippines* Both were to be limited operations
as far as the Amy was concerned. China operations were to be geared
primarily to tho protection of Japanese life and property* and
Philippine operations were to be local operations to support the ,iavy
28
in the event of war with the United States*
The Japanese istavy it its planning adopted a defensive concept of
fleet strategy which was to become the virtual tradition of the ftavy
ouch like the Amy*s devotion to offense* This defensive concept was
based on the assumption that a numerically superior United States jtavy,
by virtue of its higher ratio of ships * would seek the offensive in
25. "Japanese uperatienel Planning Against the U3m $ i93M9k5*H
Japanese 3pectel Study on Manchuria* Vol 1. Amy forees ?&r last,
195S» unpublished monograph on file Office of the Chief of
Kilitary History, Washington, B* C*, p. 20*
26* Ibid* * pp. 16, *0*
26. Hattori, "Complete History," p* 250*
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the waters of the tfeatern pacific In the event of war, And that tho
Japanese $evy*s best chance of victory would bo to intercept and attack
thooo hostile forces in tutors close to hone* the backbone of the
Japanese fleet would renaln the battleship with carriers flaying en
increasingly inportant role. To promote success ship* were to be
designed for nsxijtun offensive power and speed at the expense of radius
of action and defensive arwawents. qualitative superiority was to neJre
up for quantitative superiority, and tactics were to be designed for this
29
type of mission.
Kaval aviation's mission during the years fron 1923 to 1931 oaae
to be closely tied to this strategy, but not exclusively* %- 1924
Japan* s naval air force consisted of both land-baaed and *e*~based
aircraft (carrier aircraft and seaplanes) and stress in training and
development of tactics was on destruction of land targets as well as
sea targets* This was a sonewhat broader concept than that of the Amy
air m« but it still reflected a narrow approach to the problems of
air warfare, and this narrowness was to plague both air arras in
acrid War II, 30
It is significant that the strategic concepts of warfare and war
planning that were developed during the 1920' s were to remain remark-
ably unchanged during the 1933* s. iach service faithfully $tihmrm& to
its basic concept to a point of inflexibility,*1 On the highest level
29. aitsuo ?uehi4a and Masatake Qtassiya, ffiMtfffii
, flfr lllMUf,.flftff.
Dooaed Japan (Anaspollss United states Mml Institute, 1955) •
pp. 11*12.
30. United states, Uqftft0 sfoftoa ^tra^o, Iftflfttan purvey Pecfflo »>T
(So. .62, Japanese Air Fewer , tfaehin&tom ^fiitary Analysis
Division, 19**6), p. 2,
31. 3<uchida and Olnssiya, Midway , p. lit Slayaefal, Kogun. p. 3»
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of &*tmM* planning there had been a recognition after wforid War X
that future vara were likely to be tang and drawn-out affairs* Japan*s
war potential was such that victory in a protracted war would bo
difficult, therefore, Japan throughout the years fro© Hbrld Var X to
fearl Harbor began laying stress in its planning and training on surprise.
speed and a quick decisive victory* this was net an ineorreot approach,
but the building of plana and strategy around thia preniae was to involve
only the Amy and Mary supreme command authorities, and they failed to
take Into consideration political , economic and other factor* involving
the nation aa a whole.^ There wee a tendency for the Amy in particular
to view all-out, total war in tern* of the &usse«Japanese War rather than
in view of what soon a conflict would be decade* later*
th* ostrsw««seT of Km poker
The task of those seeking to build American air power into an
effective farce was to remain a difficult one ftan 1932 to 1931* «3y the
late 1920*0 soma progress was beInn made in the expansion of aviation
from the near disastrous state to which it had been allowed to fall,
bet the depression overtook these programs and the scale that had been
set were not reached* These were net entirely barren years, however*
end by the end of 1931 Amy and Havy aviation was at least approaching
the threshold of the technology and theory that was to be expanded and
developed into a victory formula over 10 years later*
fteny of the obstacles to air power development have been mentioned
&* Hayashi. KjQfltuw * p. 2.
33. Sattori, "Complete History*" p# W*
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briefly in earlier caaptere. these were not to 4lMpo««r daring the
years covered by tills chapter, although some, such a* the cotstrovaray
ever separate air forces And the #itehell«»enjirendered alrpower versus
sospower dispute > vara to bo put aside temporarily. It would not only
ba a formidable task to discuss In any detail the reasons for thaaa
obstacles, un\t beyond the scope of thia paper, *nd «o tha focus will
ba on pregreas made in aviation that had or una to have an offaot on
Pacific nor planning and polioy.
Of tha two air arms, naval aviation raqulraa first attantioni
for success in any war afainat Japan during thia parted would dapand
largely on how wall tha %a*f could naat tho assumption* and requirement*
of tha lataat Qranjga Plan, Also as long as tha llavy remained America's
first lino of defense, and was fraa to plan for offansivo and dafonsivo
missions to fulfill this mission tharo was mora froadom to adapt tha
alrplana to tasks other than striot defense*
Prior to 1922 tha Mevy had boon making pl*a« for talcing tha alrplana
to saa whara it would aarva primarily In a scouting and obsarvation
role* After tha bombing trials and tha Washington Oonforanea float
aviation was given added importanoa by many in tha ftavy* Jhil* numarous
military leaders did not think that aviation would ba as affaotlva
against tha Japanese fleet in the <&st«rn faelfle as it had bean in
sinking the uatfrissUnfl.^* others argoad that naval aviation and* In
particular carrier aviation, was possibly tha last remaining mesne
whereby the fleet might operate effectively west of Hawaii without





adequate bases. **3 x» Haroh of 1922 the tan^ley was coaeslssloned and the
,*ary now had *n experimental carrier In addition to eight battleship*
outfitted with turret launcher* for c**ol*a»«« The following year
the ;*avy succeeded in getting authorisation for two additional carriers,
thooo to bo 33»&00-to« conversions from two battle cruisers loft uneow~
plated as a rooult of the rive Power fcaval ireaty. On* important point
in **ar AitelrAl ttoffett's arpwents for these conversions was the know*
ledge thAt Japan was planning to build up to her full allowance of
carriers. >lnoe the hanglay did not count in Anerloa'a 135,030 tons,
the completion of the two converted cruiser bulls would still leave the
United itatee £9,000 of carrier tonnage unfilled*
Although the fcavy had carrier airplanes at sea by 1923 there wore
no plans for a carrier task force for independent strike operations.
The carrier was still tied closely to the battleship fleet, and its
prbte mission was to provide air scouting and protection of toe
38
battle-lino,' This included not only protection against surface ships
and submarines, but against hostile aircraft threatening the fleet and
United States territory* koffett had declared shortly after the first
successful landing on the Leagjoy that "the air fleet of an enouy will
tv&wwr get within striking distance of our coasts as long as our aircraft
oarrlers are able to carry the preponderance of air power to sea.**"
35. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Sarber . p* Sty Sprout and {Sprout, Toward
A. Hew QrqerY p* 236*
'
36. Willis* Green and John Pricker, The Air forces of the *.-orid
(r;ew terki Hanover House, 1958} • p. 310.
37. Archibald 2. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, history of United states
t
val aviation (Hew tfavent Tale University ?reas, 19W, P. 210*
^U, o* 310.
39. Ibid.* p. 215.
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Bat even &n air*»inded admiral like Moff«tt wit still ranking the
gunnery snottlnt? and scouting missions of naval aircraft ahead of bombing
in 1928,*°
In February 1923 aircraft participated in their flrat float
exercise with single planes representing whole squadrons and launched
from a battleship. These "squadrons" were successful Is attacking the
Panama Canal without being attacked by either anti-aircraft guns or
ill
defending aircraft. * this Halted exercise showed that It night be
possible for carrier aviation to have a larger role than envisaged at
tho tine.
Despite these early successes In shipboard aviation, naval aviation
by the mid-1920«e was still fighting a battle for recognition, expansion
and even survival. 'While some new aircraft had been provided the fleet,
and while technological Improvements such as the air-cooled engine and
catapults on battleships were being adopted, there was still the problem
of limited funds for expansion and replenishment, and too often the air
arm had to depend on the dead hand of obsolete *or!4 *ter X equipment..
This parsimonious treatment was not entirely due to Congress » as conser-
vatism and threats to vested Interests made the ievy Department Itself
often less than enthusiastic about appropriation requests from the iureau
of Aeronautics,
?hs fight for survival as a separate air arm was won soon after the
**>. Sftwerd Arpee, from Frlcatsa to Fiat-tops (Lake forest t Edward Arpee,
1953) • p. W,~
M. Tumbull and Lord, fllstpry of WfaA 3.*irtf $**& WMp* *• »*•
4*. at?—, from frigates to flat-top*, o. 121 1 Ashbrook Lincoln, "the
United state* JSavy and the ftise of the Doctrine of Air Power,"
Hllltarv Affairs. Vol. 15 (mi, 1951) • f>. 156,
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borrow :iaArd roport in which this ootc&lttao. Appointed by frosidoat
Coolldgo to oonsldor «*tfco ooat ftOAns of dsvoloping and Applying aircraft
la actional Oof*»ao #M ' opposod a slagl* Air sorvioo And * gonera!
vindication to too status sua In th« organisation of th« nttt ion* a *ir
Ants* Walls th« appointnont of this oowwittoo In 1925 was widoly intor-
protod as a Moans of countering tho unfavorable publicity froa tho
PitehAll oourt-auirtiAl, And tho Anticipated pro-ujvificatlon roooanandations
of tho Lamport Joanitlao (concurrently i .'berked on a sweeping re* lev of
Military aeronautic*) , Ita impact on the Savy aviation was so profound
thAt Its roport has boon termed tho "feiaguA Cart ivuX Aviation* " *
This ssssis An overstatement, but most demands that All Aviation bo ttnlflsd
were to bo put away for a while, And the findings of the boArd wore An
important factor In Congressional legislation soon to be passed thAt
Authorlssd some icng~neoded expansion for Aviation.
In -June of 1926 Congress parsed An sot Authorising a five~yoAr
program for building 1,000 aircraft including replacements to maintain
thAt figure, this was a giant stop toward what was needed, but only a
hAlf stop* as appropriations still had to bo nods* After delay And cuts
In requests by tho "ajreau of the Budget, Congress finally Approprlatod
approximately 60 percent of too amount that tho »avy estimated tho
program would require. Jeneress, being eonoornod about aviation At tho
time, was rosponslblo for restoration of some of tho funds out by tho
*3. Office of Air force History, Tho Army &U» Forces In Worlfl *+? II
(Vol. 1, f\m aryl ffarly ^poro^ns,, Wssloy >TAnk CrAVon And « ales
Loa Cats, ods., Chicago « Tho University of Chios*© Proas, tW),
p. 23.
***** 1JS44*» pp* 27*28.
*5. **P*w. Fran gfrtaft** fr, A»V4W» •• »5.

bureau of the budget. He thi« wa» not overwael^iag generosity,
iho five year program **« to provide ft vital springboard for navel
aviation growth arri achievement.
In late 192? tho conversion of the two cruiser hulls to carriers
was oomnletsd and t**e ^aratoge and Lexington *ere commissioned, giving
tho United >tates what wis at that time tho largest and fastest carriers
in tho world. Tho same year tho ttureau of Aeronautics, Impressed by
Japan* a uao of tho small oarrior flosbo , recommended that tho .iavy
build five 13,300-ton carriers, one to bo built during oaoh of tho next
five roars* in favor of several small oarriora * as opposed to favor
largo ones, was more invulnerability t$i tho ability to keep moro
aircraft in the air for a longer period of time* Tho General stoerd of
the Wavy agreed to the recommendation , but Congress was less generous
•
approving the eonstruotion of only one. America, therefore* was to wait
to build up to treaty strength in carriers, but the ones she had in 192ft
and 1929* in addition to providing demand for airoraft and thus giving
Impetus to the expansion program, were eoon to show the full offensive
potential of naval aviation.
£Leet exerelses and war games were nothing new in 192& end 1929, even
those involving airoraft* let in these years there were two war games
which have ooaring on a study of air power in Facifio policy, i^he first
was a series of war games held around the Hawaiian Islands in 1926.
On a Sunday morning during these games the Laaglsy launched her aircraft
on a surprise assuit against Pearl Harbor, fhe Attacking planes were
587"" Turnbull and Lord, ^atory of Onlted State* ftlaval Aviation , pp. 257-
260.
*7. Ibid., p. 261.
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successful* ravening their target undetected and catching the defender*
are later *•<
identical attack, but this time it was net to be a war game.
In January 1929 a fleet exercise that was to receive stash acre
attention nee held with the Panama Canal being the target and with two
aircraft carriers* the Lsxinaton, and the Saratoga . participating,
total of 256 aircraft* including **9 land-based* were involved* The
attacking force was the battle .-loot under Admiral ..4111am ¥, Pratt*
and in its attempt to attack the canal the carrier ^ar&toga embarked
on operations independent of the main attacking body* On the morning
of the 25th her aircraft successfully attacked the Panama Canal and
nearby airfields and safely returned with only one technical Ices.
This lesson of what a fast carrier could do when given a proper
opportunity was to have an leportant impact. One result was the study
of the possibility of forming carrier task groups* which were to be
complete tactical units with a carrier at the core operating to provide
hja
independent but simultaneous attacks ahead ef the Battle Fleet.
1931 the formidable potential of the fast carrier task force was being
recognised, and the carrier was threatening the battleship as the ba<
bone of the fleet, full recognition and the requisite strength to carry
out these concepts were still a long way off* but this was a most
Important step.
The depression had overtaken the progress of the five year expansion
plan in 19>"> and this particularly interfered with the attainment of the
3T "arpem* ?rpm, ffrlgafrts to,, ftsyfapm. p. 1*9.




goal* of thai. plan, let the expansion achieved should not be ainiaised*
/roiii less than 5>5 operational *ir<s?».ft la 392** ta» aavy at th* end of
the five year plan hud 95® operttlorwd aircraft, 216 additional aircraft
on order, and one additional carrier under construction, :>i
^•oLoynantfr of naval aircraft la the Facif ic consisted of float
operations which have been nentloned, plus defense and patrol aircraft
on tho Hawaiian and Philippine Islands* the only active iavolvenent
of Unitod states aircraft ooeured in 1927 and 1923 when a dsteohatent of
Marina aircraft vara sent from 3uam waii Jan Jlago to China as part of
America's Harina roinforeotaents, when the Chinese Civil War threatened
American lives and property in tho *hanj?h*i and Poking area* Eventually
there were to be three Carina squadrons stationed there including
fighter, scout and observation contingents, they were to rcRain for
one and one~half years, fly over 3,813 sorties, mostly around fsientsln
and primarily reconnaiaance niasions, to keep the Chinese adveraarles
under survellanoe. Vhila they were fired upon, they did not fire a
shot in anger.
The Amy air am was to be faced with many of the sane probleas
as the 8*vj from 1922 to 1931* Amy aviation was handicapped in 1922
by obsolete and inadequate equipment, inadequate personnel, a lack of
recognition by the Amy, no representation on the General *taff and a
disinclination by Congress, the *'ar jepartseent and the General >taff
to do much about remedying these problcRS, In addition to these the
Amy Air Service had a problem which was causing special difficulty
JET Croon and Pricker, *fr forces , p. 312,
51. Sober* Oherrod, flU^yy of fts*frny .Corps ArMMffiR, %$.„**>*H «»T ft A
xsMnztunt Combat Forces Press , 1952), pp, 2?w
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naasely the problem of finding a mission and developing en air doctrine
for the future while tied to tho Halted role of coastal defense.
% 1922 tho 7*0*9 of postwar neglect were bogInning to catch up
with tho Aray »\i* Service. Tho surplus aircraft of World '4*r I that
hod ooirlod It along were beeeainft excessively obsolete and fowor in
limbers* and air units were booonlng «©re and wore cadre or$*nl«etiens.
The situation was a grin one, and tho nood for remedial action to prevent
tho virtual extinction of tho air am was reeoanised by «or* Just
alr«*nthuslasts. In 1923 tho tormy General Staff appointed its own hoard
,
tho Lassiter Board* to examine tho present stato of tho Air Service.
This board found that tho Air Service was praotioally demebiliaed, and
recognising tho Increasing importance of aviation It roooemonclad a ton*
year expansion program sailing; for 2*530 aircraft, and tho organisation
of tho ma>rtty of offensive aviation into a Oonoral Headquarters (
is
striking fore*. This would have plaoatod sjany of thoao crying for
greater autonomy of th* Air Service, but this was In th* saiddl* of tho
heated air power and separate air fore* controversy* and when the
proposals reached the Joint Board and wet naval opposition* the
ieoretary of tiar, who had approved the proposals* let them die a quiet
death* S3
amy aviation by this tine was centered around the pursuit
aircraft* as this was felt to be the dominant type of aircraft by
virtue of the experiences of the war* fhls view was to predominate
until the 19$)* s« But if pursuit was to be the main Interest of the
&. Qravenand v*te* flejis an^, farfr ftporaMpns* p. 26.
53* areen and Pricker, Air Forces * p* 2$U
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Amy *** »** *» th» Chief of the Air Service, Major Ganaral
Mason K« Patrick, irsed, ono would bo hardVpressed to detect this frcM
aircraft strength figures of 192&. Of \y$b An** aircraft only ?5*fr were
in oesmissleaa ^*w. If «ny« *•*• saodem, tad only 7$ were pursuit
aircraft, the bulk being training and observation planes*
In addition to a replaesitejit and exgtnnsi&n program the ;'a*»y Air
:>erviee vitally/ needed representation on tha General Staff If it was
to got any roal opportunity to affoat policies at a high level, Thie
body was raeofmlead by ariatora aa th« stronghold of bureaucratic eon*
aorvatian* and in aany way* their judgnent was a eorraot one.
Tha report of the Horrov aoard in 1925 was * nixed blessing to tha
Aray Air ierviea and reaction vaa not as favorable here aa it was within
tha tfavy air am* Itegsrding tha Amy the report conceded that there
was sows distinction between support aviation and offensive striking
aviation, but confined its positive reee&nen&atlons to a reeoamendation
that the Air service be renaned the Air Corns and be reoreaented In the
Oeneral <:*taff , KnA that there be appointed an assistant Secretary of 'sitae
to supervise aviation.^*
fhesa reooanendations were given sanction in the Air Corp* Act
of 1926. the Air Service became the Air Corps, there was to be an air
section within each division of the Oenerel Staff* and the position of
Assistant Secretary of War to help in promoting military aviation was
established. The Amy Air Corps also recieved authorisation for a five
5*, Green and !?rie3eer, Air Forces , p. 291.
55. Craven and cat*, plans »rrf
.ftyfc qftora^oias. P*>* **•»•

year orofram to es&and aviation and to correct deficiencies, -The plan
16
authorised *xj>anfile»n to a total strength of 1900 aircraft,
fhe results of this were to prove disappointing to the Air Ciorps,
which tjuiekly found that a change in met* did sot bartn~ a change in
status* fhe Mr Corps continue*? at a mere branch of the tangr and aa
such had even lota orestisje than the infantry* svsn representation on
the General Staff nroved to bo of little value* The five year program
also fail abort of Its seel, in part because of the depression, but alao
because funds mire not nade available in the leseunts needed* Here much
of the bleite aeons to rest on the War Separtnent and the Buruau of the
Budget* tihoae cute in requests averaged about kO peroent over the five
year period*" Xet the program was far from being a complete failure.
Pre* en aircraft complement of 968 aircraft in 1926, with less than Z$$
of those considered modern, toe &rmy Air Sorps by the end of the program
in ilane of 1932 had increased its tetsl number of squadrons from 37 to
*5 and had ft total of 1,709 aircraft* 5
®
the period was also far from barren in technological advances.
1931 the Air Corps1 eaehasie on increased range was paying dividends,
and such improvements in aircraft as variable pitch profilers,
retractable landing fear, infllfht refueling* better fcembsi^its and
bomb racks improved the position of American aircraft.
The main problem of the Army Air Corps still remains to be
discussed* this was the problem of developing an air doctrine* Tied
5&* Ommejid Jete, flans end ^r^«f«frte»> p. 29*
13Q7«A;jffi (Princetonj B, Van Jtestrand Company, Inc., ifyrJV P« 37*
Craven and Gate, flaps and ^arly, po*^»n*» »* ^*
5S* Goldberg, i&s^ory of
.ftho MM,&&m As? ftm* ?• 3?.
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to support of ground amies and th© official public polio? of defense
only, the Air Corps was not only straggling within the confinea of s
narrow ©oncost* but in the absence of s clear-cut, well*definsd
strategic policy for the United States there was in reality little wore
that it could do to improve its position*
The basic problem was reconciling the official policy of defense
of the United states and Its possessions with theories of strategic
air attack in which air forces would devote the great majority of their
effort in wart fete to missions independent of land and naval forces and
designed to destroy the enemy* s morale* will to resist * centers of
production, transportation and other objectives not necessarily on the
fighting lines* This was a dilemma for leaders of Amy aviation* but
in the absence of a clearly defined strategic premise which Army aviation
could use in planning* the official Army policy had to be faithfully
observed, Acceptance of this ruled out any plans for large-scale
expeditionary operations* and so aviation procurement, equipment,
planning, training and tactics was of necessity confined* on the surface
at least* to the furtherance of the d^tm** concept* And this seems to
have been generally accepted by a majority of Air Corps leaders until
well into the W&'s, 59
Many aviation strategists* however* found it difficult to rule out
completely offensive theories of air warfare* and as a result there was
to develop throughout the 1920' s and 1930* s a growing body of theory
for future strategic missions. Considerable caution had to be exercised
>• S***** The Develoment of Air Ppotrtao. pp. 29-31* 52*
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in doing this* for excessive devotion to enytfciag but the official
doctrine was likely to bo treated as heresy within the War Department,
end the American public wee easily aroused over oner plans or equipment
that suggested en offensive nor nee being contemplated.
One oonsacuenoe of this nee th» kind of organisational sehiso*
ohrenia in the Air Ceres and much double*talk about air doctrine. Ae
an example there wore two well-fornulated plane for the nee of air power
in 1926o Training angulation #»Q-15» fundamental Principles of
aaplojfiaent of the Air Service," dated January 26, 1926* and promulgating
the official air doctrine* wee sanctioned by the Oeneral Staff and ^ar
Department and* although it made a few traditional concession* to the
possibility of limited strategic-type operations it represented the
traditional attitude to war and air power* T!l~ViO~\5 described the
fundamental mission of air units as aiding ground forces in the achieve*
merit of decisive victory* and this was to be c^ne by both direct and
indirect aid* Direct aid was to be provided by air units operating as
an organic part of the ground command* while indirect support might be
provided by other unite which say or may not be in the immediate battle
area* The latter would be a G-HQ air force* a self-contained, highly
mobile force, whose objectives upon outbreak of war would be to gain
control of the air, disrupt enemy movements and faculties, protect
friendly forces from enemy air attack, and then either aid the ground
forces directly or continue Indirect support "whenever conditions are
favorable* by carrying out special missions at great distance from the
ground forces" against targets which might include critical areas of the

6?
ensoy homeland. This Bound* *tor« radical than it was, ami while it
provided 3SQ aviation with a limited strike ala*ion and gave recognition
to th* OtU eoneept, it lifts not until 1933 that a 3%2 air fore© was
created. 61
Also to aopoar in &prli 1926 was the Air Service Tactical School
tost* tha "Combined Air Force Text." It envisaged the mission of tho
air forces as cooperation with tha military and naval forces in tha
furtherance of tha national war pallor ***i operations which would destroy
tha *nm&*9 mersle and will to resist by tha ajost effective means
available. While this embraced tha doctrine of ours strategic warfare,
tha teat also recognised tha necessity of gaining control of tha air and
providing soma assistance to fiold forces.
WhlXa radically different in concept, thasa two documents contain
two points in common* they both recognised some tm^d for aviation
support of ground forces, and both wars emphatic that control of the
air was vital* Tet even in these areas there was conflict, and this
was to stand in the way of Air Corps expansion geared to meat even Its
official role* Beth the Savy aoard unA the Amy General Staff seriously
doubted the possibility of significant air attacks against the United
States, giving substance to argument* against a large air force, and the
61
Kavy was doubtful of the value of air power for coastal 6»fitnM9
the problem of responsibility for eosetel defenses had become a
source of Amy«Havy conflict when the shore-based Amy airplane began
60. Craven and Cate, foeae f^d jftarfr ppera^ons,, p. ^5.
61. lbJ4.« p, 31»
62. 0*-*, rhff l^eve^ffsfn^ ,o,f ^ir jXKftrfrno, w* 31. *i.
*3. IkM*» ?• 3*.

to challongo tho fiary's traditional responsibility for defense beyond
the shore!Ins, The Aeronautical #oard in 191? solved the problaa
temporarily by deciding that the shoreline would bo tho lino of
this demarcation was becoming aero and wore unworkable as tho Mavy
began baaing aircraft la tho Amy* a domain, and tho Amy often extended
ita flight* beyond tho shoreline. Tho Joint Board atteaated to eolm
tho dispute la 192? la a publication It Issued entitled Joint action
of tho Amy and tho 8avy. In coastal dofonao tho $**?*» **** «**
declared to bo support of "local naval dofonao forces operating for tho
protection of lines of aoa communication and ooaatal sonoa agalnet
attacks by hostile subaarinca or surface raiders," *«4 tho taek of
Amy aircraft was to dofond harbors, cities and aunition plants In
United .iUtei territory.
'
This brought littlo relief to an Aray air am that was anxious to
extend ita ooaatal dofonaoa far out to aoa to intercept both enemy
aircraft and ships. In view of hl#s level doubts about hostile aircraft
attacks, tho amy Air Coma sight wall ham wondered if It had a mission
at all. ?ho stalemate was to eontlnuo until 1931 when Admiral
William Pratt who had booofto Chief of 8aval operations, roaohod an
agreement with tho Amy Chief of staff, Goncral Douglas MaoArthar, by
which tho f*avy air am would relinquish ita coastal dofonao responsibilities
and future demarcation was to bo dotomlnod by mission mthor than
6*. Adrian 0. Von Wyen, ?he Aomnaufrloel
.foard, fflo-jfflg (waeadnftero
director of >&avel History, 19^7) • p. 30,
65, furnbuU and Lord, history of tfaltad States NatajL Aviation , p. 273,
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geography. Pratt** motivation was to note* tho defensive miaaien a
secondary one and to *tr*s* development of Hoot offans!*® potential
rather than leaving any portion of too floot waiting for attack in
defending the ©east* Tho PratWiaeArthur agreement was not a clear-
cut decision and tho controversy was to continue, bat in many ways It
wa* a landmark agreement. Aside from underlining increasing Navy
emphasis on offensive air power aa the boat defsnse, tho decision was
a major novo to fro* tho Army Air Corp* from dofons* of cities, harbor*
,
and munition plant** and opened tho way for a new exploration of tho
rolo tho Amy9 * air am should play in national defense. It was to pa**
the way for tho long rang* bomber to play a koy rolo in d*f*n*o of tho
Unit*d State* and it* overseas possissiems.
Tho importance of tho problem of finding an air dootrino 1* of
thraofold importance to thi* study as it helps explain event* to happen
over ton years later. First, the neglect of American Army sir power is
partially explained by the limited mission that it wa* assigned, fhis
i* far from being th* only reason* but air defense of an area that was
not felt to be in real danger of attack or of a possession like the
Philippines which by 1931 was becoming more a sacrificial lamb, va&
support of ground forces whieh were at almost minimal level and whloh
planned no large expeditionary mission were net missions conducive to
the development of massive air power* second « the narrow boundaries of the
defense-only dootrino reflects the dichotomy whieh is a major theme of
this papers the gap between American oommltmenta and willingness to




support them. Finally, the air doctrine of T-WtfO»i5 to to bo found
elsewhere in almost identical form. It is strikingly similar to
Japanese air doctrine of the 1930* s. &at Ameriee hod more expensive
doctrines develop**! end waiting ia th® wings* Japan remained largely
inflexible.
Xn examining aviation developments in Japan from 1922 to 1931 one
ia confronted with an alarming scarcity of information* The few
available details are too often of questionable accuracy* and may are
later centredieted by wore reliable information on a later period* Xt
would be possible to fill some of the gaps by way of inference from the
better~docm«nted aviation events of the 1930 • s» bat this process will
be used sparingly to avoid repetition*
Mm
Japan's plans to expand her aviation ' after '.*urld ,«ar X brought
Impressive expansion and developments in that country's air power,
although economic and technological problems and a national tendency
toward disarmament and financial retrenchment prevented the program
from producing all that was t^*9iJtmi m Nevertheless* her progress was
such that Japan was listed by the ffigfr Aircraft yearbook as a stgnlfleant
potential air power, while the United Hates was not mentioned in the
same listing.
Japan oontlnued to rely to a large extent on foreign aviation
missions and foreign equipment to strengthen her air forces* The success
of these missions was apparently more than acceptable, for Japan is
reported to have sent home in late 1923 one-third of the Sritiah air
o7* 3ee above* p. 32.

nTiiasicm advising on the construction of th« JipuwM aircraft industry*
becww of tfa* great progress made, Japan was also keeping h«r eyes
open to aviation developnents abroad , maintaining a mission in ?r*ne*> 9
and employing l?reneh technicians to visit the United States to obtain
information on technological progress there, "
"
Too Imperial Japanese Sary'e air am demands particular attention
not only boeauso of the progress it made* but because it was th© air
branch of tho service with prima responsibility for operations against
America in tho ovont of hostilities, tho iJavy had made plana for
expanding ***$ strengthening Its aviation units in I9S0» and aftor tho
rlaahington Conforonco tho Navy» fooling that tho inferior ratio accepted
there would "weaken the Imperial 8iavy»p napped out even more extensive
70
plans to overcome theae weaknesses in part by building up air strength,'
While this program suffered from 1922 to 1927 Jm^hn was to beoome
a loading nation in aircraft carrier aviation by 1924, Japan* s first
experimental carrier , the Hpsho . was completed in 1922. and in Keren
1923 Siavy pilots participated in their first carrier qualifications. 71
In the same year the first fleet exercises involving carrier aircraft
were held,72
Japan elected to convert ships into carriers that were designated
to be scrapped. In 1922 or 1923 work began on converting tho Amaffi
**** &fc»M Into Z? $50Q ton carrier*. Tho Aaajtl was damaged in the
^ Aircraft yearbook 192fr. p, 200,
70, "Outline of Ksvsl Armaments and Preparations for 'tfar* (5 partSt
Japanese studies in Jorld rfar II, Japanese Ponograph 145,
Washington* mimeographed, undated copy in office of the Chief
of military tSistory, Part i» 1922~l93k)» P. ?•
71, tfohn Ceane Potter* Tanamotp {mm forki tho diking Press, 1965)
.
p, 22.
72, Uroraft teerbeofe 19ff>. p. 201,

nearthquake of 1923 end scrapped before sonstruetion was completed,
but a replacement , to besoms the lags * was soon ordered, the frfcafl
when It Joined the fleet gave Japan a modern* fast ©«rrl*r capable of
carrying over 50 aircraft, ^r 1927 Japan was rapidly pushing toward
maximum treaty strength la carriers with construction authorised or
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th» carrier that was to become the lyujo . *
Japan was also putting aircraft on battleship* and developing
landUbaaed and sea«ba**d airplanes. Aviation was rttll tied to ths
fleet and rsoonnaisaneo and gm spotting a primary mission* tut ths
sues*** of tho Siavy air am in aortal bombing during ths 1930*0 and
aftsr would strongly auggsst that preparation for strlks missions was
not nsglsotsd. It would also seam correct to conclude that increasing
emphasis was given to anti-ship missions, air control and amphibious
support scissions. Prow 1924 to 1930 ths aunber of fi&hter and attack air
units was to mors than double.'
Ths Japanese l.iavy doss not seem to have ssoapsd an airpowsr versus
soapowsr controversy. 3rsn though this nation mads imaging strides in
naval aviation during ths 1920* a » Japan sssnsd to havs hsr share of
tradition-winded naval offloors who dsprsoiatsd ths ralus of air power*
considered oarrisrs too vulnerable, and fslt ths battlsship was always
to remain ths key to naval supremacy. Soma of thsss wsrs to remain
faithful to this conviction to ths end of aforld *ar Ilv ' There is also
evidence to suggest that there was a dominant naval view in ths 1920*
s
73. "Outline of JNaval Armaments *" p. 19.
7<*. Ibid., p. 7.
75. Kuehida and Okunlye, Hldvay . pp. 240-2fel.
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that the beat *ir defenae of Japan mm a t&rc* of auxiliary vessels
strong enough to pravent hostile carriers fro* getting within launching
range. Japanese air power advocates also appear to have taken extreme
position* branding tha battleship aa completely worthless.7?
3y 1931 naval air power bad become strong enough to play an
Important part in operational planning for any future conflict. Like
United States naval aviation* Japan was placing increasing emphasis on
offensive air operations against sea and land targets, and this focus,
which node necessary extensive training in ©verwater navigation and
aircraft with capacity for long range flights, was to pay important
dividends for the next ten years.
Japanese tossy aviation after 1922 centissued its expansion program
in spits of a general tendency to reduce toe sise of the Japanese
78
Any* Raphaels was placed on the reoonnalsance and pursuit function,
but bombing aviation was gaining in Importance throughout the 1920* a.
The air units remained subordinate to ground force commanders who
viewed aircraft primarily as a tactical weapon for inmedlate support
of troops at short range. Training, organisation and technological
developments were geared to this concept. Throughout most of the period
there does not seem to have been too much concern over the threat of
air attacks against J^p»n9 probably because of the absence of threatening
76. M. a. Kennedy, 3omo Aspect* of Japan and ffor i?efonse forces
77. fuchida and Otnwiya, Midway, p. #»0.
?S. Kennedy, 3ome Aspects of Japan * p. 11
79. United States, Un^od atafros,
..sfrfiSyHft?>wMM , *ffW ***WP '*!*
(So. &5, Japanese Air Power , tfashingtoni Military Analysis
Division , 19**5), p. 1*
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air ocwer in h*U and because of Japan* s geographic*! position*
Consequently bar air dofensoe wore organised ineffestively and
destined to remain neglected.
So evidence hat boon found that suggests there was an air
doctrine controversy in Japan during thia period, although it la highly
improbable that the gospel of strategic air power aa preached bgr
Mitchell and Ottilia aeuhet wont unheard* If thoro were propononta of
such doetrinoa in Japan it would soon that they either went unnoticed or
ignored, for Japan at no time to tho end of world War XI was capabio
of making heavy, sustained, lenf-range attacks on roar aroas or economic
m
targets* ' This was in largo part duo to too stratoglo premise adopted
after 1913 that a short war with a quick victory was necessary, and
long-rancfo, strategic bombing was not felt necessary for this.
<J*pBn»M air units remained deployed in Formosa and Korea to
support conventional forces in defending these possessions* The Army
aircraft in Soros had m en additional mission support of the Kvaatung
Army Oarriaon guarding the Southern Manohurian Railroad* * the only
major deployment of Japanese air unite in response to a threat use in
1928 when about six Army airplanes were used in the Japanese occupation
of Tainan in dhantung Province of Chins in response to threats to Japanese
m
interests during ths Chinese civil war* Ho information of their role
in this oocupation has been found*
M. OtAtod States, Sfrr^offle, ^cab^ aurvcy p. 2.
ol* Xbid», p. 1*
83* "Japanese Oporational Planning,,** p* 20*
*** "Air Operations t93i«19**5M (Vol. 4, Japanese studies on Manchuria,




Aia pov/sa kno diplomacy
The last days of the summer of 1931 offor a significant point at
which an avalnation of air power as a factor in ?*r Eastern relations
can bo made. Air power by September of that year had takon its plaoo
in th« arsenals of both Japan and ths United States and each recognised
the potential threat of the others air power. 3ut air power was too
much of an infant to be a major factor in shaping events in the Pacific
at that tine. One must look elsewhero for factors that shaped Japanese
or American decisions on international relations. Before 1931 little
use had been made of aviation in actual hostilities in the Far siast
but the rudiments of what wss soon to follow were there.
A comparison of Japanese and American aviation technology and air
doctrines reveals acre similarities than differences with both nations
making impressive technological advances and both gradually expanding
an air doctrine in a parallel fashion In spite of many obstacles, Iet
one is cautioned not to ascribe sore to air power development in these
years than is due. fhe cries of the Mitohelites notwithstanding . the
fact remained that the air weapon* s true potential wss still largely
unknown* and a weapon's value is generally measured in how well it fits
present assumptions of warfare, not those of some unknown point in the
future. What wss known in 1931 was that the airplane had value as a
scout, sn observer* a gunfire spotter* and in a more limited sense it
could be used in pursuit and bombing. The J9pttm»9 and the Americans
assigned to the airplane missions commensurate with its ability* and
while air employment doctrines ware beginning to swing more to emphasis
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on the latter two functions, those who would assign the more ambitious
tactical and strategic missions to air power would have to wait until
technology, resources, organisation and decislc n-tnakors would support
such a doctrine.
A few summary generalisations on war planning are also in order,
Japanese and American war plans and defense policies had contained
provisions for operations against each other for over 20 years,
are of immense significance in the sense of their recognition of the
possibility of war over conflicting policies, and in their adoption of
basic concepts for war that remained generally constant. Beyond these
two attributes though, one east brand both nation* s efforts at war
planning as unsound. The United States had devoted much attention to
its Orange plans, but in 1931 the gap between American Pacific
commitments, which the plan professed to uphold, and the military
ability to enforce them was so great that War Plan Orange was each
year becoming little more than an academic exercise in unreality.
Japanese war plana provided broad strategic concepts, but few details
and remained excessively vague on specifying just how a war was to be
finally won. Japan's never-abandoned national policy was such that the
provocation of war with the United States, China and Russia, either
singly or simultaneously was possible, yet her plans made no provision
for total war or fighting more than one enemy at a time. *Jut whatever
the shortcomings of either plan, events were soon to reconfirm that
one ionr-standing premise was correct! American and Japanese Far
jist policies were incompatible.
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The policies of friendship, internationalism and peaceful diplomaoy
that characterised the foreign relations of Japan from 1922 to 1931
and brought with only occasional exceptions comp urative harmony to United
States-Japanese relations, were becoming increasingly unacceptable to
large segments of the Japanese population from 1927 on. Constitutional
and party government had been workable as long as it could retain
popular support by maintaining prosperity and at least a status quo in
Manchuria, but in 192? a chain of events started, which was to lead to
the downfall of liberal party government and to the ascendency of the
militarist, nationalist and extremist elements,
the decline of p*rty government began with an economic crisis in
1927 end the loss of public support that followed was intensified with
public resentment at the Hamagucht government's acceptance of less than
parity at the 1930 London Saval Conference. When the world depression
reached Japan on top of already serious economic deflation, Japan was
hit exceptionally hard, and the political parties received the brunt
of the blame, not only did the depression call into question the
validity of Japan's constitutional order, but it east doubts upon the
value of the world economic system. Arguments for military expansion
to create an autonomous Japanese economic empire insulated from the
vagaries of the world economy became more widespread.
In addition to the crisis within Japan, there was also a threat
to the status quo in Kanehurla from a more unified, strengthened
nationalistic China that was attempting to undermine Japan's position
95. John K. Fairbank, -sdwin 0. iielschauer and Albert H. Craig, aast Asia f





in Manchuria. There was also a risursronc© In Soviet Russian power in
the Far 3ast which had been daisenstrated in the Sino-Russian border war
of 1929. **ith China actively challenging Japan1 s "lifeline of empire*
and with Russia a potential threat, 3hidehara*s "friendship policy*
was soon to ©rureble, as the Army, with growing support froa important
groups of the population, chose to initiate a return to a "positive
policy.
*
36. Fairbank, aelsohauer and Craig, SaetAsia, pp. 5&3-536.

i u m ikt
JAPAKS5S AIR P» ;, 1931.1935
When a bomb damaged a small section of the track* of the Japanese
ath Kanchurian Hallway a few miles north of Mukden on the even:,
of September 18, 1931. Japan returned to a "positive policy*' with a
vengeance. It was a Manufactured crisis, plotted by officers of the
Japanese Kwantung Amy with the knowledge of that Amy's command!
general and the General staff in Tokyo, 1 and the Japanese forces
wasted no time in launching "punitive operations" which were to expand
Japan's control into all of Manchuria and carts of Inner Hongolia and
northern China before a truce in 1933.
Japandid not delay in employing its air power in the conflict.
Amy aviation units were widely used as Japan advanced through Manchuria,
and Kevy aircraft played an active role in operations in Shanghai, ath
her use of military aviation Japan brought air power from the realm of
training operations and theory into the field of battle for the first
time in a truly modern sense. It was an Important testing ground for
equipment, tactics and doctrine, and a useful training ground for giving
combat experience to her pilots. To others, Japan's air action brought
only concern and shock, especially after her often brutal bombings of
cities.
The response of the United States to Japanese aggression was one
1 > mm* m
1. Jo tin K. ?*irbank, Mwin C. iieiscbauer and Albert .. -raig,





-sasurad caution and an opposition of diplomatic remonstrances rather
than throat of uaa of &rfr forcaful action* Japanese aerial bombard-
ment of citias provoked a violent reaction in America, but mere attitudes
and protests, no natter how strong, do not take the place of action, and
international agreements for the preservation of peace are but expressions
of sentiment and attitude unless there is an expectation of enforcement.
Japan judged correctly that the vorld in 1931 would not offer any
effective challenge to her venture.
Militarily the impact of Japan* s resumption of aggression brought
no drastic changes to American war planning and aviation development.
Var Plan Grange at the end of 1935 was basically unchanged, although Army
planners in particular had taken oareful note of Japanese action in Asia,
including her use of air power. 3y 1935 they were calling for a realistic
plan which would abandon assumptions of early operations in the Western
Pacific. American air cower was suffering from the effect of the
depression in addition to its usual obstacles, but by 1935 naval aviation
was beginning to benefit from expansion made possible in part by anti-
depression funds, and the Army finally acquired a General Headquarters
air force in addition to a prototype of a heavy, long-range bomber
i
the a*17.
Japan after her success in Manchuria began taking steps to secure
her gains in Hanehuria. A puppet state of Manchukuo was created and
recognised by Japan in 1932. fhmn the league of Nations adopted the
report of the Lytton Commission, which condemned Japan's actions in
KaneburjA and called for a restoration of Chinese sovereignty there,
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Japan resigned from the League. In 193^ Japan gave notice of her
intention to withdraw from adherence to the naval limitations of the
Washington Conference, and by early 193& she had severed completely her
connection with disarmament efforts by refusing to sign the London
5iaval Treaty and walking out of that conference, •'!thin Japan party
government caste to an end for all practical purposes with the aasasi*
nation of Premier Inukai by an ultranetionalist in Hay of 1932* The
cabinets for the next four years were to be a precarious balance of
factions held together by two moderate admirals, but time was running
out on parliamentary democracy in Japan,
m traiAR 9 am air, 1931*1933
jhile the Japanese government was recovering from the surprise of
the military* s latest use of its autonomy of command and trying to
reassert control over Japan's foreign policy by limiting the hostilities*
the Kwantung Army had already seised Mukden and Changchun from the
Chinese and were preparing to extend their conquests throughout all of
Kenehurla. There was little doubt that the Mukden crisis and subsequent
action had been long-planned, that it was deliberate, and that Japan*
a
2
designs were political as well as military. The government of Prime
Minister ^atkatsukl attempted to convince the world on September 21
that Japanese forces were acting only in self-defense and that the Army
was already returning to the South Manchuria Railway sons, but the Army
3
was actually continuing its advance. In addition the Kwantung Army was
2. H&irttj L, Stimson, the far Saltern Crisis (Stow Xorkt Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1936)* pp. 32*33.
3, Pairbank, Relsohaumr and Craig, jast Asia , p, 537*
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getting assistance In Its "self-defense" operations: air squadrons of
th« Japanese Army vers arriving.
Amy operational plans before 1931 bad provided for aviation
assistance in the event of hostilities against Japanese forces protecting
the South Manchuria Hallway, and upon the opening of hostilities three
air squadrons were dispatched almost Immediately to Manchuria, One of
fa
these was sent from Korea, while two were sent from Japan* These units
were to be used exclusively for support of ground troops, but Japanese
air doctrine by late 1931 did not make this as limited a mission as one
might think* Japanese aviators were quick to demonstrate that this
included gaining air superiority and strikes away from the front lines*
The air units had an easy task in disposing of the ineffective air
forces of Manchurlan Marshall Cheng Hsueh-llang and seising his airfield
in Hukden* This quickly eliminated any serious problem of interference
from the enemy* a air power, end thus a primary requirement of effective
5
use of air power was met*
*ith only sporadic interference from Chinese aircraft thereafter,
Japanese aircraft were free to undertake armed reconnalsance missions
directed against "bandits ," and bombing missions directed both against
enemy frontlines and areas away from them* The reconnalsance missions
were to make up a large portion of the air effort in Manchuria and were
particularly important due to the lack of large, massed Chinese armies*
The reconnaisanoe planes were usually arced with machine guns end a few
bombs and ranged over vast areas of Manchuria scouting for enemy activity
4. "Air bperailons 1931»19Z*5M Vol. ^, J^unmat itudies on Hanchurls,
VJashlngtoiJi typed , undated. Office of the Chief of Military
History), p* 2.
5* Ibid,, p* kt
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and attacking band* of "bandits" when possible. .Since tha tern
"bandit" was latar defined by Prime Minister Inukai as a regular
Chinese soldier who stopped getting paid* the term apparently was
usad to describe anyone whom Japanese pilots thought was the opposition*
As the pilots became store skilled at this so did the Chinese. i*y 1932
Chinese forces, usually in small* scattered groups* had learned how
a
to anticipate air raids and to hide effectively from them. Japanese
pilots were not the only ones to learn from combat.
While reconnalsance and scouting missions were Important* it waa
the attack mission of aircraft that gave a better picture of air power
potential. The Japanese were to use fighter and bomber aircraft for
this job in addition to the armed reconnaisanee planes mentioned above*
and the Manehurlan proving ground was to bring interesting results.
there were two alternative uaem of bombing operations in support of
ground forces. Aircraft could either bomb 9inmy rear reserves* supply
depots and points of assembly just prior to the main attack of ground
forces* or they could provide close-support in the form of attacking
enemy front lines and forward artillery positions just prior to a final
ground assault. Army aircraft did both and experienced both success
and failure. The close-support role brought to light problems of
intelligence* timing and identification in addition to the problems of
accuracy. There were many instances of Japanese aircraft bombing their
6. "Air Operations," pp *f, 10.
7. United States, Department of state. Papers delating to the foreign
Washington, 19*3) • Vol. 1. p. 67.
i>. "Air Operations," p. 10.
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own forces, and extensive use of close-support tactics were further
o
frustrated by the absence of massed Chinese resistance.
Bombing attacks behind enemy lines were to have wide use in
Manchuria, and they suffered from many of the same problems. They also
presented a problem which transcended the immediate realm of military
technique and entered the domain of diplomacy and public opinion. The
hostilities were less than three weeks old when, on October 3* eleven
Japanese aircraft, flying ahead of their ground forces bombed the city
of Chinchow. The targets were apparently offices of the Manchurlan
government and railway yards with few if any targets being of a pure
military nature. Regardless of the contribution of these attacks to
the eventual capture of Chinchow, world public opinion was angrily
aroused. Japan learned quickly that foreign public opinion which might
ignore aggression on the ground became quickly inflamed when bombs fell
away from frontllnes.
By May 1932 Japan's air power In Manchuria had increased to a total
of three air battalions which included heavy and light bombing squadrons,
fighter squadrons and reconnaisanoe squadrons. These battalions became
the Kwantung Army Air Unit and began establishing airfields in Manchuria
for permanent use.
The last major operations in which aviation was involved came
between January and March of 1933 with operations against the regular
9. "Air Operations," pp. 15-20.
10. Hilton P. Ooss, Civilian Morale Under Aerial apmbardment 191*M939
( Air University Documentary Hcaoaroh Study , Montgomery, Alabama*
Research Studies Institute, Air University, 19^*9) • pp. 106-107.
11, "Air Operations," p. 2% "Japanese Operational Planning Against the
USSR, 1932-1W#M Japanese Special Study on Manchuria, Vol. 1, Army
Forces Far Hast, 1955 • unpublished monograph on file Office of the
Chief of Military History, Washington, D. C. , p. **0.
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Chinos* Amy In the Jehol and Kopel provinces of northern Chine.
these followed the general pattern of ground support operations with
12
more opportunity for dose-support missions, Some isolated air action
took place after the Tangku Truce of May 1933 t but for all practical
purposes the Amy's Manchurian air combat was over in March,
The Japanese .Navy air am was to participate in less combat action
during the Manchuria Crisis with its operations taking place in the
Shanghai area, but its bombing activity in populous and well-observed
Shanghai stirred up an even greater round of protests than the Army in
Manchuria,
Military action in Shanghai was the result of an economic boycott
and other anti-Japanese activities by the Chinese which had grown more
Intense with Japan's aggression in Manchuria, On January 20, 1932 the
Chinese Mayor of Shanghai was presented with a list of demands which in
effect called for an end to the boycott* and later warned that If these
demands were not met voluntarily Japan would take the necessary steps to
enforce them, with January 19 being soon established as the deadline.
The mayor accepted the Japanese demands in their entirety on January 2-3,
but the commander of Japanese forces nevertheless decided to send out
troops late that night to protect Japanese nationals, Early the next
morning they clashed with elements of the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army
which was quartered in the Chaipei sector to protect Shanghai and
Nanking, This force had been stationed here regularly and was not
connected with the boycott. Nevertheless the clash that occured led






In Manchuria, was all-out fighting. By March Japan was still
unsuccessful In attempts at dislodging Chinas* troops from the araa
and decided to withdraw.
Among tha many reinforcements that had arrlvad In Shanghai whlla
Japan waited for a reply to its demands was the Aircraft carrier Kaga
with a complement of about 60 airplanes. After the Chinese offered
resistance to Japanese ground forces spreading through Shanghai, Admiral
Shlosawa, the naval commander , ordered the Saga's air complement to
bomb the Chalpel sector on January 29* In the mass stack that followed
and in intermittent attacks that tcok place throughout the day the air-
craft failed to dislodge them, although they Inflicted great damage.
They did succeed in setting on fire much of the quarter of Chalpel by
incendiary bombs and in killing and injuring thousands of unwarned
civilians. These attacks have been described as the "most severe
bombing of a civilian population between 1913 and the Spanish Civil
War in 1936V' 1 -* and the world had its first glimpse of whst modern
aerial bombardment could do to a thriving, populous city.
These attacks were only the beginning of air action in the
Shanghai area. Between late January and early March when the Japanese
decided to withdraw, naval aircraft launched from the Kaga, and later
the Hosha, and from a land field which the Japanese constructed,
continued their attacks against Chinese military and civilians alike.
Bombs also began to fall upon the property of third nations, giving
14
neutral nations more substantive complaints against air attacks.
13. Qoss. Civilian Morale Under Aerial apmbardmont . pp. 106-108.
!*• Ibid. , pp. 113-116.
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It 1* difficult to determine to what degree the attacks on civilians and
property of neutral nations was deliberate. Undoubtably sone of the
attacks were designed to intimidate the population and therefore
deliberate » while others were the result of faulty intelligence * lack
of bombing skill and the close proximity of military and non-military
targets, let it is impossible to deny the possibility that oversealous
and ruthless pilots sought purposefully to inflict unnecessary injury.
In any case the Japanese were to become masters at such extracurricular
attacks from 1937 en.
the Chinese had on several occasions sent their own aircraft
against the Japanese * but they proved no match for the superior Japanese
aircraft. Japan was able to retain control of the air throughout the
hostilities. 15
The results of aerial action in Shanghai were well-observed and
well-reported. If Japan had hoped to undermine the morale of Chinese
soldiers and civilians by unmerciless bombings and hasten a retreat or
surrender, they appear to have failed. One of the major assumptions of
strategic air power advocates was given a limited test* and, while
results were not conclusive* observation showed that* not only did such
bombings fail to break civilian morale and intimidate enemy troops* but
they had an opposite effect in intensifying hate and resentment against
16
the Japanese and toughened the Chinese soldiers will to fight. These
attacks also earned the condemnation of the world. *ith the Kanchurian
15* *niliam Green and John ?ricker» the Air Forces of the World
(Sew Torkt Hanover House* 195$) • p. 179.
16. Goes* Civilian Morale Onder Aerial Bombardment , pp ^ 113*116;
otimson, The Par Eastern Crisis , pp. 123-132.

Crisis of 1931 to 1933t sir power became en important subject in
diplomatic cables.
America's response to Japanese aggression In Hanchuria and China
oonsisted of diplomatic protest , reminders to Japan of her obligations
under existing international treaties* and some cooperation with the
League of Nations. In January of 1932 the United States adopted a
policy of noi*»adtaisslon of the legality of any situation de facto or
treaties or agreements between Japan and China impairing American treaty
rights, the Qp^n itoor policy. China's sovereignty, independence and
administrative and territorial integrity, and non-recognition of Mery
situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means
contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris, . . ."
Before this Secretary of State Henry L. Stlmson had exercised caution
in responding to early Japanese action. Stlmson felt that more liberal
elements in Japan would regain control over the military and restore
order to the Far <£ast. and that overly strong protest or action on the
part of the United States might provoke such an extremist, anti»American
18
attitude as to undermine the chances of a restoration of order.
3y the end of 1931 Stlmson was beginning to realise the futility
of such a mild policy and the ineffectiveness of international pressure
against Japan to date. He became more determined that America should
talcs more positive action. There was considerable recognition in
17. United States. Department of State. Peace and War* United States
Foreign Policy 1931-19**! (Washington, 19*3). P. 160.
18. Stlmson. The Far Eastern Crisis . pp. 3**»37«
19. Robert S. ferrell. "Henry L. Stiason." The American Secretaries
of State and Their Diplomacy (Vol. 11, Sew York* Cooper Square
Publishers, inc., 1963), p. 236.

America of the danger of inaction in the face of Japan** resuaption of
har old* well-known policy of expansion* and in th« winter of 1931 and
early 1932 there was even concern that Japan might extend her operations
20
against American Pacific possessions , but the state of American public
opinion and the American economy were such that President Hoover would
not permit the use of language than even hinted that sanctions might
21be applied* Stimson had to be content with a policy of non-recognition
and legal and moral sanction.
Japanese bombing activities caused Stlmson and the American public
great concern, itimson became especially upset over the Chinohow bombing
in October of 1931 end called this "a matter of great importance in the
United States" since "bombing of an unfortified and unwarned town is one
of the most extremes ot military action, deprecated even in the time
22
of war." He became even more upset over the repeated bombings in
Shanghai, branding Admiral Shoisawa's initial order the "act of either a
perfectly ruthless or badly excited man." ^ The protests of world public
opinion did not excape notice in Tokyo and seemed to have had an affect
in curbing indiscriminate bombing.
On flay 31 , 1933 the fangku Truce brought hostilities between China
and Japan to an end. China agreed to demilitarisation of the
20. Stlmson, The Far Eastern Crisis , p. 138*
21. Ferrell, "Henry L. itimson," pp. 236, 242; Henry L, itiraeon and
Msfieorge 3undy, On Active Service in Peace and tfar (Sew Torkj
Harper iirothers, 19«6), pp. 244*245.
22. Onited 3tatee, Foreign delations t Japan 1931-1 9**!. Vol. 1, pp, 18-21.
23. 3tlmson, Ihe Far jastern Crisis , p. 124.
24. Goes, Civilian Morale finder Aerial Bombardment , pp, 107, 118.
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Peiping-Tiontaln area and Japan agreed to withdraw her forces to the
Great Vail # after ascertaining that china had complied with her agreement,
Japan now had not only the puppet-state of Manchukuo, but troops in Jehol
and in the Peiping-rientain area (by virtue of the Boxer Protocol)* to
protect Manohukuo frost the south. Her return to expansionism had been
both successful and easy. Her evaluation of the strength of the
international agreements on Sast Asia had been correct.
AVIAT2DH ANS PUN8IHG 18 JAPAiit 193M935
Among the legacies of the Mancburlan campaigns were the lessons
for Japanese air power and its enhanced position in Japan9 a defenses,
Sarller chapters have traced the growth of Japan* s aviation and have
shown that Japan possessed most of the ingredients for major air power
status in 1931. Operations in Manchuria and Shanghai were to provide
two more combat experiences for aircrews, airplanes and air tactics, and
recognition that air power can make an important contribution to warfare
in a variety of roles. As a result Japan's air services were to play
a dominant role in defenses and planning from 1933 on. The status of
other nation's air power was also to be an important factor In plans
and decisions,
Basic to any air power is equipment, $y 1930 Japan was approaching
the stage where she was able to rely more and more on her own aircraft
production and less on foreign planes, and by the ^rA of the Manohurlan
campaign the transition was largely complete. Both air services were
seeking to expand not only the slse of their forces, but performance
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ability of their planes as well, Japan had been fighting Chinese between
1931 *nd 1933t sh« would possibly be fighting Americans and Russians in
tho future, and tha challenge to her air power would be much greater
there.
While Chinese air operations against the Japanese were almost
non-existent and ineffective when they were attempted* the lessons
loarned by Uavy and Amy aviators in the little counter-air action they
had and in their free reign of air bombardment pointed to the great
Importance of winning and maintaining air superiority. From the early
1930' s on Japan's emphasis was to be on new and better construction in
25
fighter and bomber aircraft and away from reconnalsance and scouting. *
Japanese-Army air tactical doctrine from 1933 to about 1939 was to give
primary emphasis in the attainment of air superiority to the bomber
aircraft with fighters providing these the necessary support* Tactical
thinking at this time was that the best means of achieving air superiority
was to take the initiative and m^m with speed and surprise into enemy
territory to destroy enemy aircraft on the ground. Little emphasis was
26
placed on interception of enemy aircraft.
In the years after the Manehurlan Incident Japanese Army and Navy
aviation based their plans on the requirments of future air wars with
Russia and the United States as well as on the lessons learned on the
continent of Asia. Japan's expansion into all of Manchuria and her
retention of military strength in Manohukuo after the truce posed a
25» "Air Operations ,H p. 12j "Outline of ftaval Armaments and Preparations
for War" (in 5 parts* Japanese Studies in World War XI* Part 1* no. 1^5*
mimeographed* undated copy in 0CM3, Washington* D. C.) Part It 1922-
193*. P. J2.
26. "Air Operations," pp^, $b-55*
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threat to Russia, and that nation's recovery frost revolution and bar
increased interest in strengthening her Liberia military forces brought
to the fore the historic concern of the Japanese Army about the menace
from the north.^ Thus plans for expansion and operations of the Army
air force from 1933 were to be based on destruction of Russia's growing
Asiatic air power and suoport of Japanese ground forces in defending
the empire, particularly from the north. The goal of Army air power
expansion was narrowly focused on the ability to move quickly from well-
developed alrbases in Manchuria into nearby border areas. This is the
9 st important explanation for the limited striking range Army aircraft
were to have,
Japanese naval aviation came to center more around the carrier
striking force. The Saga and Hosho had participated in the Shanghai
attack, and with the completion of Japan's fourth carrier, the Ryu.jo
in Hay of 1933 the carrier air force was gaining recognition in many
circles as the levy's main offensive units,
^
The Navy continued to promote its plans for expansion with an eye
to the United States, As long as America failed to build up to her
allowed strength, Japan had felt some m&na^ of security, but with the
American naval expansion plans of 193** Japan not only sought appropriations
to build up to treaty limits* but began to intensify her demands for
parity with America In naval armaments. These demands were not new and
Japan's replenishment plans for naval expansion were underway before the
27. lekushiro rtattori, "The Complete History of the Oreater Sast Asia
*/ar° (^ vols. , Dai Ton Sense &enahl . Tokyo* Masu Publishing
company, 1953) • typewritten K35 translation. Doc. 73002, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Washington, tfol. 1, p. 12.
28. "Air Operations in the China Area, July 1937 - August 19**5"
(Japanese Studies in World War II, Japanese Monograph ?6 9 copy
in OCHH. Washington, D. C), p. 16.
29. "Outline of ftaval Armaments," p. 19.
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United States* Vlnson-Tramaell Act was passed, but It was a convenient
way to justify increased appropriations as wall as an excuse for increased
armaments.
™
Japan* s dilemma in the problem of naval arMaaonts was that sha did
not hava tha facilities, money or material to eonpata with wealthiar
nations in a quest for naval supremacy* a stats of competition which
could easily result if the naval limitation treaties were abrogated. On
the other hand public and naval indignation at limits of less than parity
had been in large part responsible for the assassination of two prime
sinisters, and It would be dangerous, to say the laast, for any government
31
to accept continuation of an inferior ratio. Japan chose to go to the
preliminary conference of the upcoming London Haval Conference with
proposals that Included a common upper limit on naval armaments set as
low as possible, and a drastic reduction of offensive forces, including
aircraft carriers."^ Arguments of the United States and Great Britain
that equality of security was obtainable with less than equality of
armaments fell on deaf ears, as did Japan* s demands for parity. Japan
on December 29, 193** gave the required two years* notification of her
intention to terminate her adherence to the Five Power ftaval Treaty of
1922, and on January 15, 1936 her delegation walked out of the London
33
Naval Conference."
Japan* s nrooosal for the reduction or abolition of aircraft carriers
30. United States, gersjga
,
Relations? Japan 1931-19*»1 . Vol. 1, pp. 250-251.
31. Ibid., p. 250s "Outline of ftaval Armaments ,»* Part 2, 193^-1939, p. 1,
32. United States, Foreign ftalatlonas Japan 1931019M . Vol. 1, pp* Z5fr-
255. 28*.
33. fter*e Tate, The flnltod atatos and Armaments (Cambridge! Harvard
University Press, 19W)
, pp m 189-190.

and her listing of these vessels at the top of her list of particularly
offensive ships is somewhat difficult to interpret* This was s strange
proposal to cone from such an air power enthusiast as Admiral Yamemoto,
and from a nation that was rapidly building up to treaty strength in
aircraft carriers and placing increasing emphasis on carrier aviation in
operational planning. Perhaps Japan was offering proposals of such
scope in order to five weight to her demands for parity in vessels of a
more "defensive*1 nature, or perhaps she was merely setting the stage for
her walkout and withdrawal from world armaments limitation, $o
satisfactory answer has been found in the material examined for this
paper.
There was no fundamental revision of Imperial Defense policy through
the end of 1935* and the vague guidelines of earlier policies continued
to serve. The Hanehurian operations had generally taken place within
the framework of the 1923 plan. let with the acquisition of Hanchuria
and what were felt to be continuing threats to Japan's security* many
could argue that defense policies were in tvNtd of revision. They were
to get their way in 1936. 35
The period between 1931 end 1935 can be viewed as important
transitional years for Japanese air power, '^heroes the period before
1931 might be called the infancy and adolescence of her aviation, the
four years that followed witnessed a growth toward full manhood. Japan's
air arms were all in all well-prepared for the rapid expansion snd
demands to be placed on them in the next six years.
W. United States, Foreign Relations s Japan 1931-tW . Vol. 1,
pp. 256-257.
35* See Chapter V.
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*AR PLASHING TO JAPANS33 AH lOfl
When Japan embarked on her coarse of aggression la Asia* thereby
challenging America's Far Sastara policy, the military response of tho
United States was so feeble that it is not even deserving of the term
"measured and cautious." The only response that even suggested the
possibility of military sanction was the decision to keep the United
States fleet in waters around Hawaii after the Japanese attack on
shanghai and to order some token reinforcement of Hawaii and the
Philippines. The fleet had been scheduled to be there long before the
Hukden incident, and while its presence was undoubtedly noticed* it is
going perhaps too far to say as Stlmaon later did that the fleet's
position "undottbtably exercised a steadying effect ," and that "it was
a potent reminder of the ultimate military strength of peaceful America
which could not be overlooked by anyone, however excited he might be."3®
Xf Stimson meany by "ultimate military strength" America's vast
power potential he was on firmer ground, but the status of American
preparedness in the summer of 1931 was more likely to encourage aggression
rather than deter it. although both the Army and Mavy were aware of the
threat posed by Japan's actions. The sad truth was that depression ha
;
been added to the long list of factors that had held American armaments
at minimal level. Aviation, which had often fared better than other
armaments, was no exception, although pre-depresslon expansion dating
3&I ?tlason. The Far Eastern Crisis , p. 138.
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from 1926 prevented total stagnation during the early t?30» s. Yet in
1931 «nd 1932 the threats fro* Asia did not launch any significant
increase in preparations for possible action in the Pacific,
The Navy's air am was to benefit from resumption of expansion
earlier than the Army Air Corps, but this was store the result of antt-
depression economic measures than concern about Far Eastern commitments,'"
An Important source of financial aid to the Navy appeared when the
administration of recently inaugurated President Franklin D, Roosevelt
mode funds available from the National Recovery Administration and the
rubllo Vorks Administration* These funds vere to play an Important role
in the building of more aircraft carriers,
American carrier strength was increased in February 1933 when the
Kanfcr was launched, but prior to completion her sise was already felt to
be too small. Carrier doctrine had swung from favoring small carriers to
large carriers. In 1932 the #avy General iotrd decided that 20,000 tons
was the optimum sise. Two were started in mid-193^ end vere to become
***• Torktown and Snterorice, Funds from the Public Works Administration
38
made their start possible.
Naval aviation was to receive another boost from the Vinson- frammell
Act which was passed by Congress in March 123^. In addition to authorising
naval construction to bring the Navy up to the strength authorised by the
London Naval Treaty of 1930, it authorised building of "the necessary
J7. Hark i, Watson, The War Department} Chief of Staff, Prewar Plans
and Preparations ( The United States Army in viorld lar II , Ivashingtom
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1950), p. 4.
3Q. Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L, Lord, History of United States
Naval Aviation (Hew Ravent Tale University Press, 1W), op. 2&fc-
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aircraft for vessels and other purposes," and permitted the addition of
about 650 naval aircraft***' Fvuadt wore appropriated for this expansion
in June, but tha Jlavy still required outside help from 8&A and WPft funds.
Concurrent with expansion in numbers of aircraft, the Hsvy was able
to carry out research and development and experimentation in new types.
Since air doctrine is only as good as the technology that supports it,
many of the uses of carrier aircraft, especially in attack, had to await
airplanes with greater range, strength and endurance before they could
be fully exploited, the planes that were to be developed as a result
of 193** expansion programs were destined to five valiant service, especially
after 19*1 .**°
The Army Air Corps continued its repressed existence from 1931 to
1933* #ot only had the expansion program of 1926 come to a virtual halt
short of reaching its goal, but funds were so scarce that it was difficult
41
to keep the planes the Army had in the air.
In 1933 «R investigative board was appointed to examine ways the Air
Corps could better contribute to national defense. This board, known as
the Drum 3oard, did not recommend anything as radical as an independent
air force, but did admit that there was room for a GHQ air force in
coastal defense, and recommended that such a force have about 1300 air* -aft.
This recommendation was to become part of the report of the 193* Haker
Board, which had been appointed by President Roosevelt to examine the
difficulties of American military aviation, so vividly demonstrated in
39. Turnbull and Lord, History of United states Naval Aviation , p. 285.
40. Xpffi. , p. 28* . . Potter, ed. , The United Jtatas and *orld Sea
fewer (^nglewood Cliffs, S. J.i Prentice-Hall , Inc. , 1955) • P» 592.
41. Harold Hlnton, Air Victory t The Han and the Machines (Mew Yorki
Harper Brothers, 19*8;, p. 64.
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the Air Corps t tragic attempt to take over flying of America's air
nail. Thai Baker 3oard»s report, issued July 18, 193^, was Actually a
rejection of appeals for a more autonomous role for Army aviation. It
was highly critical of the more outspoken airmen who were demanding sore
recognition of the air arm, it discounted any danger of attack on the
United States from the air, and it upheld the traditional view that the
nation* a prime defences were the Savy and the Amy, with their air
forces providing assistance.
ret the Baker report was far fro* a damaging blow to the Army Air
»orps, particularly in 193^* the recommendation for a OBJ air force, or
self-contained strike component of the Air Corps, was not a new one, and
actually the Air Corps had established « provisional G2& in 1933. But
this was at least an Important concession that there might be an Independent
mission for the Air Corps. The reorganisation was officially adopted on
March 1, 1935 «nd the Air Corps at least had a force that could better
provide the indirect support of ground forces envisaged in TRJWM3-15 of
Another recommendation of the Baker Board was the immediate
acquisition of 2,300 airplanes, some personnel expansion, and Improvement
and expansion of facilities. This moved the *tar Department to order in
December of 193**
. 30 pursuit planes, UO attack planes and ?1 observation
planes. The Air Corps was also able to benefit from anti-depression
non-appropriated funds, securing for example relief funds which enabled
kz. Office of Air Force History, The Army Air Forces in World ^ar XI (Vol. 1,
Plans and aarly Operations. Lesley JPrank Craven and James Lea Cats, eds.,
Wiieagot The University of Chicago Press, 1948). pp. 30-31.
43. See above p. 66.
44. iiinton. Air Victory , p. 69.
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the construction of training schools to take place.
Although expansion was getting underway once again* tha long*
standing problem of air doctrine remained, the Air Corps was still
United to the role of defense of American territory and support of
ground forces that had no large scale expeditionary missions planned.
Sven the QHQ air force was to be a defensive weapon. But those
advocating a more strategic mission for the Air Qorp^ refused to remain
inactive. There had of course been some recognition of this mission
from time to time, but this was largely a theoretical admission of the
possibility of some long-range air strikes against vital areas of an
enemy country after first gaining control of the air and aiding ground
forces, this was of little value without the proper equipment. The Air
Corps clearly needed long-range bombers if strategic doctrines were to
have a chance.
fhe development and acquisition of a long-range bomber was a difficult
evolution, beset \^ so many problems that It was miraculous that America
was able to develop this type plane at all. A basio problem throughout
most of the 1920*8 was the adequate technological development which \«ould
give to such a plane the speed, altitute, range and bomb-carrying capacity
required. Experimental bombers produced during these years were so limited
in performance and range that no one was too concerned that they might be
fee
planes for use other than in a ground support capacity.
cjy the early 1930»* technology was advancing to such a state —
especially in the field of aircraft engines — that construction of
45. Craven and Cats, Plana and ISariy Operations , p. 57.

too
long»range strategic bombers vma now practical, within the Air Corps
an impressive shift of sentiment had tafcen place from emphasis on pursuit
aircraft to ths conviction that bombing aircraft with greatly increased
range could best Insure adequate defenses of Juaerica*s coast. This
was not necessarily a conversion to Mitchell-Jouhei concepts • but rather
a reflection, of interest in extending coastal defenses , and concern about




The 1931 MaeArthur-?ratt agreement, which opened the way for sane
Corps activity beyond the shoreline, was followed by instructions
from General MaeArthur in 1933 which further defined the role of Army
aviation in coastal defense as including operations to locate, observe
and destroy enemy forces and vessels between the line of contact with
49
ground forces and the outermost range of the aircraft. Another portal
to the development of long-range aircraft was opened.
The chosen approach was to request construction of an aircraft that
would combine reeonnaisanoe and bombing ability and a range of 5#300
miles at a speed of 300 miles pw hour. Final approval was given for
this project May 16, 1934, and among the tactical characteristics
approved by the General Staff were those that would enable the new
plane to reinforce American possessions as far away as Hawaii without
the use of Intermediate servicing facilities and to destroy distant land
46. Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air
Am 1917-*! 941 ( United States Air Force Historical 3tudfoai Ko/'o? *
Montgomery , Alabama! United States Air ?orce Historical Division,
Air University , 1955). pp. 53, 59.
47. Craven and Cate, Plans and Sarly Operations , p. 63.
43, See above, pp. 6SU69.
49. Craven and Cate, Plans and Sarly Operations, p. 63.
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and naval targets by bombing.^
From this authorisation the 3ooing Aircraft Company proceeded to
construct a four-engine bomber of revolutionary design. Designated the
X.3-17 it flew its first successful test flight in July 1935. end by
J.mury 1?, 1936 th. Air Corp. contract*! to tmrohu. 13 of the*. 5*
But the struggle was far from won. The IM7 was not a 5,000-mile bomber,
and even its 2,000-mlle-plus range was to be brought into question* The
Army-Navy controversy on coastal defense had been reopened with the
retirement of Admiral Pratt on June 30, 1933 . and by the tins the X3-17
appeared the Joint Board in a revised M Joint Action of the Army and &avy"
had by implication returned to much of tha ore-1931 coastal defense
doctrine. The Army Air Corps was to wait until 1939 to start receiving
8-17's in large quantities.
The developments in Army and Navy aviation that hare been mentioned
were not mads without an awareness of events in the Pacific. In fact,
air power expansion at this time was predominantly guided by concern
about attacks on America and American possessions from the Pacific. If
there was no acceleration of aviation preparedness in response to Japan's
aggression, the Army and Navy were not entirely at fault. Such decisions
were political ones, and the United States sought a solution to the Far
Eastern problem by non-military means.
The activities of Japan In Hanchuria and Shanghai were watched with
concern by those responsible for American war planning. Since the
administration was firmly opposed to any action that even suggested
JO. Graven and Cata , Plans and Sarlr Operations , » 66.
5*. Xbld.. p. 66.
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force, the planners were not too concerned over the possibility of putting
W«r Plan Grange into action, There was also a tendency, at least fcy tho
Amy planners, to diatlss any fears that Japan might attack the United
States or her possessions anytime in tha near future. It was felt that
Japan was too dependent on trade with America to run the risk of war, and
"only by the adoption on the part of the United States of a policy of
armed intervention would Orange be justified in bringing on a war."^2
President Hoover had ealled in ranking military officers early in
the crisis to seek their views on how things would stand if the United
ftates should fo to war with Japan, They recited the assumptions of War
Plan Orange and asserted that America should be able to win, but four to
six years would be required due to deficiencies in military strength.
53
They also ad«itted that the Philippines would be quickly lost. This
fact apparently made Hoover even more reluctant to contemplate the use
of force.
War Plan Orange was not quite as honest. The Joint Board maintained
its position that the Philippines provided America a position of immense
strategic value, and were vital to present plans even in their present
state of Inadequate defenses.*^ tills position was retained despite dissents
from Army officers in the Philippines who felt that hopes of their holding
55
out against the Japanese were nothing but self-delusion. The position
of Washington planners, though, was that despite the provision of the
~5Z* Louis Horton, "rfar Plan Orange," World Politics . Vol. 11, $o. 2
(January, 1959). p. 238.
53* Thaddeus V. Tuleja, Statesmen and Admfofts {New Xorki
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., *963). p. &*•
5*. Norton, "War Plan Orange," p. 236.
55» IkJd., p. 2J7.
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Tyding«McDuffle Act for independence in 19&6 . and serious doubts About
the feasibility of plans for the relief of the Philippines in an Orange
war, these islands must be defended. Thus a revised War Plan Orange in
Way 1935 kept the basic provisions of the 1924 Basic Plan for defense of
the Philippines a although it increased the time the defenders would have
to hold Manila Say. 56
Although the revised plan maintained the old assumptions, there had
been increasing deaand since the f'anchurien Crisis for a complete re-
evaluation of Pacific military strategy in view of Japan's impressive
land, sea and air power. Arguments for neutralisation of the Philippines
and withdrawal of American forces there and in China began to be heard
again. One of the advocates of this and adoption of an Alaska-Oahu-Panama
line as America* s strategic frontier in the Pacific was Kajor General
. Booth, commander of the Philippine Department. This proposal came
in 1933 and did not prompt any changes in the Army* a support of Philippine
defense provisions in Orange.^ But by the end of 1935 there was growing
conviction among Army planners that in view of the delay that would be
required in establishing naval superiority in the Western Pacific, so
that the Philippines might be relieved, it was folly to insist on defense
of the Philippines, especially in light of Japan's adopting the view that
retention of the Philippines was a liability and that sound strategy
58dictated adoption of the strategic triangle line advocated by General :iooth.
The Navy disagreed, maintaining that any further reduction of
5£ Norton, "War Plan Orange,* p. 2*H,
5?. Ibid . . p. 23S.
58. Ibid., pp^ 237 . 239, 2 .

to*
American forces in the Philippines would encourage farther aggression
on Japan** part and lower American prestige throughout the world, 39
The Nary *tUl held to Its strategio offensive approach and seemed to
fear abandonment of tola would severly reduce tlse Havy«a mission, 60
American war plannart at the end of 1935 were in the middle of
a debate on Pacific strategy, prompted for the most part by a recognition
of the harsh realities of the situation in view of Japanese power, her
renewed expansionist Alms, the weakness of the Philippines, the dis-
inclination of the nation to strengthen the Philippines, and the eventual
1 ss of these islands in 19*6, 3nt It was to be several years before
the Joint Board effectively abandoned all hope of defending them.
59. tforton, tt *ar Plan Orange," p, 2*3,
6°* £•«*•*«*•«• United states Army in acrid dar lit i'he War in the
faffifo* Strateo- and Commandt The First Two Year» (Washington




tds cajtihs of gas arsi
air powsa asp hatxqsal rouci 1936-1 9*»o
By the end of 19**0 decisions had boon made and oolicies hod boon
ohooon by both tho United States and Japan that for all purposes loft
unanswered only tho question of time and place of tho outbreak of war.
The collision course of Pacific policies that had boon sot many years
before had not been changed* and although the United States had chosen
not to enforce her policy by adequate defenses in the Far Seat or
intervention to protect her rights in China, she had refused to abandon
it. As long as America refused to modify her position or recognise
Japan's conquests she stood in the way of the fulfillment of Japan's
aggressive plans of expansion* plans from which Japan felt there was no
turning back.
The year 1940 is also significant in that the strategic plans and
the role air power was to play in them wore largely set. Japan had
adopted a policy of southward expansion in 1936 and by 19**0 was preparing
to launch operations to expand her empire in that direction. American
war planning was also taking its final pre-war form* but events in
Surooe had largely supplanted the problems of the Pacific* and defeat of
Japan was becoming secondary to plans for future victory in Europe.
More important tho United States was in the midst of an unprecedented
rearmament program that placed groat emphasis on air power.




air power in United States and Japanese relations la that by this time
the air doctrines, tactics, equipment and plans that were to affect
relations prior to the outbreak of war had been generally established.
There were to be important additions such as Yamemoto's plan for a Pearl
Harbor attack, and America's decision to place vast air power in the
Philippines in 19M, but by end large the Importance of air power in
pre-war relations can be found from an examination of Its status in each
nation in 19^0 and its history in the years before.
By 19**0 Japan was reaching her peak of skill and efficiency in air
power and had recognised the importance of aviation in her plans for
war to such a degree that she felt air superiority was vital to victory.
The United Jtates as it girded for war had made a belated acknowledgement
of the importance of preparedness air power and was rapidly trying to
correct the deficiencies of past years. It had the plans and superior
air potential but not the time. And time was what was required to produce
airplanes, pilots, bases and carriers.
JAPASft 8XPA«SI0*I Of POLICY AMD AH34AMSNTS, 1936. aOLX 1937
In the early months of 193& it appeared as if more liberal elements
in Japan might be gaining the upper hand once again, and that strengthened
parliamentary government might keep in check the radical militarist move*
ments that were fighting for control. The hopes of moderates were to be
short-lived, for although they won victory in elections on February 20,
their success prompted a mutiny on February 26 of an ultra-rightist segment
of the Army. The revolt was put down by the dominant faction of more
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conservative generals, who were firstly opposed to suoh radical extremism,
but not necessarily opposed to many of the strongly nationalistic policies
the rebelious faction espoused.
While the extreme wing of the Japanese military had failed in its
attempts to stop the shift of leadership to liberal elements, the more
moderate military leaders did not, and the February 26 incident can be
said to hare marked the end of moderate party government in Japan. The
cabinet of the new Prime Minister, Hirota Xoki, that was formed about 10
days later was more favorably disposed to the military point of view and
for all practical purposes held office at the mercy of the Army. The
Army had decided that the time had come to make the Army's policy Japan*
s
policy, and felt tills would be possible by their exerting a stronger
influence on government policies. While they chose to work through
existing institutions, effective control was in the hands of the military
who could always withdraw or threaten to withdraw their ministers and
bring about the collapse of a cabinet.
The overall goal of the Japanese Army was a Japan strong enough to
be the unchallenged leader of Asia. Fundamental to this was a strong
military machine backed by en industrial, self-sufficient national
economy and policies which would secure Japan's position on the continent
and guarantee the acquisition of strategic raw materials needed to insure
2
self-sufficiency. Such a goal meant expansion of military armaments,
industrial strength and geographical expansion of empire as well.
1. George M. Bcctaaan. The Modernisation of China and Japan (Mew forkt
Harper and Row, 1962), p. 575.
2. Louis Morton, United States Army in World War lit The War in the
Pacific , Strategy and Command* The First Two Tears (Washington;




Japanese military policy became official government policy in
August 1936 when the Hirota Cabinet adopted and reported to the emperor
on August 15 * baste policy which aimed at Japan's becoming in name and
fact a "stabilising power in East Asia" with a secure diplomatic and
military position there and with "national influence extended as far as
3
the South ieas." This was to be achieved by eliminating the influence
of other powers in Sest Asia, by strengthening national defenses to the
necessary degree, by preparing for future operations against the Soviet
Union, the United States and Great Britain and by expanding gradually
and peacefully to the outer South Seas area. This basic policy was to
serve as a guide for international, domestic and military policies.
In outlining foreign policy goals to implement the basic policy,
the Hirota policy specified that Japan would seek to settle its problems
with the Soviet Union by peaceful means, including the possible
establishment of demilitarised sones, and a non-aggression pact. For
China the policy Included continued efforts to make starts China a special
anti-communist, pro-Japan and pro-ftanchukuo area and a source for obtaining
vital resources. It stipulated that foreign policy toward the United
States should be to promote friendly relations and "seek the United
States' understanding of our just attitude through respect for her
commercial interests in China,*** but at the same time it recognised that
Japan should also seek to prevent America from interfering with Japan in
the far East. It was felt that "in view of the fact that the United
3. "Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War" (5 parts, Japanese
Studies on World War II, no. W, copy in Office of Chief of Military
History, Washington, 1952), Part 1, Appendix I, p. 1.
5. HI*. P- Hi*
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States la engaged In rearming," and In light of her traditional Far Seat
policy there was danger that aha saight assist China to tha point of making
6
China dependent on tha West.
Domestic aotion in pursuit of tha basic principles was to include
industrialisation to support the overall airs, and programs to promote
national unity and spirit in support of Japan's national policy. In
planning for industrial expansion great emphasis was to be given to Military
7
oonatruetion t including rapid expansion of aviation.
The official Hirota policy was careful not to include any reference
to definite military action, although tha structure of the whole program
was geared to an increase in tha nation* a military might and to policies
that would hardly go unchallenged by other nations. The "National
Defenae Policy" of Japan, which military leaders had prepared by Hay 1936
in anticipation of tha govermental acceptance of their basic policy, waa
not so cautious. An examination of the Hay revision of tha defense policy,
the first najor revision since 1923* shows clearly that the military was
willing to go along with promotion of the basic principles by diplomatic
and peaceful means as long as they were successful, 3ut in ease of
failure on the diplomatic front, tha military strength of Japan waa to
3
be ready to awing quickly into action.
The 193^ defense policy was incorporated in a document known aa
"Outline of the Overall War Procedures of Japan." After designating
the Soviet Union aa the United States aa the nations with which Japan
V, "Political Strategy," pp. iii, V.
7. Ibid., p. 11.
9. Takusairo Hattorl, "The Complete History of the Greater East Asia
^ar" (4 Vols. , pad. Ton Senso Zenehl . Tokyoi Masu Publishing
Company, 1953). typewritten HSS translation, Doc. 78002, Office of
Chief of Military History, Washington, Vol. 1, 00. 2^7-248.
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was most likely to clash (although tfreat Britain and Chin* were also
listed as potential enemies), the "Outline" specified that In case of
war* coordinated Army and Havy activities were to be launched "in order
to deal a crippling blow to the enemy and taercby effect a speedy settle-
ment of the war."9 f^is would be done by speedy annihilation of Qmety
field amies and main naval forces followed by occupation of strategic
10
enemy areas* including politically vital points.
The Army retained primary responsibility for operations against the
Soviet Union and the Army's strength, including air power, was to be
based on what was needed to defeat the forces the soviet Union could
employ in the Far &ast« The "Outline of Overall War Procedures'5 was
a testimonial to the importance of air power in initial operations. It
directed that upon the outbreak of war the Army first destroy the Russian
forces, "particularly his air power in the Ussuri area," and in coordi-
nation with the Navy capture strategic points such as Vladivostok, The
Army would then annihilate the mawy i*» the Amur area and take action
to repulse all enemy attacks. The Hevy would assist in all this in
particular by destroying Russia Far Eastern fleet at the outset, by
assisting in the destruction of the enemy's air power, and by controlling
12
the waters of the adjacent seas.
In case of operations against the United States, the "Outline"
assigned the Navy prtmaaj responsibility and directed it to destroy the
American Asiatic Fleet at the outset of war thus gaining control of
9. Fsattori, "Complete History," p. 248
10. foid.» p. 248
11. •Political Strategy,"p. 11,
12. Hattori, "Complete History," pp. 243-249.
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Western Pacific waters. This step was to be followed by occupation of
kay points on tbs island of Luson in the Philippines and the enemy naval
base of Gruam. The Army and its air am was to assist in the above. After
success in these operations the Navy was to destroy main bodies of the
American Fleet that ventured into far Eastern waters by "launching tinely
13
attacks." Ifcval armaments, including fleet aviation, were to be expanded
14
to a level necessary for success in the above plan.
The "Outline" did not envisage any major operations against China.
The operations that were to be planned would have the primary objective
of securing the rights and interests of Japan that might be threatened.
and protecting Japanese lives and property. In the event of an outbreak
of serious hostilities in China, Shanghai and strategic points in North
China, including the Peiping-Tientsin and Tsingtao areas, were to be
occupied. The Navy was to cooperate with the Army in this, and there*
after assume responsibility for control of the coastal waters of the
15
Xangtse. Japan, therefore, hoped to extend its control over China by
political means rather than military conquest.
There were two other Important principles in the defense plans of
1936. Japan was basing her operational planning on the recognition that
a crippling initial blow at the outset and a speedy end were necessary
in view of Japan's long-run capabilities. But military planners also
were aware of the fact that future wars were likely to extend over a
13. Hattori, "Complete History," p. 249
14. "Political Strategy," p. ii.
15. aattorl, "Complete History," p. 249.
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considerable length of tine, end deemed It essential tvr Japan to under-
16
take preparation* for such a possibility. This was a mild confirmation
of a reality of modern warfare. Finally there was a reiteration of another
old premise. Japan was to do all possible to avoid fighting more than mm
enemy at a time. Japan continued to avoid planning for oonfliet with
several nations at once.
With the ascendance of the military to a dominant position in Japan
and the adoption of national pelley and defense plans based on military
strength * the air services received a gigantic boost for acceleration of
expansion and planning that was already in progress. The expansion program
while impressive was still not a complete success* for technological
limitations had not been completely overcome* and although military goals
were paramount in Japan* the move to military dictatorship was not quite
complete.
The Navy's plans for expansion of air power continued to place great
emphasis on carrier aviation* although land-baaed bomber aircraft were
not neglected. By 1936 the Havy was receiving modern types from earlier
plans* and work was to soon start on advanced prototypes which were to
play a major role in air warfare in the 19**0's,
The 1937 Replenishment Plan was the first to be planned free of
international agreements on arms limitations and the first to benefit
from government buildup policies. Basic to the plan was a determination
to achieve at least quantitative equality in carriers and air power with
W. Hattori, "Complete History," p. 248,
17. Ibid., p. 250.
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the United states, If not qualitative equality. 1 The plan called for
construction of two new 20,000-ton carriers which were to balance
American carrier construction authorised in 193**. But in 193? Japan
learned that the United States was preparing to construct even greater
carrier tonnage. Hiie dampened the outlook of the 193& plan* and Japan
in her search for ways to keep up started considering the possibility of
converting first class merchant ships into aircraft carriers. ^
The Navy air arm, as it gradually acquired improved aircraft and
greater strength, did not relax its quest for more effective use of air
power* During this period dive bombing and long-range bombing received
added attention as did night carrier Hying and combat aerobatics. In
general, Havy pilots In 1936 and 1937 were becoming more skilled and were
20
flying better equipment than their Army counterparts.
The Japanese Army air force centered its expansion plans and tactical
plans on future operations against the Soviet Union, a task that was
becoming increasingly Important in 1936 as Russia had greatly increased
her air power in the Far East. Japanese estimates placed the number of
Soviet aircraft there in excess of 1,200 in 1936, approximately ten times
21
the strength of the Kwantung Army Air Units.
Like the Navy air units, the Army received additional and Improved
18. "Outline of Naval Armaments and Preparations for War** (Japanese
Studies on World tfar II, tfo. 1**9, undated, mimeographed copy in
Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington), Part 2,
PP* 2-fr.
19. Sold., p. 5.
20. «illiam Green and John Fricker, The Air Forces of the World
(Sew York* Hanover Bouse, 1958), pp. ikl-182.
21. wAlr Operations 1931*19^5" (Vol. ^, Japanese Studies on Manchuria,
typed KSS, undated, in Office of the Chief of Military History,
Washington), pp. 33 • fc>.
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equipment although expansion was far frost rapid* There was a major
organisational improvement In 1936 with the establishment of an Air
Command Headquarters* a rough equivalent to America's GHQ air force,
Thia command was given control over the flying units assigned to it and
had direct access to the General Staff. Thia was not complete separation
from ground units* but it waa a start toward an air force concept.
Since the main conern of air planners waa the Soviet Union, the
Kwantuitg Army Air Unit became the key to Army air plans. By the end of
1936 this force had between 130 and 200 aircraft in five air regiments*
each of which had six fighter* six reeennalsanee, two light bombing and
four heavy bombing companies. These were to remain on station near the
borders of Manchuria and be prepared to take the offensive &gai<<st the
Soviet air force immediately upon outbreak of war. These regiments
would be reinforced as necessary from Korea and Japan until eventually
about 500 aircraft would take place in operations. 2^
It was expected that initial air operations would take one month*
after which the air units would engage in direct ground support operations
while rataining command of the air. Army air units would be assisted
by Navy air units from carrier and land bases as long as there was no
threat of war with the United States. Bombers were still to assume
primary responsibility for destruction of enemy air forces* but in 193?
a slight modification to this took place. From here greater emphasis
22* "Air Operations," p. 37.
23. "Japanese operational Planning Against the USSR* 1932~19**5>"
Japanese Special Study on Manchuria* Vol, 1* Army Forces Far East*
1955 1 unpublished monograph on fUe Office of the Chief of
Military History, Washington* pp, W>, <&.
#*• *b*<*»» pp* 66-6?, 85,
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was placed on * surprise strike when war was imminent and bombers were
to be preceded by fighter aircraft to secure command of the air, **
Other aspects of air doctrine for Manehurian operations are also of
interest. Ground support operations were to include direct and indirect
support, flfoUe the first obligation of the aircraft after air supremacy
was close-support assistance, they could also carry the attack far beyond
front lines. Sven recoimelsance aircraft were to be used for bombing and
strafing.
'his doctrine was soon to receive combat testing, and while many
weaknesses would appear and considerable change would take place, the
fundamentals remained unchanged to World War II. In this sense there is
an amaslng similarity between American and Japanese Army air doctrine.
Both placed first priority on air superiority, and next emphasis on
ground support operations, but both provided for flexibility in missions
to allow some attacks at more strategic targets located some distance
from battle lines. Both nations had adopted some form of GHQ air force
organisation but neither had an official doctrine for sustained long-
range strategic bombing in 1937. Here the similarities end. Japan*
s
air doctrine was becoming increasingly inflexible not only because of
an apparent absence of weU-developed unofficial doctrine, but, more
important, because of lack of any long-range aircraft as her aircraft
were being designed and manufactured for operations in Manchuria from
airfields close to enemy targets. In both oases planning was so
~"T "Japanese Operational Planning," p. 85.
26. "Air Operations," p. 56.
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narrowly focused on future operations In Manchuria that the Japanese
Army air forces became slaves to suoh doctrines.
As the military prepared to play Its role in national policy, the
Army-donin*tea government moved closer to its natural ally* Geraany*
Fearing isolation after severance of other ties with the world, the Army
began looking for ways to bring a Japanese-German rapprochement s The
Army had been working on this since 1935* *nd in July 1936 persuaded
the Hirota government to accept an Anti-Oowintern Pact, which was signed
in Berlin on tfoveaber 25 • 1936. While ostensibly a mutual pledge to
resist international communism, in reality it included secret commitments
that provided for consultation on measures to preserve the common
interests of the two nations, and a provision that if either wer* attacked
or threatened by the Soviet Union, the other would not give relief to the
Soviet Union. 27
WAR IM CHUtA, GRSATSft SAST ASIA GQ-P80SPSROT
--ISRS AMD ALLIASCSt J9U 1936-SSPT^QSl l<m
While Japan had hoped that hegemony over China might be increased
by political means alone, the Chinese had other plans, China had onoe
again been making Impressive progress toward national unity, and with
this progress and the increased national sentiment that followed, anti-
Japanese action was being stepped-up. Particularly vexing to the Chinese
was the presence of large Japanese forces in the Petplng-tflentsln area
27. Seekman, The Modernisation of China and Japan , pp. 577-578,
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which numbered approximately 7,000 in the summer of 1937. The Japanese
government And particularly the irmy were concerned about increasing
Chinese pressures which -were felt to be threats to Japan* s policy of
dominance in Sast Asia, yet the stress cf Japan's national policy in
mid-1937 was on expansion by peaceful means while preparing the military
strength that might be required for action against greater powers than
China. The government of Prime Minister Konoye and the senior military
officers neither wanted , nor thought Japan could afford, bothersome and
costly action in China.
filaments of the Japanese forces in the Peipin* area apparently
felt otherwise, for on July ?, 193? hostilities erupted between Japanese
forces engaged in field maneuvers near the Karoo Polo Bridge and Chinese
soldiers from the tfanplng garrison. There is dispute even today over
responsibility for this incident, but It is not unreasonable to assume
23
that here was another case of dual diplomacy by Army units. >$ardless
of who was responsible, the spark that was to spread into Far Eastern war
was ignited.
The Konoye government and the Army and Havy adopted on July 3 a
policy of supporting localised action for a settlement satisfactory to
Japan, but opposed letting the matter spread. There were three important
arguments against any action that sight generalise the incident. The
Navy feared expanded operations in China would interfere with their
expansion program and possibly bring Oreat Britain to the aid of Chinas
zs. ieotean. The Modernisation of China and Jaaan. p. &U
Morton, Strategy and Comand . p. 50.
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the Army mi also concerned about interference with Its expansion program amd
was opposed to any action that would require shifting troops away from th«
borders of tho Soviet Union, and there was general concern that excessive
intervention in China might bring economic retaliation from 3reat 8ritain
and the United States, on whom Japan was still dependent for critical
import*. 29
The policy of localising the North China Incident did net work. An
uneasy peace followed the initial dash during which both sides tried
to reach an agreement. Japanese demands were harsh, amounting to requests
for Chinese acceptance of Japanese domination in the north* but
Chiang Kai-shek appears to have been on the brink of accepting them when*
30
on July 25 « fighting resumed. The incident spread rapidly fro**- here as
Japanese reinforcements* including air detachments* arrived. Peiping and
Tientsin were captured by July 31* fighting spread to Shanghai in August
and gradually Japan was spreading its conquest to banking* Hankow and
Canton. Despite overwhelming military superiority Japan was unable to
bring capitulation of the Chiang Kai-shek government* which had moved its
seat of government as Japan advanced. The Kuomlntang government eventually
settled in Chungking* and Japan in November 1938 proclaimed that the
Chiang Kai-shek government was no more the government of China* and
announced the establishment of Japan's Hew Order in Seat Asia* an insurance
for the permanent stability of Saat Asia by a tripartite relationship
between Japan* Hanehukuo and China. In short Japan was setting up a
29. "Political 3trategy,» p. 10.
30. Dorothy Borg, fhe United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of
1933-19?S (Cawbridgoi Harvard University Press, 1964), pp, 477-
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puppet government in China and erasing to deal vith Chiang, although
continuing tho war against him*
Air operations in tea China Incident (it was not called a var) were
of broad scope and great importance. The importance of air power in
Japanese military policy is indicated by the promptness with which air
units were alerted and dispatched upon the opening of hostilities in
China, During the negotiations between July ? and July 25 seven Army
air battalions were sent from Japan to South Manchuria to stand by for
31
possible action*
tfhlle this provisional air group was in route, the Army and Navy
General staffs were establishing tentative plans for the use of air power
in the event hostilities were to expand. Agreement was reached that air
operations would be limited to support of Japanese forces in North China
although destruction of any Chinese air opposition would be the initial
objective. In counter-air operations the Army would be responsible for
the northern area, while the Navy air force would destroy enemy air
power in central and southern China, While Army and Navy air units were
to exercise separately their respective tasks, provisions were made for
the navy to provide assistance to Army air units in dose-support, the
Navy was also given the task of escorting and protecting transport vessels
during landings, and Amy troops during and after landings until Army
32
aircraft arrived.
On July 26 the Army air units sent from Japan were joined by units
31. "Air Operations in the China Area, July 1937-August 19^5? (&>. ?&•
Japanese Studies on World War II, mimeographed, undated, in Office
of Chief of Military History, Washington), pp^ 15-16.
32. "Political Strategy? Appendix ?, pp m 1-li.
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from the Kwantung Army air unit, and both engaged in air action in the
Peiping-fientsin area* providing close-support for troops and advance
bombing of Nanyuan and Chlnghuayttan prior to ground action* In August
Army aircraft were sent to Shanghai with tho outbreak of hostilities
there* although the bulk of Army air strength remained in the north
during the early month* of combat. Some opposition was encountered in the
north from aircraft of the Chinese air fores* but the Japanese appear to
have faced no serious opposition in this area, Host of the Japanese
strikes were against Chinese frontlines, although in October and November
they enjoyed great success in attacking retreating Chinese unitsJ**
Naval air planning was based on the Army«$avy air plan of 3 July
and provided for localised missions to gsin air superiority* But more
expansive plans were also made in case of the spread of the incident* and
these included utilisation of the entire naval air force from carriers
and land bases to annihilate enemy air opposition and to strike airfields*
Thus when the fighting spread to Shanghai in early August* naval air power
was on ths scene flying support for troop landings and counter-air
operations.''^
On August \h the air superiority that the Japanese had enjoyed was
being seriously challenged by the Chinese, who were Hying foreign
aircraft that often proved superior to Japanese planes* While naval
aircraft maintained what was at times rather tenuous air superiority*
new Mitsubishi carrier fighters were rushed to Shanghai aboard the Jaga,
351 MAlr Operations in the China Area/1 pp* 25»26.
3**. "Political Strategy
*




and their arrival In September along with perfected Japanese fighter
tactics enabled Japan by early October to achieve complete air superiority
over what had been a Chinese air force of between 70 to 90 aircraft in the
35
Shanghai area.
While carrier fighters were fighting for command of the air, attack
and reconnaissance aircraft engaged in strikes against Shanghai and other
central Chinese cities including Hanking. A raid on August 23 *sw not
only carrier aircraft but land-based naval, aircraft frost Formosa attacking
airfields near Shanghai, Hanohang, Hangehow and Kwangteh. The flights
from Formosa — a round trip of over 1200 miles — were viewed as a
36
particularly Important success by the Mavy.
Attacks were not limited to airfields, and from mid-August naval
aircraft embarked on aerial bombardment raids on cities, and other non-
military targets. The issue is clouded somewhat as Chinese aircraft were
also guilty of inflicting damage on civilians and neutral property, but a
lack of skill seems to be the reasons for China* s action, «fhlle Japanese
pilots erred unintentionally as well, there was little doubt that many of
these attacks were deliberate. Nanking was subjected to especially vicious
attacks between August and its capture in December 1937* ±nd again the
37
world raised its voice in angry protest. * It has been estimated that the
Japanese flew over 1,200 sorties against Hanking prior to its capture, in
which over 500 tons of bombs were dropped. But as was the case five years
earlier, there was no indication that air bombardment Itself led directly
35« "Air Operations in the China Area," pp» 28-32; Green and FTicker,
Air Forces . 181*
36. rtAir Operations in the China Area, 1* p. 27$ Green and Frieker,
Air Forces , p. 181.
37. Hilton P. Ooss, Civilian Borate under Aerial Itamberdmont (Ur
University .Documentary Research study, Montgomery, Alsbemai
Research Studies Institute, Air University, 19**8), p^m 118-1 31.
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to the capitulation of Hanking or that It had tho desired affoct on
civilian morale.™
By early 1938 tho China Incident had settled down to a long drawn-
out affair • and Japanaao air action was devoted more and more to mass
attacks on cities such as Hankow, Canton and Chungking* with leas
ambitious attacks against Chinese ground opposition* Again the Japanese
ran into difficulties with Chinese air opposition which still had a total
strength of over 300 aircraft* Gradually this threat was reduced with
improved fighter aircraft and tactics and Japan began carrying out what
was becoming her version of strategic bombardment with impunity. In
raids against cities and targets at substantial distances from Japanese
bases* the Bevy played the dominant role, there are two reasons for
this. The most important was that Navy aircraft were about the only
ones with sufficient range and performance for distant targets like
Chungking and Sunning* A secordary reason was that late in 1937 there
had been a delimitation of responsibility with the Mavy receiving the
mission of bombing targets in central and southern China, J aty the
end of 19*>0 Japan was continuing her attacks on the Kuomiatang govern-
ment in Ssechuan Province* now from bases in Indochina as well as from
China u These raids still failed to break the Chinese enemy's will to
resist but they proved to be an excellent test and evaluation for
aircraft* tactics and pilots* who were rotated so that as many as
possible might get combat skill* The persistency of Japan's raids
38. Ocas, clrftlaq Horale . p. 132.
39* "Air Operations in the China Area," pp 9 26, 35.
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against inland eities is illustrated by the fact that In September of
19^*0 naval aircraft flaw 168 day and l<t night raids against Chungking
alone.
While the overall contribution of Japanese air power to China
operations was of immense value, thara were mora specific aspects of
Japan* s air action which were of doubtful value to tha war effort and
Japan' a overall policy, if not detrimental to it. From August of 1937
until weH into *forld War XI Japan undertook combing raids in whloh
cities and other areas of high population density and little Military
value were subjected to air bombardment. One estimate places the total
air raids against civilian population from July 193? to March 19*)0 at a
total of 9.786 with more than **2,0QQ bombs dropped, causing civilian
casulatles of about 51,000 killed and 65,000 wounded, * There is no way
of knowing if these figures are correct, but they should be indicative
of the scope of the attacks. If they were designed to break Chinese
morale and will to resist, evidence is overwhelming that they were a
failure. An apt evaluation of the effleet of one of these raids on
Chungking was offered by the United States Ambassador to China,
Nelson T, Johnsons "The effect of these bombings of undefended eities
far behind the lines has been to unify the people and to build up in
fcdi
them a spirit of resistance that was not there before.w
In addition to a noticeable lack of accomplishment, the raids on
civilian targets also provoked the disapprobation of the democratic
00. Green and dicker. Air Forces . pp. 181-.182.
*1. Goss, Civilian Morale , pp. 138-139.
*>2. United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
ft«MSOT Of the tfajtod StafoSf Japan fflMffi, 2 vols.
(Washington, 19*3) • Vol. i, p. 662.
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world in forms ranging from resolutions of distress and condemnation by
the League of Rations* ** to shook and disgust on tha part of tha nan on
th« street.
Japan also built up a bank of ill-will against her by repeated and
often malicious attacks on nationals of neutral nations and their
property. Between July 1937 and aid~1940 there were countless cases
where Japanese pilots inflicted damage on foreign commercial interests
,
missions t hospitals, ships, and even motor vehicles in areas that were
clearly non-military and away from cities that were being bombed.
American property seemed to be a favorite target of the pilots, and
American diplomats were kept busy penning protests to Japan. By February
19**0 the United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, had made
44
over 149 written protests for which he had received no reply. When
Japan did reply a study of the replies shows that they usually took the
form of denials, statements that the bombing was unintentional, dis-
claimers of liability or accusations that China had made the target a
military one. There were variations on this general pattern, including
statements that Japanese pilots were lacking in experience and skill and
45
that American property had not been adequately marked. In addition
to hisaanitarian concern, the United States was properly protesting
violations of its legitimate rights and interests in China. A strong
oase can be made for the view of Ambassador Grew who felt in 1939 that
43. United States, Foreign ftelations» Japan 1931-1941 . Vol. 1, p. 506.
44. Ibid., p. 657.
*5« Ibid., pp. 603, 606.
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"these *tt*cks arc intentional and pert . . . of a studied campaign to
drive foreign Interests out of China*1*
The most famous attack against American property during the China
Incident was the bombing and sinking of the U.S. 3. Pansy on December 12,
1937. the Pansy was an American gunboat on station in the Yangtse
River that was evacuating American diplomatic personnel from Hanking
prior to its fall to the Japanese. In the early afternoon on December 12
in perfectly clear weather flights of multl and single engine Japanese
naval aircraft bombed and strafed the well-marked Pansy, sinking it and
killing and injuring Americans. Japan claimed that the attack was
unintentional* and that the mistake was due to poor visibility and
inadequate markings of identification on the boat, but expressed profound
regret and promised to take action against those responsible. A United
States Stavy Court of Inquiry found that the Pansy was clearly marked,
the weather was clear, and that it was inconceivable that the aircraft
**7
after 20 minutes of low level attack could not identify the ship.
By the end of 1938 most Army air units had been withdrawn to
northern China and Manchuria primarily because of their inability at
long-range bombing missions and pressures from Russia. In Kanehuria
the Army continued its primary role of protecting Japan and Manohukuo
from Russia, A series of border disputes between Japan and Russia and
Japan and Mongolia created Tense relations in mid-1938 *ad finally
erupted into armed conflict between Japan and Russia at Changkufeng Hill
^JK United States, Foreign Relational Japan 1931-19M . tfol. I* p, &*%
V?. XM4.. pp. 521-5*6t 5*2-W.
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on July 11* 1938. The bitter fighting included air action between
Russian and Japanese air units* While the Japanese were outnumbered
and inferior in performance to Russian air units* the results were
indecisive. The dispute was settled by compromise in August, but
48
peace was to be short.
On Hay 13» 1939 fighting broke out at ftemenhan on the Hanehurlan
border with Japan taking the offensive this time. Japan had strengthened
her air power and achieved quick successes against Mongolian and Soviet
Far Eastern air forces. But as Russia brought in reinforcements Japan's
battle for air superiority became more desperate. Air battles became
of vital importance, and Japan after committing almost all of her air
force to the struggle suffered a resounding defeat, losing over 500
ha
aircraft and 150 pilots. This was her first major encounter with a
superior air force, and it revealed bitter truths about Japanese Army
air power. It particularly brought to light how fast air potential
is sapped in the face of superior opposition. An Important lessen had
been learned and the Army air units were determined to do something
about it. 50
Kanehurlan and Chinese air operations were both a blessing and a
curse to Japanese air power. Aviation benefited from the combat skills
acquired, from tactics and equipment evaluated, from early exposure of
deficiencies and from the impetus these operations provided to further
48. Green and Pricker, Air Forces , p. 182.
49. United States, United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Pacific v/ar .
Japanese Air ?owcr t We,t 62, H^Ury Analysis p^v^sio^
(Washington, 1946), p. 4.
50. "Air Operations, 11 pp9 62~68| Qr**n and Frieteer, Air Force* , p. 133.
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expansion and reorganisation. But the negative list is impressive.
The combat losses of airplanes and personnel placed a severe obstacle
in the path of both the Array and l?avy*s replenishment plans, While these
losses did stimulate more rapid expansion of equipment and personnel,
this taxed an economy that was already approaching its maximum
production level for aircraft, and the expenses and resources required
for support of ground operations in China interferred with naval
rearmaments.
Amoro* Army air force changes that took place after the Nomonhad
Incident were modifications in tactics and planning. One result was
an increased emphasis on fighter aircraft for both offensive missions
and air combat. Operations had revealed that massed bomber attacks
were ineffective against airfields, and the best way to achieve air
51
superiority was by use of more and better fighters.' Army air planners
after 1939 also devoted more attention to the highly probable situation
where Japan would be fighting more than one enemy, a situation which
had actually existed for several months in 1938 and 1939* 3ut the
contingency plans made were still inadequate being little more than
52
vague plans for initial action*
The Havy in 1939 end 19**0 continued to press for completion of their
impressive replenishment plans, always with an eye on America* s progress
in rearmament. Japan's goal was parity of ships and air strength with
the United States Navy. In pursuit of this, great importance was placed
51. HAir Operations," p. 68,




on aircraft carriers and plants, so much so that naval air armaments
began receiving priority within the limits of resources, manpower and
construction facilities* As a result air replenishment plans were
53largely successful.'
Yet the Navy air arm was not entirely without problems. There was
still the problem of naval conservatism with many naval leaders still
regarding the battleship as the nucleus of sea power. While this does
not appear to have stood in the way of air replenishment programs, it
ft
does indicate that a doctrinal dispute still existed within the flavy.
another problem that was arising was an inability to provide training
and to recruit personnel at a pace equal to the expansion of air
55
strength."
Jy 19**0 Japan was observing United States' air expansion with
alarm and was realising the impossibility of maintaining parity with
America* s vast air potential. While Japanese air power was quantita-
tively and qualitatively far superior to America's present level of air
power in the Pacific, Japan recognised that this advantage would not
last forever. Since Japanese operational planning required air
superiority, strong arguments began to be heard that if Japan hoped to
acquire her rightful place in Asia and achieve early and decisive
victory, she could not afford to wait too long,
Japan from 1937 was little by little being transformed into a
militarist state in which the national cause was becoming a "holy war
53» "Outline of Saval Armaments," pp* 19-23.
5*- Ibid., p. 22.
55. IbTcT.. p. 23.
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56for the fulfillment of the historical mission of ths Japanese people.*"^
While ths structure of parliamentary government remained, ths Diet and
ths parties were quickly losing what littls power they had In 193&.
Power was in ths hands of ths cabinet and ths military services, and for
all practical purposes ths oabinst was but an outlet for military policies.
The goal was constantly the policies adopted in 1936 and Japan's
foreign policy and Military action rarely deviated from pursuit of these.
The Anti-Comintern Pact and the New Order in East Asia policy wers well
within the framework of long-range national goals, By the smner of 1940
with war raging in Europe and Great Britain fighting for her existence
,
Japan prepared to move southward to expand her empire. On July 26, 1940
the new Konoye cabinet adopted as its policy the establishment of a
Greater Sast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which was to include ultimate
Japanese control of Kong Kong, Burma, French Indochina* Thailand, Malaya,
the Motherlands Indies, the Philippines and Hew Guinea. Japan hoped to
be able to extend her control to these areas by peaceful means, but was
prepared to use force if necessary. Specific measures that were to be
taken to promote the grand objective included the conclusion of an
alliance with Germany, a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and an
all-out effort to bring the China Incident to an end.
On July 27 the Liason Conference, a policy-planning body of selected
cabinet members and the military chiefs of staff, approved the Co-
Prosperity Sphere program and set the guidelines by which ths program
56. John £. ^airbank, ^dwin 0. Aeischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia ,
The Modern Transformation (Boston? Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965).
p. 601.
57. Hattori, "Complete History," p. 25.
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was to be carried out. This policy was enbodied In a document known as
"Outline of General Principles to Cope with the development of the World
Situation." This specified that Japan's objectives should be gained by
peaceful means, but listed criteria for the use of arms in the southern
area that included
i
1, Wien the China Incident has been generally settled*
force of arms shall be employed for the solution of the
southern area problems by seising a favorable opportunity;
the situations at heme and abroad permitting.
2. In oase the China Incident remains unsettled, our
policies shall be pushed within the limits of not coming
into open hostilities with a third power, but in oase
of particularly favorable development of the situation
at home and abroad, force of arms may be employed in order
to solve the southern area problem.
3* Utmost effort shall be made to employ force of arms
against Britain only; and since involvement in a war with
the United States may become unavoidable in such an
event, sll possible preparations shall be made therefor.™
The term " situations at home and abroad" was the Liason Conference's
way of saying successful completion of an alliance with Germany, a non-
aggression pact with Russia and a strengthened wartime structure of
59industry and armaments at home.
That there was concern over American rearmaments is shown by the
view of one of the military members at the conference who felt the time
was ripe for expansion southward by whatever means, lie pointed out
that the United States was preparing for war, and feared that American
60
Far Eastern policy might become stronger after rearmament.
On September 22, 19^0 Japanese troops began to move into French
W. Hattori, "Complete History," p. 3*
59. Ibid., p. 36.
*°« ffl** . , p. 35.
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Indochina and the move southward was underway. On September 27 Japan
concluded a Tripartita Pact with Germany and Italy which* in affect,
was a warning for the United Stats* to remain neutral. As armament
expansion and other military preparations continued Japan was approaching
the point where only onm item was missing to make the " situations at
home and abroad" criteria completes a settlement with the Soviet Union.
Japan was to achieve this in April 19^1.
UOT&O STATS9I a&TMAT AMD SSAmfAMSUT, 1936-lW
As the |»eace of the world became more threatened by events in the
Far East and SUrooe, the United States held tenaciously to the belief
that it was not in America's interest to get involved, that by policies
of non-entanglement, neutrality, unpreparedness, and intervention by
diplomatic remonstrances on moral and legal grounds the United States
and its Interests could somehow remain secure. Hot all of those who
were responsible for American policy were blinded by this ostrich-like
aporoach to security. As the Japanese were pushing their attack into
China in 1937, Secretary of State Cordell Hull admitted to Grew that
"hostilities are not likely to be brought to an end by manifestations
of disapprobation on moral and legal grounds," but added that it was
necessary to keep in mind the wishes and attitudes of the American
people.
So while Japan closed the Open Door in Asia and armed in preparation
for even greater aggression, and while Germany and Italy defied
ol. United States, Foreign delations! Japan 1931~19*H . Vol. 1, d. 362.
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international agreements in Surope and Africa, America legislated
neutrality and kept her armaments at a totally inadequate level. The
situation demanded leadership* and forceful action from a position of
strength-in-belngf the United States was not willing to provide this
until the eve of war.
The United States nww abandoned its traditional Far Eastern
policy and continued its policy of refusing to recognise agreements and
situations that violated It. Army and Navy planners were therefore*
prevented from ignoring these commitments although denied the requisite
strength to enforce this policy. let by early 1938 War Plan Orange,
which had never been fully realistic in its approach to defense of
American Far Eastern interests, had for all practical purposes written
off the defense of the Philippines and interests west of Hawaii. The
plan* a partial retreat from the Western Pacific to the strategic
triangle defense concept reflected concern over events taking place in
Europe and the danger of a two ocean war.
Before this in 1936 and 1937 debate had continued between Army and
Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee on American Pacific
strategy. At the end of 1936 the Secretaries of the War and Navy
Departments had appraised America* s military position in the Fvt &ast as
so weak "that today our position ... is one that may result not only in
our being forced into war but into a war that would have to be fought
under conditions that might preclude Its successful prosecution. 3y
1936 the Army, convinced of the Impossibility of defending the
62. Louis Morton, "tfar Plan Orange," World Politics . Vol. 11, Uo 2
(January, 1959), pp. 2*1-242.
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Philippines, had eliminated from its strategic plan all provisions for
sanding reinforcements there.
With tha outbreak of the China Incident the Joint Board viewed the
existing Orange plan as unsound and directed a reexamination of the plan.
The result was a split report, with the Army urging adoption of a defensive
position of readiness east of the 130th meridian and the ftavy holding to
ita traditional view that planning should aim at defeat of the enemy at
the earliest opportunity instead of a purely defensive strategy of readi-
ness. The Savy felt that they could and should take the offensive into
64
Japanese territory once the war began.
8ut after several more split reports a compromise was reached, and a
new plan Orange was adopted in February 1938. In it the Navy did not
abandon its concept of a progressive advance across the Pacific, but the
new plan did not specify any time for this. The Army gained official
recognition of the Alaska-O&hu-P&nama strategic triangle defense concept
as being of primary Importance. Manila Bay was still to be defended,
but no plans were mentioned for reinforcements of the garrison there and
no statement was made of the time it would take the fleet to come to the
65
rescue of the Philippines.
After the Munich Agreement in September 1939 American planners
became even more concerned about the possibility of a two ocean war and
the security of the Western Hemisphere. In studies prior to this, the
Joint Planning Committee had examined various contingencies that might
arise and concluded that priority in a two-ocean war must go to defense
63. Morton, "J*r Plan Grange, 1* p. 244,
6*. Ibid., p. 247.
65. MI., pp. 247-249.
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of the vital positions of the Western Hemisphere, iven in the event of
s war with Japan alone the committee fait that America could expect to
Xoaa all her possessions wast of tba Hawaiian Islands. Regardless of
what tha eventual situation night be. It was believed that America could
66
be bast dafended by a strategy of defense in the Pacific,
In 1939 tha planners began to think sore In terns of Germany, Japan
and Italy acting together in coalition and began to examine more seriously
the possibility that the United States would not be fighting alone. This
led to a series of five contingency plans , known as the Rainbow plans.
Ultimate choice of strategy would be a political one, but the planners
were determined to be prepared for a variety of situations.
The five plans that were formulated all had the common objective of
defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere against aggression,
and the situations included assumptions of United States involvement either
alone or with allies • and contingencies that included emphasis on offense
in the Pacific, strict defense of the Western Hemisphere only, or hemispheric
defense with action in Europe, Two of the plans. Rainbow 2 and Rainbow 3,
provided for early operations into the Western Pacific, Rainbow 2
assumed that the United States would be acting in concert with Great
Britain and France and would be able to launch tax immediate offensive
across the Pacific with only limited participation of American forces in
iSurope and the Atlantic, Rainbow 3 assumed no allies for the United States,
and while hemispheric defense was to retain priority, conditions were to
be such that American forces could undertake early operations from Hawaii
•~T~ Mark 3, Watson, United States Army in World War II , The War Department !
Chief of Staff t Prewar plans and Preparations (Washington! Office
of Chief of Military Hietory, 1950) , p. 99? Morton, Strategy and
Command , pp. 6S-70.
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into the Western Pacific.67
tfith the outbreak of war In Surra* in September 1939 it appeared as
If Rainbow 2 fitted the situation bast* and hurried efforts were devoted
to the completion of that plan. In the spring of 19**0 with the resumption
of the German offensive and the threat of Japan's exploitation of the
European situation to take over British, Dutch and French possessions in
the Southwest Pacific, the Rainbow plans calling for offensive against
J*p*n were given top priority, but this was to be short-lived, With the
fall of France in June 19**0 the focus of attention again returned to the
Atlantic with recognition that danger there represented a far greater
threat to American security than Japanese aggression. Here it was to
63
remain, 3y December 1940 the Joint 13oard had approved American
strategy that would have as its major objective the security of the
Western Hemisphere, and until forced into war the United States should
concentrate on preparing for hemispheric defense in both the Atlantic
and Pacific while maintaining cooperation with Great Britain in this
task. If forced into war American strategy should be to concentrate its
efforts on the defeat of Germany first, maintaining a strategic defensive
in the Pacific to contain Japan. Until forced into war with Japan the
United States should attempt to restrain Japan by political and economic
means while taking care to avoid forcing Japan into open hostilities. If
war caste with Japan America would have to fall back to the strategic tri-
angle line until such time as the situation would permit a progressive
69
offensive back across the Pacific.
67. Morton. Strategy and Command , p. 71
•
£*• fold/ * pp. 73-76*





This plan of action which th© situation envisaged in preliminary
.Uiifcow 5 of 1939 became the basis for more detailed planning in 19M and
closely reflected the pattern of operations that took place in World War XI.
let it is important to realise that this was not abandonment of American
interests and possessions in the Far East. Japan was to be contained by
political and economic means from further aggression, particularly against
British* Dutch and American possessions in the Far 2ast, and if war came
with Japan* the United States would in due time take the offensive to defeat
Japan* Strategic thinking and planning at the end of 19^0 was a shift in
priority from Paoific-oriented planning that had been dominant for years
to planning for what was recognised as a more serious threat from Europe,
American military strength was too weak* despite rapid rearmament* to
provide defenses that would be required to maintain American interests in
sll parts of the world* and until military preparations exceeded what was
required for defense of the Western Hemisphere and Atlantic operations*
the expectation that American possessions in the Western Pacific would be
lost was only a realistic appraisal of the situation. It was a retreat*
not surrender or abandonment* and hopefully America could forestall pre-
cipitation of conflict with Japan until either events in Europe were more
favorable or United States military strength* especially air power*
reached toe point where a forceful position could be taken in the Pacific
70
as well.
The strategic decisions of American military planners in 1939 and
1943 were in large part based on a new awareness of the importance of air
power and the shocking inadequacy of American air power. Although the
'd.' See below* pp tai'-iUe.
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United States had started a major rearmament program in 1938 which vaa
expanded and accelerated in 1939 and 19*0. two deoadea of neglect of air
power eouid not be corrected overnight. The expansion waa to be unprece-
dented and in many ways Miraculous, but the taek was so great and time so
vital that the United States was still trying to achieve a position of
readiness when war came in December 19^1.
From 1936 through most of 1939 the broad picture of American military
aviation remained much like it had been since 193*K »aval aviation con-
tinued making modest but steady expansion within doctrinal confines that
were conducive to such a program, while the Army Air Corps continued its
struggle not only for growth and acquisition of modern equipment, but for
a modem mission as well. The limited gains of the Navy, authorised by the
Vinson-Tramaell Act of 193^, required financial assistance from emergency
government agencies, and pointed out the need for balanced expansion
whereby additional aircraft are matched by additional personnel, training
faculties and repair facilities. 3y May 193S the Yorktown and the
Enterprise had been commissioned and America added two large carriers to
its sea-going air power arsenal, tot while naval air power profited by the
expansion program and continued to demonstrate in fleet exercises the
offensive potential of carrier task forces, naval aviation in early 1938
was still too weak to undertake much more than the official support of the
fleet missions assigned it. The United States Mavy was to remain a battle-
ship-oriented Navy until after the Battle of Midway in 19^2. 71
The story of the Army Air Corps from 1936 until well into 1939 is its
717^ rhaddeus V. Tttleja, Statesmen and Aft^rala (SJew York, tf, tf. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 184-185.
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straggle for development of more long-range bombers, for procurement of
ones that were already available, and for redefinition or elimination of
the defense-only concept of air power that continued to shackle Army
aviation, AH these were related problems and were but a continuation of
the same problems that had existed tinee the early 1920* s. Between
January and August of 1937 the Air Corps did take delivery of 13 8-17*
s
which had been officially sold to the public and the General Staff as
72
weapons chiefly for sea search and sea attack,' Jut the Army General
Staff opposed acquisition of any more of these for fiscal year 1936,
officially because they felt that the role of coastal defense could be
better filled by small* two-engined bombers, Xt seems probable that an
additional reason for this stand was fear that more long-range bombers
73
might detract from the Important ground support mission.
In addition to the General Staff another major stumbling block was
the opposition of the Savy to Army flights beyond the Immediate coastline.
This led to a verbal Army-Navy agreement in May 1933 which limited the
range of Air Corps operational flights to no more than 100 miles off shore.
Thus a request for additional long-range bombers was returned that seme
month by the Deputy Chief of Staff with the following reminder*
(1) Our national policy contemplates preparation for defense,
not aggression , (2) Defense of sea areas, other than within
the coastal sone, is a function of the Navy, (3) The military
superiority of • • . a 3-1? over the two or three smaller
planes that could be procured with the same funds remains to
be established, • • • If the equipment to be provided for
the Air Corps be that best adapted to carry out the specific
72, Thomas H, Oreer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm>
1917-lffH (United States Air force Historical Study, So, 89, Hontfomery,
labamaj United States Air Force Historical Division, Air University,
1955). 9. a*.
73. Alfred Goldberg, ed,, A History of the United States Air force 190?«»




functions appropriately assigned it under Joint Action., . •
there Mould apoear to bo no need for a plane larger than tho
3-17.?*
this statement succinctly summarised tho problems of Amy air power
development until September 1939.
In their search for a broader, acre strategic mission Air Corps
leaders were not deserting official air doctrine which recognised the
importance of air superiority, direct support of ground armies, and
indirect support by quasi-strategic missions, TheT were sorely seeking
to expand this and to gain the equipment with which to win air superiority*
In the years before 1939 it appears that American air doctrine was
relatively uninfluenced by other nation* s use of air power although Air
Corps officers could not help but be impressed by the air power other
nations were building. Yet American air theorists regarded most air combat
before September 1939 as but limited proving grounds for the weapons and
75
technology of support aviation.
Air Corps leaders were particularly Impressed with Japanese aviation*
although they saw nothing novel in Japan* s air power. Commenting in
October 1937 on Japan's air forces in the China Incident. Major General
H. fi, Arnold was impressed that they showed an awareness of sound tactioal
doctrine, seeking first air superiority then such targets as enemy air-
field®, rail centers, war vessels and aircraft factories in addition to
direct ground support operations, Arnold felt that "the employment of the
Japanese Air Force is directly in line with the most up-to-date teachings
of our own Air Corps Tactical School and with the doctrines of our own
"Wi Watson, Chief of Staff , pp. 33-36.
75* Oreer, The Development of Air ^pctrfoo. p. 101,
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) Air Force. That Is significant* There is abroad la the world a
?6first rat© air power which Knows how to use its air strength."'
As war clouds formed in ths Pacific and the Atlantic, America bogan
accelerating its aviation expansion. The first service to benefit was the
Savy by the Naval Expansion Act of Hay 1938 • which authorised carrier
tonnage tip to a total of 175*000 tons* the immediate construction of one
carrier* and the construction of naval aircraft and supporting parts and
equipment to bring the total of "useful naval aircraft" to not less than
77
3,000. This authorisation stimulated in turn the need for additional
training facilities and naval air bases.
To satisfy the need for air bases and bases for submarines and surface
vessels, a board of naval officers, headed by Hear Adoiral A. J, Hepburn*
was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy in Hay 1938 to recommend the
number of additional bases that would be required and suitable locations.
In its report in December 1933 the Hepburn Board included recommendations
for air bases on Guam, tfake and Midway Islands. Guam was felt to be of
great strategic value as a major advanced flight base. It was felt that
its location in the midst of Japan* s mandated islands could neutralise the
78
defense value of these bases which were believed to be heavily fortified.
Congress eventually met some of the recommendations for Pacific bases and
for bases within the United States, but refused to fortify Quern, in part
79because of fear of offending Japan. Actually Japan had only token defenses
on most of the mandates prior to 1939 and undertook strengthening of these
76. Greer. Th^ Development of Air Doctrine, p. 102.
77. Archiband D. Tvnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States
Naval Aviation (Hew Havent Tmle University Press, 19W* pp. 30O~301.
76. ruleja, statesmen and Admirals , pp. 179-480.
??• Ibid., p. 180| 0. J. Roweliff.'Guam," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings
. Vol. 71. So. 507 (Jaty* W5). p. 769.
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islands including the deployment of air unit* there in large part
80
because of American rearmament.
Accelerated expansion of American airpower was to come after the
Munich Conforeneo of 1933 which seems to have convinced President Roosevelt
that air power would plan a dominant role in any upcoming conflict in which
31
the United Jtates might bo involved. As a result Roosevelt in early
1939 called the Army Air Corps "utterly inadequate* for American defense
needs and urged that the Army air arm be increased to include at least
6,000 aircraft. Congress responded and passed on April 3» 1939 an emer-
gency air defense bill authorising the procurement of 3*251 aircraft, to
bring total air strength to 5*500 aircraft, and appropriated ?300 million
for this* an amount about one-half the total aircraft appropriations of the
32
preceding 14 fiscal years.
A re-examination of the role Army aircraft should play in hemispheric
defense was started by the Army Air Board as a result of this positive
recognition of the potentialities of air power. It recommended that the
Air Corps with long-range bombers should play a major role in guarding the
approaches to the Western Hemisphere in keeping with the recent expansion
of American strategic policy toward defense of this entire area. This
report was approved by the new Chief of Staff. General George C. Marshall*
who concluded that it gave "for the first time a specific mission for the
Air Corps." ^
Actually the Air Corps had anticipated this recognition and expansion
60. Thomas tfilda, "How Japan Fortified the Mandated Islands," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 81 (April, 1955)* 9P* 400-404.
91. Goldberg. A History of the Onited 3tates Air Force , p. 43.
82. Office of Air Force History, The Argy Air gbrces in ^arld W"ar II (Vol, 1,
Plans and iSarly Operations . Lesley ftrank Graven and James tea Cats, eds.,
Chicago! University of Chicago Press, 19**6) * p. 104.
83. Goldberg, A History of the United States Air Force , p. 44.
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before it was finally sanctioned. fy the time appropriations for ca3>an*i©n
were passed the Air Corps had already negotiated many contracts and sianu*
fecturers were prepaying to get production started, Time was important,
for when war erupted in Europe on September 1, 1939 the Army Air Corps had
only 800 first line combat planes and these were qualitatively inferior to
most foreign eombst aircraft. There were only 23 S-17*s in service, and of
all the aircraft in stock in 1939* only the 3-17 was to fly as a first-line
aircraft after Pearl Harbor.
the Air Corps had been anticipating the new mission assigned them for
years, and the official recognition of the need for acre long-range bombers
and overseas bases sorely put the stamp of approval on a shift in doctrinal
thinking that had already taken place. This was no panacea though, for
excessive emphasis on the bomber led to continued neglect of pursuit aviation.
There were many causes for this neglect which had started in the early
1930* s, but perhaps the primary cause was the belief that the United States
would not be attacked by enemy air power* and if it was. the bomber, which air
leaders felt could develop speeds and fire power so great that it did not
need fighter escort, could provide all the air defense needed.
5
This
overemphasis on the long-range bomber was to bring tragic results when
America's obsolete fighter aircraft engaged in combat early in the war.
In 19**0 the resumption of 8aai aggression was to bring forth a demand
for air power that completely dwarfed previous programs. In &ay 19^0
Roosevelt called on Congress to provide authorisation for a total strength
of 30,000 aircraft for the Army and Navy which he hoped would be backed by
fr. Goldberg, A History of the United States Air Pores , pp. #ju45.
85. Greer, The acvelopaont of Air Doctrine . o. 33.

the ability of American aircraft industries to produce that number a
year. To a nation whose military strength in April 19W was less than
4.00-.) aircraft, few of which were modern, and whose capacity for aircraft
production was less than 5»®90 pw year* this was recognition of air power
with a vengeance. The United States had the potential to meet these
demands and subsequent authorisations, but it was preparing for possible
conflict against nations that had long been on a war footing. What was
need*!*** tl*ae, and this Congress could not grant.
.iearmament was paralleled by other steps which if not designed to
deter Japanese aggression at least would hopefully hinder her
progress. Too many of these steps were void of forceful meaning and
action • yet others, especially economic restrictions perhaps had some
bite. A moral embargo was placed on the export of American aircraft and
aircraft equipment in mid-1939 • and this was followed i^r other measures
including abrogation of the Japanese-American oosnercial treaty in July
1939 which In early 19J*0 left the United States free to employ economic
sanctions. & 1940 the United States had also repealed the arm embargo
section of the Neutrality Laws and this in conjunction with other pre-
parations opened the path away from isolation and strict neutrality.
let regardless of the merits of the measures short of war, the
problem at the end of 19**0 was one of time, as neither nation was willing
to change its fundamental policy. As the united states was trying to
overcome the great problems of balanced preparations and to stall Japan's
southward movement by carefully avoiding provocative action, Japan was
&. United States, Department of State, Feace and Wan United States
Foreign irollcy 1931-19M (Washington, 19*3) t p. 530.
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anxiously working for completion of a "favorable development, of the
situation at hone and abroad." In both nations air power had become an
Important determinant of what would happen* for as Japan started military
plans for her move southward and as the United States pushed forward plans
for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, air power became a keystone in
planning. Hr the end of 19^0 the factors of air power that would influence
events of the next year had been generally determined. Japanese air power
was approaching peak efficiency v while the United States was embarked on a
crash air expansion program which remained unable to provide to overseas
bases air contingents adequate for fulfillment of their mission* And sadly
it would not be possible to bring these up to strength without seriously
hampering expansion and training at home,
xldqusi i94i am asrcsaAL coaaasiois
flihile 1941 is a year of importance and significance in any study of
air power * it is to receive only brief mention in this preliminary study.
Details are abundant and the story of air power in the Pacific in the days
before Pearl Harbor is interesting and exciting, but the fact remains that
the crucial years of air power were those before 1941. The development of
aviation technology, an aircraft industry, a training program for aircrews,
an air doctrine, and the Implementation of defense plans all require con-
siderable time even in periods of emergency. There can be modifications
and acceleration and specific air orders of battle can change in a short
span of time, but the outcome of events of a given jB9.r are more likely to
have been determined by basic decisions made years before.
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la the oase of Japan * major reason she elected to go to w in 19*1
was her belief that she had air superiority in both numbers of aircraft, and
quality of pilots and aircraft in 19*1. This evaluation was oorreot in
19*1. but Japan also recognised her limited war potential and realised that
her advantage in air power would decrease as American air power responded
to rearmament programs of 1939 and 19<*0. Japan's move south was to be the
culmination of a traditional national policy and a goal that had been stated
as early as 1936 and amplified in 19*K>. The air power that was to play a
major role in her plans for war was the product of years of growth and
maximum expansion of air power since 1937,
The decision to attack the Philippines and Pearl Harbor were made in
19*1
•
and they were not radical innovations, but logical consequences of
war planning that had stressed surprise, the need for quick and decisive
victories and annihilation of American naval, military and air strength in
the Pacific. Again general decisions predate the specific decision of 19*1,
On the American side there took place a series of events in late 19*1
that might have changed the view presented here that the role of air power
would play had been determined before 19*1. In 19*1 the United States
began having second thoughts about leaving the Philippines weakly defended.
By the end of the summer with the aermans occupied with Russia and Japan
expanding slowly southward, the United States moved toward a more hardened
resistance to Japan. One manifestation of this was a decision not only to
reinforce the Philippines so that they could be defended in tne event of
war, but to provide long-range bombers as a deterrent to Japanese aggression.
&V. Hattori, "Complete History,* pp. 260-261, 263, 278.
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and for offensive strikes against Japanese forces and installations
within the tactical operating radios of the bombers In the event of war.
Reinforcement of the Philippines was given top priority, and by November
all modernised B~17»a and all B-24«s in the United States as well as some
3*17* s from Hawaii were to be sent there. But the decision was made too
late. On December 3, 1941 on*y 35 B-17't of a scheduled complement of
165 had arrived. The same was true of the pursuit aircraft destined to
bolster air defenses with only 107 of a scheduled 240 In the Philippines
in early December. American assumptions that hostilities with Japan
would be avoided until March and April of 1942 were four months off the
58
mark. Again it was tine that was needed to alter decisions of preceding
years.
Ko attempt will be made here to present a summary of material pre-
sented in the preceding pages, nor will an attempt be made to analyse air
power in the Pacific in terms of its use in World mar II. However a few
general observations are in order.
i. A dear definition of national policy with strategic planning
based on this definition and backed by willingness of a nation to support
such a policy are vital ingredients for the successful development of
modern systems of warfare such as military aviation, which are in the end
only instruments of national policy. The United States for over 40 years
maintained a Far Sastern policy that it was unwilling to back with the
force necessary for making it a viable policy until it was too late. The
only policy that was willingly backed was that of defense of America only,
TO Craven and Cate, Plans and Sarly Operations . pp t 17&-i93f
Morton, Strategy and Command , op. 96-101.
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and this, coupled with the prevailing view that America was safe in her
geographical isolation as long as she did not get involved in events not
of her own chosing, was not conducive to the development of air power.
Japanese national policy • on the other hand, was acre favorable to
air power development, and although her war planning was vague and incom-
plete, the strategic premise was clear. It was a policy that envisaged
more than defense of the shoreline of the Japanese Islands, and air power
was seen to be a helpful means to achievement of national goals.
2. The fact that American air power was able to acquire the founda-
tion for expansion that was to turn early defeat into victory in the
Pacific is testimony to those who saw beyond the confines of a narrow
defense-only policy and were able to lay the technological and doctrinal
groundwork which was available when America finally awoke to the necessity
of strong air power. An excess of theory was about the only item United
States air power had in abundance* It was this bank of theory, which
went beyond accepted doctrines of air power, that in combination with
America's vast air potential, helped pave the way to victory.
3. Military air power was a factor of great importance in the
events leading to Pearl Harbor. The fact that it was carrier air power
seeking primarily to destroy carrier air power that opened hostilities
between the United States and Japan would alone make air power important,
let for years before this Japan had made the airplane a vital part of its
military machine, and from the mid-1930' s onward Japan recognised that
command of the air was as important as command of the land and sea below.
Japan watched the air power of other Pacific powers with care. Parity
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with the United States In air power was an Important goal of the
Japanese Navy, and when it appeared that American rearmaments might
eventually challenge Japanese air superiority in the Far Sast a strong
argument was provided for starting the major southern offensive,
While the United States underestimated the strength of Japanese
air power, it was nonetheless respeoted, and m important factor in
arguments for re-examination of America's position in the Western
Pacific, Significantly when the United States attempted to strengthen
Its position in the Philippines in 1941. it was to be air power that
received priority. But the recognition of its importance is only part
of the formula for effective air power. The United States elected to




Hattori, Takushiro, "The Complete Histoid of the Greater £ast Asia War"(qal Ton Sense ^nshi. Tokyo j Kasu Shaba, 1953), <* vols.,
typewritten mB translation, Poc. 73002, Office of Chief of
Military Hist© ^hingtoa? Vol. 1 consulted.
United States, Department of the Army, unpublished studies located in
Office of Chief of Military History, Washington,
— "Air Operations* 1931-19*5? ?!***« and Preparations Against the
rt" (Vol. k, Japanese Studies on Manchoria, typewritten h
undated)
.
— >erations in the China Area, July 1937 - August 19*5"
(8o, ?6, Japanese Studies on World War II, misieographed, undated),
" Japanese Operational Planning Against th« , 1932-1945"
(Vol, 1, Japanese Special Study on Manchuria. Army ^oreea i?ar
8*«t, 1955),
— "Outline of $aval Armaments and Preparations for War"
(Ho. 145, Japanese Studies on World War II, mimeographed, undated
..
«•»- "Outline of Mv&l Armaments and Preparations for War"
(Mo. 149, Japanese Studies on World War II, mimeographed, undated).
— "Outline of Maval Armaments and Preparations for War*1
o. 160, Japanese Studies on World War II. mimeographed, undat*.
— Politioal Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War" (in 5 parts.
Part 1, i*o. 144, Japanese Studies on World War II, 1952).
Published Material
atea, Congress, House of Representatives
, Summary of Past Policy,




— XnvgsUjgation of the Fwl flarbor Attack
.
79th Cong., M seas..
Senate Doc. So. 2^4 ( Washington 19**6).
Univ Jepart-a*nt or iUte, Papers ablating: to tin* /orei&n
lations of the United atatess*"" Jaoan i'^l»i9^i . s' WlVl'
»saington, 19*0).
— i^ttcg and War.» .United itatag foreign foliey 1931-19*H (Washington,
W3)«
United itates. United States strategic Itot&hXm Survey. Pacific War*
Ifttyrwttwi of Japanese Officials. Reports. iSSaT Analysis
'Division , 2 vols. (Washington. *"''
ttnltad States 3tr»fglc ,9oabin£ Survey. Pacific War, Japanese
Air ?ovcr. Ho. 52. Military Analysis division (Washington. 19^*6).




Aircraft Yearbook 1920 (uav lorki Doubleday, Pago and Company, 1920).
Aircraft Yearbook 1921 (Boston: &saU, Maynard and Company, 1921).
Aircraft Toarbook 1922 (&ew ibrki Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce,
1322).
Aircraft yearbook 193fr (Sew Torkj Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce,
i9#0
Arpee, Sdward, From Frigates to Flat-tooa (Chicago* Jidward Arpee,
1953) .
8eckman, 3eorga xiernifeation of China and Japan (Mow York?
>rp«r and Eow, 1962).

ttonis, Samuel ?lagg, A Diolmatlo History of the Unite*
(*th ed. , Mew York': Holt, Rinehart and! Winston, 1963).
^so.n, f. A., American policy in the Far 3>st 1931-19**0 (Sew York:
Institute of Pacific delations, 191*0),
St Dorothy, The United States and the gar tiaetern Crisis of 193^-
33 (From the Hanohurian Incident Through the Initial Stage of
the Undeclared 3irK>-Jaoanese tfar) (CaiabridKet Harvard
University Press, 1964).
Caldwell, Cy, Air Power and Total War (New Yorkj Caward-ftcCann, Inc.,
*
.
" * MM 1'IWXI —II II I *
19*3).
Cole* Wayne ,>., Senator Gerald r . .iye and American Foreiiro delations
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962).
Davis, Colonel W. Jefferson, Japan. The Air Menace of the Pacific
atom The Christopher Publishing House, 192^).
DeSeversky, Alexander P., Victory Through Air Power (JJew York» vision
and Schuster, 19^2).
DnaHiond, 0. F. , The Passing of American Neutrality 1937-19^1 (Ann Arbor
t
University of M ichigan Press , 1955)
.
Same, iSugene K., ed. f The Impact of Air ; :o*»n National >acurlty and
>torld Polities (Princeton* 0. Van Mostraas Company, Inc., 1959).
Falrbank, John X., Reisehauer, Sdwin 0. and Albert K. Craig, $ast Asia
.
* Kodera transformation (Bostons Ivsughton Mifflin Company,
1965).
Fairbank, John K. , The United States and China (Cambridge: Harvard
versity Press, 195%).
Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor (;--rinoetom Princeton
University Press, 1950).
Ferrell, Robert »nry L. Stlnson," Tho American Secretaries of
of .itatv» ana *a
Publishers, Inc
s d Their Diplomacy (Vol. 11, Sew Yorkj Cooper vkjuare
.
19*3).
Fuchida, tfltsuo and Masatake Okumiya, Midway} fhe Battle That Doomed
Japan (Anapollst United States tiaval Institute, 1955)
»
Furniss, Jdgar A., Jr., ed. , Awerioan Military policy (Sew Torki
->eh*rt and Coraoany, 1957).
^*
Alfred, «d., A .K&ftwry of the United States Mr Force
I i iikium iu li ii i i n H i mum ii n in n m n . n mm « mm m i »„*,„. *, 1Til n n iijg;
1907-.195? (Princeton: D. Van Jlostrand Company, Inc., 1957)
•
Goss, Hilton P., iviUan florals Under Aerial ao&bard»«nt (Air
verelty Documentary Research Study, Montgomery Alabama?
<e search Studies Xnstitute, Air University, 19^8).
Qr+*ni /illlea and John Pricker, i'ha /ijr Forces af the 4orld
m York: Hanover House, 19$).
Greer, fhomas H., the j>evslop»ent of Air Doctrine in the Army Air
Arms 1917-1*51 (United States Air force Historical Study,
no. 89, tfontgoraery, Alabama: United States Air Force Historical
vision. Air University, 1955)»
Griswold, itney, Fha Far jgas.tsrn, rollo? of the United states
(Hew Haven: Tale University Press, 1962 }'•
%shi, 3afouro, &o&un: lite Japanese Almy in the Pacific Vfar
uantieo, Virginia: The Marine Corps Association, 1959)*
Hinton, Harold, air /ictor;/: fhe Hen and tfrs Hachlnss (New Xork:
Harper brothers , 1 9^3 J
.
Hsu, 3hushi, :pnduot of the Japanese ( Shanghai i Kelly and
dsh, Ltd,, 1933).
as fear -iook (1?1*M925# 9 vols,, Tokyo: Japan leer ciook office,
191^1925).
Ksse, ?oshika*u. Journey to the Missouri (Kew Haven: Tale University
ess, 1950).
Kenned; . »e Aspects of Japan and Her .;»fense Forces (London:
K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and C&xp&vw, Ltd., 1923).
flng, Fleet Admiral Tamest J. and Walter hitehill, Fleet Admiral King
(#ew fork: tortoa and Company, Inc. , 1952).
~
Kiralfy, Alexander, Victory in the Pacific: nou *% «ust defeat Japan
ew York: the John Day Company, 19^2).
Lander, William L. and Sverett 3, Sleeson, The Challenge to Isolation
nr fork: Harper Brothers, 195
Loe, Asher, Air Power (London: Duckworth, 1955).
•*
>SJ
*«^» **"^*» &*-Jy Pl»na To gin. KUaoo K. awn. tram,
.
(itovtont LitUa, 8mra and Gowpany, 1942).
^Tllf^rfrfJ ****?* of United SUtH i*aval Qoarations in
Ayq. iyte t doatoni Littia, 3ro*n and Ompu^T 1955)/
Morton. Louis, gnitad Statss 4r*y in &>rld Way n ffl« Way in the Paclfl* .
Ils\or^^7^^*"* Ushingtom «<qf ghiif of mitoly
"jjffi?!*
-StoUt Amy fo World utor II. fho war in th*> P^ifin. .^ratagy
gltobo, Inaao. ed<# *»atara Inflaancos in Modarn Japan (Chicago*DniwoMy of Chicago ProssTi^i}/ ' L~sa2S ^n C*« '
°ffiC
pi!L^^r? Hn*ta3T: tha Amy Air forca* in ttrtd ito tt (m , ltP^ms and #arly ypsratlpna, Itfaalay Frank Cww' anTjaaaa loo Cat*/
ad*.
.
Chicago, University of Chicago Proas, 19&3).
Potter, John Dean*, Xmrno^ (i*ev York, ?h« Viking Press, 1965).
J&gfejg <**«* *<«*» Harold final. LtdV. i92oTT "~
Sherrod, *obort v History of Marina Con>s Action in **ia ^rMhlngtom Combat Force* Frees, 19^2). ' —*-^^
T^
.^
Shigealtsu, MMon. Japan and Her Dest^nr (London, Hutohlnaon and
uxapany, 195©)
«
Sprout. Harold and Margaret Vpront. toward A flow Order of ;i— p^
(Princeton* Princeton University Prow, igto). *****
3tla
^36)^ L ' • .m«,/y Jtoi^yii Crisiq (Staw torki Harper fathers,
Stimsen. Hanry L. and KeJaorga 3uady. Qn Artin Samoa in Paacs and
,
.
r (New Torkt Sarowr Brothers, 19^),
U|
Tate, Merso, The United states and Arwattonts (Cambridge* Harvard
University Press, W8).
Tuleja, Thaddeus V., Statesmen and Admirals (Hew lorki W. W. Norton
*nd Company, Inc. , 19&3)
•
Turnbull, Archibald D. and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States
Naval Aviation (Hew Haveat Yale University Press, 1W).
Van Wyen, A. Q., The Aeronautical Board 1916-1
W
(Washington* United
States Government Printing office, 19*7).
Watson, Mark 3,, United States Amor in ^orld War II . The War Department!
Chief of staffs Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington! Office
of Chief of Military History, 1950).
Wheeler, Gerald £.» Prelude to fearl tiarbor (The United States Navy and
the far jgast 1921-lff3i (Columbia} University of Missouri Press.
19o3).
Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbort^ Warning and Decision (Stanford}
Stanford University Press, i9o2).
Articles
Bruno, Lester H. , "Foreign Policy and the Air Power Dispute, 1919~1932,"
J&storien, Vol. 23, Sfo. 4 (August, 1961).
Field Jaaes A., Jr., "Admiral Tamanoto," United States Haval Institute
Proceedings . Vol. 75 (October, i9W.~
jCiralfy, Alexander, "Watch Japanese Air Power," Foreign Affairs ,
Vol. 23 (October, 19^).
Lincoln, Ashbrook, "The United States navy and the also of the Doctrine
of Air Power," Military Affairs . Vol. 15 (Fall. 1951).
Hauer, Hauer, "A Delicate Missions Aerial Heeonnalsance of the
Japanese Islands Before World War II," Military Affairs .
(Suwaer, 1962).
Morton, Louis, "Pearl Harbor in Perspective, A Bibliographic 3wmy"
United States Maval Institute Proceedings (April, 1955).
"War Plan Orange," World Politics . Vol. 11 (January, 1959).
ei
iST
Sowellff, 0. J., "Ottera," United States flairs! Institute Proceedings ,
Vol. 71. So. 507 (July, 1W).
Shiaada, Xoichi, "Japanese Naval Air Operations in the Philippines
Invetion," United SUtag Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 81,
Ho. 1, (January, 1955).
Wilds, Thomas, "How Jaoan Fortified the Mandated Islands," United States














Air power and the Far Eastern
policies o
3 2768 002 13072 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
